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Abstract 
This thesis studies the effects of various dimensions of the public sector on 
economic performance in China, including economic growth, innovation, labour 
mobility and the internal core–periphery pattern. It adopts mixed theoretical 
perspectives and empirics and uses prefecture city–level panel datasets. The aim is to 
contribute to empirical analysis of regional development experiences in 
prefecture-level cities. 
Chapter 1 provides an introduction of the research objectives and questions, and 
discusses which indicators of economic performance form our main interest and how 
these are influenced by government policy. Against the backdrop of China’s transition 
from rapid gross domestic product growth to sustainable development, Chapter 2 (the 
first empirical study) explores the features that are unique to China’s innovative 
performance, yet are missing from the literature. The study analyses the role of 
government institutions–particularly meritocracy–in shaping innovative development. 
Following this, given that transportation development led by the government is 
an important driver of urban economic performance, Chapter 3 explores the effects of 
various modes of transportation infrastructure on economic growth in prefecture cities. 
The results indicate that both inter-city infrastructure (highways and railways) and 
intra-city public transit play significantly positive roles in the economic growth of 
these cities. The western region benefits mostly from improvement in transport 
infrastructures, while the effects of transportation construction on economic growth 
are least pronounced in the central China. As a result of the confirmed significant 
effect of railways in Chapter 3 and the progress of concomitant technology, this study 
deduces that China’s development of high-speed railway (HSR) continuously 
reshapes the city landscape and generates significant effects on the distribution of 
economic activities. 
Chapter 4 first provides a detailed overview of the development of China’s HSR 
system in the period 2008 to 2014 regarding connections, frequency and travel time. 
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This chapter then analyses the effect of China’s HSR system on economic activities. 
The results indicate that regional market access is a crucial determinant to explain the 
observed wage differentials between prefecture cities in China. Moreover, the 
counterfactual simulation indicates that the expansion of HSR networks would 
strengthen core–periphery patterns for China. 
Finally, this thesis concludes with Chapter 5. Main findings, contributions, 
policy implications and further research are summarized in this chapter. Our first 
major contribution comes from the estimation of local leader’s roles in promoting 
innovation using manually collected patent information and profiles of city party 
secretaries. The results provide fresh evidence showing heterogeneous impacts of the 
cadre governance features on city innovative performance and have rich implications 
in regard to official appointment and selection mechanism in leading innovative 
development. The second main contribution lies on the use of spatial models to 
understand the economic performances which are not neutral across space, wherein 
we look into different types of transport infrastructure in different types of cities and 
simulate China’s future economic activities based on different scenarios of transport 
cost. 
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Publication 
Chapter 3, “Heterogeneous effects of inter- and intra-city transportation 
infrastructure on economic growth: Evidence from Chinese cities”, co-authored with 
Yang Chen, Nemish Salike and Ming He, is now published in the Cambridge Journal 
of Regions, Economy and Society.1
 
1 Chen et al. (2016) in the Bibliography. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In the wake of China’s remarkable industrial development since the late 1970s, 
the new challenge facing the country is to sustain its economic success, which has 
been historically built on massive investment and led by a series of economic reforms 
(Chow, 1993; Song et al., 2011). As a response to this new challenge, the Chinese 
government has adopted several measures with two main focuses: (i) to build an 
innovation-oriented country,2 which highlights the role of institutions in general and 
government governance in particular (Freeman, 1995; Nelson, 1993), and (ii) to invest 
in various modes of transportation infrastructure, particularly to construct a 
high-speed rail network to improve economic development. In brief, this thesis 
studies the effects of various dimensions of the public sector on economic 
performance, including innovation, economic growth, labour mobility and internal 
economic geographical patterns in China. This question is analysed at the prefecture 
city level under a spatial framework. 
1.1. Two perspectives of the public sector 
1.1.1. Leaders’ personal characteristics and qualities and the bureaucratic 
system 
Lane (2000) discussed the concept of the public sector, which fundamentally 
refers to both the types of public activities undertaken by a set of public institutions 
and the way decisions and policies are made and implemented by these institutions. 
The marked economic growth in China is somehow illustrated as evidence of good 
national leadership (Easterly and Pennings, 2015; Shih et al., 2012). Good leadership 
is attributed to both leaders’ personal characteristics and qualities, and the 
bureaucratic system. China’s subnational personnel structure not only relies on the 
 
2 The national strategy can be found from a government report of the Eighteenth National Congress of the 
Communist Party of China, available at http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2012-12/28/content_2300813.htm (in Chinese). 
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performance and achievement of local leaders, but also depends on the will of the 
superior administrative level. Thus, this study investigates the channels through which 
the characteristics of the city party secretary and the types of bureaucratic incentives 
improve economic performance, particularly regarding innovation. 
1.1.2. Heterogeneous modes of transportation infrastructure 
Given that China’s economic development levels are unevenly distributed, 
transportation plays a vital role in promoting national and regional prosperity. It 
provides easier access to nearby regions and markets, provides more opportunities for 
trade, reduces the cost of production, improves labour productivity and efficiency, and 
accelerates urbanisation (Kustepeli et al., 2012). Thus, to improve economic 
performance, China has devoted much attention to infrastructure investment since its 
new reform process started in the 1980s. 
Figure 1.1a illustrates the alterations in passenger volumes in highway, railway 
and public transit from 1995 to 2012 in various regions of China (vertical comparison 
in each figure). The figures in the bottom row with darker shades indicate the huge 
increase in passenger flows in 2012 compared with 1995. Although the flow increased 
heavily in the eastern part of China, it has also been increasing in inland areas in 
recent years. In particular, the passenger traffic of public transportation in 2012 was 
highly saturated, surpassing 550 million people in most provinces of China (China 
City Statistical Yearbooks, 1996&2013). Figure 1.1b also confirms the rapid 
development of China’s transportation, yet from the perspective of length measured in 
kilometres. It illustrates a sharp rise in railways and highways after the 1990s, which 
is consistent with the volumes of passenger flows (Ministry of Transport of the PRC 
and National Railway Administration of the PRC, 1979-2018). In terms of high-speed 
trains, Figure 1.1c displays the progressive rise of China’s high-speed railway (HSR) 
network over recent years. China constructed and put into service over 19,000 
kilometres of track of HSR over the period 2008 to 2015, which represents the largest 
HSR network in the world (National Railway Administration of the PRC and 
1.1. Two perspectives of the public sector 
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International Union of Railway, 2016). Thus, the effect of the various modes of 
transportation infrastructure is another important factor that needs to be examined. 
 
Figure 1.1a. Changes in passenger traffic volumes by mode of transportation 
 
Figure 1.1b. Length of railways and highways in China 
 
Figure 1.1c. Mileage of high-speed trains across countries at the end of 2015 
 
Source: Data in Figure 1.1a are from China City Statistical Yearbooks (1996, 2013). Data on highways and 
railways in Figure 1.1b were collected from the Ministry of Transport of the People’s Republic of China 
(1979-2018) and National Railway Administration of the People’s Republic of China (1979-2018). Data on the 
HSR were collected from the National Railway Administration of the People’s Republic of China (2016) and 
International Union of Railway (2016).
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In brief, we concentrate on the public sector from two perspectives: bureaucracy 
and transportation infrastructure. In describing economic performance, the 
performance is briefly measured by three representative indicators—innovation, gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth and labour mobility—in a spatial pattern at the 
prefecture city level. 
1.2. Key performance for the Chinese economy 
Economic growth is an important indicator of economic performance. In addition, 
to pursue a path of indigenous innovation and build an innovation-oriented country, 
innovative output is considered a new component of economic performance. Further, 
China’s large variation in population density and mobility of labour at regional and 
city levels appears to produce a highly uneven distribution of economic activities 
across space. This spatial distribution and internal economic geographical pattern can 
be predicted by using a new economic geography model. 
1.2.1. Economic growth 
During the last three decades, China—as one of the youngest contemporary 
economies—has become the second-largest economy in the world. Figure 1.2 displays 
the development of China’s economy, proxied by real GDP and real GDP per capita, 
computed by their nominal values divided by a GDP deflator, since China initiated 
market reforms in 1978. The figure illustrates a sharp convexity in real GDP, as well 
as real GDP per capita, indicating rapid economic growth after roughly 2004. 
Interestingly, the lengths of highways and railways also ascended after 2004, as 
demonstrated in Figure 1.1b. This intrigued us to explore the linkages between 
different modes of transportation and economic development.
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Figure 1.2. China’s economic development 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), 1979-2018. 
1.2.2. Innovative output 
Innovation is the most important engine of economic growth. The growth trend 
of innovative output displayed in Figure 1.3 is consistent with the GDP growth in 
Figure 1.2, thereby to some extent confirming the contribution of innovation to 
economic development. Thus, it is important to consider who or what is able to 
expand innovative capacities to facilitate economic growth. The innovation milieu in 
China is attributable to several driving forces, such as investment in science and 
technology, foreign direct investment and industrial agglomeration (Fu and Gong, 
2011; Ning et al., 2016). However, empirical evidence regarding the effect of China’s 
unique political leadership and governance on innovation remains inconclusive. 
Despite its importance in shaping growth trajectories, we know little about the role of 
bureaucratic incentives in innovation, and the leading cadre system has rarely been 
captured in the production function of knowledge. 
Therefore, this study first confirms the effects of innovative inputs on innovation, 
including domestic and foreign investment, education expenditure and labour force 
with their spatial lags, and agglomeration measured by diversity and specialisation. 
We achieve this by employing a Cobb-Douglas knowledge production function, with 
the empirical result used as a benchmark. Further, we examine the role of bureaucratic 
incentives in shaping innovative development, particularly from the perspective of 
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city leaders’ age, tenure, educational background, perceived promotion pressure, 
previous work experience and factional ties. Examining these specific components of 
government officials could provide answers regarding which characteristics of local 
government officials could stimulate or weaken the capacity for city innovation. 
 
Figure 1.3. Numbers of patent applications and granted patents 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), 1987-2018. 
 
1.2.3. Mobility of labour 
Progress in traffic and transportation technology has important consequences for 
urban development. China’s development of high-speed trains continuously reshapes 
the city landscape and has significant effects on the distribution of economic activities, 
particularly in terms of labour mobility. The last two decades have witnessed an 
alarming increase in China’s volume of migration, increasing nearly five times from 
11.10 million (1985 to 1990) to 54.91 million (2005 to 2010), as displayed in Figure 
1.4. China’s internal clustering pattern will be influenced by the rising shares of 
migrants in the total population. A recently expanding stream of literature analyses the 
effects of railroad construction on a range of outcomes, addressing the consequences 
of establishing HSR systems in China (Wang and Lin, 2011, and Chen and Meng, 
2013); however, little attention has been devoted to analysing the effect of reducing 
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transport costs on labour distribution under the framework of a geographical 
economic model. 
Therefore, after providing a description of the development of the HSR system in 
the period 2008 to 2014 in terms of connections, frequency and travel time, we then 
seek to determine the effect of the HSR on the spatial distribution of regional 
economic activities. In particular, we assess the possible consequences of China’s 
internal economic geographical pattern based on the prediction of labour mobility. 
 
Figure 1.4. China’s migration and migrants’ proportion of the total population 
 
Source: Migration data were attained from Liu et al. (2014) and data on the total population were collected from 
the NBS (1986-2011). The values for shares were computed by the average value of each five-year period’s total 
population. 
 
1.3. Research questions 
Given that we were interested in explaining the puzzle of China’s economic 
performance, we studied three research questions, as follows: 
Research Question 1 (Chapter 2): How did city leaders and their bureaucratic 
incentives affect city innovation across 284 prefectures during the 2001 to 2014 
period? 
Research Question 2 (Chapter 3): What is the effect of inter- and intra-city 
transport infrastructure on a city’s economic development?
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Research Question 3 (Chapter 4): What will happen to China’s economic 
activities and internal economic geographical pattern when transportation is 
improved? 
1.4. Data collection 
This section provides some details on the data collected during this PhD study. A 
significant portion of the researcher’s time, especially during the first two years, was 
devoted to cleaning datasets. Stata and Microsoft Excel are mainly used for data 
manipulation. 
1.4.1. Bureaucracy 
We explored the first research question across 284 prefecture cities during the 
period 2001 to 2014 using a manually collected annual dataset that combined patent 
data, prefecture city economic data and prefectural party committee secretary data. 
Three data sources were used to construct the city-level panel data, where the number 
of patent applications was manually collected from the State Intellectual Property 
Office (SIPO) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The manually collected data 
of bureaucracy was based on the curriculum vitae of prefectural-level party secretaries, 
collected using Chinese Politicians Database3, and double-checked using Baidu Baike. 
I am grateful to Dr Yang Chen for her splendid contribution in data collection of a 
bureaucrat. Finally, the economic data were collected from the China City Statistical 
Yearbooks (various years from 2001 to 2015). 
Figure 1.5 displays various institutional variables regarding party secretaries’ age, 
fractional ties and educational level. The dataset included 1,254 party secretaries at 
the prefecture city level from 2001 to 2014, with the aim of exploring their effect on 
city innovation. First, the distribution of each party secretary’s age showed a clear age 
band, with most aged between 51 and 55 years, followed by a range of 56 to 60. To 
some extent, this indicates a preference for a certain age group in the appointment and 
 
3 It can be found from http://cpc.people.com.cn/gbzl/index.html. 
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selection of cadres. Second, according to the distribution of fractional ties, 
interpersonal relationships seem to be effectively maintained during the period of the 
Communist Youth League, followed by experience in party education. Joining the 
army is less important to the fraction relations of party secretaries. Finally, the high 
proportion of party secretaries with higher educational levels indicates that 
well-educated cadres will be given priority for selection and appointment. 
 
Figure 1.5. Distributions of party secretaries’ bureaucratic data 
 
Note: Data were collected manually from the curriculum vitae of prefectural-level party secretaries using Chinese 
Politicians Database and Baidu Baike. 
 
1.4.2. Transportation infrastructure 
To estimate the influence of transportation infrastructure in China, panel data on 
prefecture cities were collected from various official data sources, including China 
City Statistical Yearbooks, Baidu Baike and the Railway Customer Service Centre of 
China (www.12306.cn). Covering information on 287 prefecture-level cities during 
the period of 1999 to 2014, the first data source was employed to assemble the 
volume of passenger traffic on railways, highways and public transit. Using the last 
three data sources, our study then extended from the physical measures of railways, 
highways and public transit to consider regimes of travel time and frequency of 
regular trains and HSR in China. 
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Figure 1.6 is particularly concerned with the status of development of China’s 
HSR, where the red dots represent provincial capitals and blue dots represent all open 
HSR stations by the end of 2014. One hundred and fourteen prefecture cities have 
established HSR stations, with 306 stations put into service. It can be clearly seen that 
China’s HSR construction is mainly concentrated on the east coast of China, followed 
by relatively densely populated areas in central China. Western areas are covered the 
least. In addition, provincial capitals are given priority in the siting of HSR stations. 
The cities marked on the map refer to the eight major HSR hub cities in China, 
playing a vital role in linking the east, middle and west of China. 
 
Figure 1.6. HSR stations opened during 2008 to 2014 
 
Note: Information on each HSR station was collected from a geographic information system (GIS), Baidu Baike 
and the Railway Customer Service Centre of China (www.12306.cn). 
1.4.3. Stock variables of factors of production 
Stock variables should be applied in the production function; however, this 
information is not published by the NBS. The official statistics report flow series, 
which represent investment figures. Therefore, we constructed the aggregate physical 
capital stocks using the perpetual inventory method of Kohli (1978). For example, the 
growth rate of real fixed asset investment in year t was defined as: 
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𝑔𝑡 =
𝑟𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑡
𝑟𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑡−1
− 1                (1.1) 
 
Thus, the average growth rate over the period of study (2001 to 2014) was computed 
as: 
 
?̅? =
1
14
∑ 𝑔𝑡
2014
2001                (1.2) 
 
The method assumes that rINV grew at the same rate prior to 2001. Thus, the initial 
capital stock in 2000 was estimated by: 
 
𝐾2000 =
𝑟𝐼𝑁𝑉2000
?̅?+𝛿
               (1.3) 
 
where δ (= 9.6%) is the aggregate depreciation rate. This depreciation rate is widely 
used in Chinese studies, as suggested by Zhang et al. (2004). Finally, the capital stock 
in subsequent years could be computed as: 
 
𝐾𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑡−1 + 𝑟𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑡             (1.4) 
 
Similarly, the capital stock for foreign direct investment (FDI) and research and 
development (R&D) could also be calculated with the use of a depreciation rate of 5% 
based on Zhong (2019) and 15% based on Boeing et al. (2016), Hall et al. (2005) and 
Hu and Jefferson (2004). 
Figure 1.7 displays the aggregate stock variables of real fixed asset investment 
per capita, R&D expenditure per capita and FDI per capita from 2001 to 2014. It 
reveals that all three lines illustrate an upwards trend, where the fastest increase was 
domestic capital, especially after 2008. The growth rates of knowledge capital and 
foreign capital were essentially the same.
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1.4.4. Others 
For each chapter, we also collected other data from official sources, such as the 
China City Statistical Yearbooks (such as GDP, employment, employment 
composition by industry, distance of city to the nearest seaport, education, roads, 
population and urban population) and NBS (such as wages, population density, 
unemployment and housing prices). 
Particularly important was the collection of patent application data from the 
China patent office. The raw data were available from their official website—the 
SIPO of the PRC. Information on all patent applications was available from the 
International Patent Classification (IPC) and Locarno Patent Classification (LPC). 
The former consists of two types of patent: invention and utility model. The latter 
focuses on design. Thus, we collected patent applications separately based on the IPC 
and LPC at the prefecture level, and aggregated them as a measure of a city’s 
innovative performance. 
1.5. Review of empirical methodology 
We examined the research questions using different empirical methodologies. 
The endogeneity of production inputs is an important issue to address if the 
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production function framework is adopted. In Chapter 2, reverse causality may exist 
that the innovative output and input variables can be simultaneously determined or an 
innovative city might be more able to conduct R&D and attract investment; therefore, 
we used the two-step system generalised method of moments (S-GMM) estimator of 
Blundell and Bond (1998). The panel structure of the data suggested the use of lags as 
instruments. The instrument was expanded with two external instruments (distance of 
each centre to the nearest six seaports and real average wage) to improve the 
performance of the instrumental variables (IV) estimator. In addition, the performance 
of the S-GMM was compared with ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed effects and 
two-stage least squares (2SLS). 
To explore whether transportation infrastructure is a major propelling force of 
economic growth in Chapter 3, we focused on the linkage between transportation and 
GDP performance. Given the stationarity and cointegration relationship among the 
variables of interest, the level equation could be estimated using bias-correction 
methods, such as fully modified OLS (FMOLS) or dynamic OLS (DOLS) (Phillips 
and Hansen, 1990; Stock and Watson, 1993). In consideration of the short time span 
in our panel data, we preferred the panel FMOLS estimator based on Pedroni (2000). 
Chapter 4 presents an empirical strategy to assess how improving the HSR 
system influences the distribution of economic activities in China. The strategy can be 
divided into three steps. First, the equilibrium wage equation was estimated by the 
nonlinear least squares (NLS) estimator introduced by Hanson (2005) because of the 
nonlinearity of market access. Our approach has some resemblance to the studies of 
Bosker et al. (2012) and Mion (2004). Second, we adopted panel linear least squares 
(OLS) estimation with fixed effects, according to Poncet (2006), to estimate the 
migration dynamics. Finally, we used the key structural parameters estimated by wage 
equation and migration equation, in combination with China’s current situation of 
manufacturing and housing, as inputs to conduct a counterfactual analysis (Bosker et 
al., 2010; Bosker et al., 2012). The combination of two empirical estimations and 
simulation provided more geographical realism to the new economic geography (NEG)
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model, which differs from related geographical economic studies in China (Wang and 
Lin, 2011; Chen and Meng, 2013).
1.6. Conclusion 
Through using various theoretical models and empirical strategies, our analyses 
confirm that the public sector constitutes a key mechanism in the improvement of 
China’s economic performance. The Chinese government has invested substantial 
effort to facilitate economic growth and innovative output, such as expanding railway 
and highway networks and adjusting officials’ appointment and selection. 
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 examines the 
effects of agglomeration and bureaucratic incentives on city innovation using the 
Cobb-Douglas knowledge production function. This production function is also 
applied in Chapter 3 to investigate the effects of various transportation modes on 
cities’ economic growth. Chapter 4 presents the final study regarding China’s HSR 
and economic geography, while Chapter 5 concludes this thesis.
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Chapter 2: Effect of bureaucratic incentives on city innovation 
2.1. Introduction 
It is accepted that the rapid innovation growth in China is partially attributable to 
the agglomeration economy, measured by specialisation and diversity (Driffield, 2004; 
Fu and Gong, 2011; García et al., 2013; Greunz, 2004; Sembenelli and Siotis, 2003). 
However, in most studies investigating influences on city innovation, cities or regions 
are viewed as ‘floating islands in space’ (Fujita and Mori, 2005), with spatial and 
inter-city interdependencies typically neglected. In fact, a city may receive 
inter-regional spillovers from its neighbours. Thus, the theory of NEG offers deeper 
insights into the relationship between cities, instead of treating cities independently 
(Krugman 1991a, 1992, 1993; Krugman and Venables, 1995). This chapter extends 
the previous literature to study the links between agglomeration and city innovation 
via combining knowledge production function with geographical consideration, 
through considering 284 Chinese prefectural cities for the period 2001 to 2014. 
In the large quantity of literature on innovation, researchers have 
overwhelmingly focused on the effects of market forces, and devoted little attention to 
the role of bureaucratic incentives. Empirical results in capitalist countries, especially 
in Western democracies, provide evidence that national leaders play an active role in 
promoting economic growth (Glaeser et al., 2004; Acemoglu et al., 2005). Different 
from Western democracies, 5,000 years of Chinese history shape the unique and 
peculiar Chinese political culture, whereby the appointment power of officials is 
highly concentrated in the Chinese central government. The Chinese hierarchy of 
officials means that subnational leaders face a national institutional situation, whereby 
momentum in local economic development is highly associated with opportunities for 
local leaders’ promotion. As the government pushes for the transformation from the 
traditional economic growth model based on factor accumulation to sustainable 
development based on innovation and productivity, whether and how leaders fulfil 
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their mission is an open question. And as a response the leading cadres in China have 
called for building a national innovation system that incorporates favourable policies, 
innovative infrastructure and entrepreneurship culture since 20004. The proposal and 
development of the national vision and implementation strategy by the ruling elites 
highlights the important role of Chinese leaders in driving innovation. 
In this regard, the characteristics of subnational political leadership and patterns 
of local official promotion are inextricably linked to local innovative performance. 
China is a textbook case that offers an opportunity to analyse the way a city leader 
affects city innovation. Studies on the effects of local officials’ actions on regional 
economic activities have begun to be conducted in response to an increasing trend of 
decentralisation of authority (Gu and Shen, 2012; Liu et al., 2012; Xu et al., 2007; 
Zhang, 2010). Nevertheless, the existing research focuses on the way that local 
leaders affect economic growth and whether subnational officials explain 
innovativeness provincially or regionally, yet none have the same focus as our study. 
In this chapter, we study how local party secretaries affected city innovation 
across 284 prefectures during 2001 to 2014 by using a dataset combining patent data, 
prefecture city economic data and prefectural party committee secretary data. Before 
undertaking this, we first attempt to explore the way that agglomeration (measured by 
diversity and specialisation) affects innovation, and this empirical result is used as a 
benchmark. We achieve this by employing the Cobb-Douglas knowledge production 
function. More importantly, we examine how industrial agglomerative forces, such as 
diversity and specialization and, joint with institutional elements to determine the city 
innovative capacities. We consider the characteristics of party leaders in each city to 
explore the role of city leaders and their political incentives in promoting city 
innovation from the perspective of the city leaders’ age, tenure, educational 
background, perceived promotion pressure, previous work experiences and factional 
ties. Examining these specific components of government officials could provide 
answers to the question of which characteristics of local government officials tend to 
 
4 The national strategy can be found in a government report in the eighteenth National Congress of Communist 
Party of China. 
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stimulate or weaken the capacity of city innovation. If we simply examined the 
correlation between a particular character and innovation, we would be unable to 
attain a complete picture of the role of the local government in affecting city 
innovation. Virtually no scholars have studied this topic from an empirical perspective; 
thus, our results will fill the gap in this field and make up for the deficiencies in the 
existing literature. 
To overcome the potential endogeneity problem, we used the two-step system 
generalised method of moments (GMM) approach within a dynamic production 
function framework. Consistent with the previous literature, we found that R&D, 
investment in physical and human capital, and FDI enhanced cities’ innovative 
outputs, while urban industrial diversity weakened cities’ innovative capacity. 
We also found the following outcomes. First, turnover rate negatively affects city 
innovation. Similarly, perceived promotion competition among city leaders, measured 
by turnover rate, plays a significantly negative role in enhancing innovation in the 
area; however, this negative effect can be moderated by industrial agglomeration. 
Second, a municipal secretary whose previous work is in the same province is more 
likely to promote innovation. Third, education background plays a positive role in 
promoting innovation. Fourth, an official who has experience in the Communist Youth 
League (CYL), army or party education is more likely to promote innovation. Finally, 
with increasing age, a city leader is less motivated to promote innovative activities. 
Our findings provide rich implications for innovation-related policy making to 
stimulate the innovative capacity of Chinese cities. 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 summarises the 
literature on the effects of city innovation from the two aspects of market mechanism 
and government official characteristics. Section 2.3 introduces empirical strategies, 
while Section 2.4 presents detailed descriptions of the data and variables. Section 2.5 
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presents the empirical results, while Section 2.6 presents the conclusions and 
suggestions for further work. 
2.2. Literature review 
Our study contributes to two main strands of the literature—first, to studies on 
the influence of agglomeration and, second, to studies considering the effect of 
government official characteristics and incentives joint with industrial agglomerative 
forces.  
The first topic generally addresses the question of whether an agglomeration 
economy affects city innovation. The growth of cities results from a social division 
that allows highly specialised enterprises and professional talents to easily gather 
together and produce a certain degree of competitiveness. Meanwhile, the diversity of 
the urban population structure, culture and social structure contribute to the formation 
of a diverse urban environment (Jacobs, 1969; Marshall, 1890; Porter, 1990). When 
urban industries agglomerate, specialisation (Marshall-Arrow-Romer externalities) 
and diversity (Jacobs externalities) are used to reveal interactions between firms and 
industries, thereby influencing innovative output and productivity growth. 
Although widely accepted as an important element of city innovation, industrial 
agglomeration still embodies inconclusive outcomes regarding which form is more 
significant. Paci and Usai (2000) analyse the linkages between spatial agglomeration 
(specialisation and diversity), innovation and production activities using a sample of 
85 industrial sectors and 784 Italian local labour systems. They find that both 
diversity and specialisation are key factors explaining innovation significantly and 
positively. Greunz (2004) finds a consistent result, and indicates that specialisation 
and diversity spillovers significantly and positively affect innovation between 153 
European regions across 16 manufacturing sectors. 
In contrast, Feldman and Audretsch (1999) find that specialisation leads to an 
overall descending of innovation efforts, while they suggest the opposite effect if the 
industries are diversified. Similarly, through examining 170 United States (US) cities 
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during 1956 to 1987, Glaeser et al. (1992) provide evidence that urban industrial 
diversity is positively related to regional growth, and that such effects are more 
effective than specialised cities. Using city-level data on South Korean manufacturing 
industries, Lee et al. (2005) also argue that diversity affects productivity significantly 
and positively, while the positive impact of Marshallian specialisation thesis does not 
hold. In a paper focusing on China, Mody and Wang (1997) use data of 23 industrial 
sectors of seven coastal regions from 1985 to 1989, and show that productivity growth 
benefits disproportionately more from a lower level of specialisation, especially for 
light industries. Despite several pieces of research providing evidence of a significant 
and positive effect of diversity on innovation and productivity, other empirical 
research presents some contradictory evidence on it. For instance, by combining a 
unique database with mapping software, Rosenthal and Strange (2003) contend that 
negative diversified externalities exist in US ZIP Code regions. 
Research regarding the effect of local officials’ actions on regional economic 
activities has begun to be conducted, with the increasing trend of decentralisation of 
authority. For example, a recent paper by Liu et al. (2012) analyse land finance from 
the perspective of local officials’ promotion, using a dataset of China’s 257 prefecture 
cities over the period 2003 to 2008. They explore a U-shaped effect of tenure of 
officials on land finance and also conclude that promotion of local officials 
contributes to city land finance, and this spillover effect is relatively larger in western 
China than in the east. In terms of the link between official characteristics and 
economic growth, some researches, such as Xu et al. (2007) and Zhang (2010), 
address the linkage between local officials and economic growth across Chinese 
provinces—from 1978 to 2005 and 1992 to 2007, respectively. However, the former 
focuses on the positive effects of governor transfer, while the latter emphasises the 
contribution of local governors’ entrepreneurial background to regional economic 
development. 
The role of local leaders in determining various economic performances has been 
acknowledged, but few studies attempted to illustrate empirically how cadres and 
bureaucracy affect local innovation. A strand of literature that shares the systematic 
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perspective of innovation that highlights the role of institutions in general and 
government governance in particular (Freeman, 1995; Mitton, 2016), with empirical 
findings at both national and regional level (Rodríguez-Pose and Di Cataldo, 2015; 
Choi et al., 2011). The closest related paper to ours is by Rodríguez-Pose and Di 
Cataldo (2015), who assess how institutions shape innovative performance in the 
Europe. Institutions are measured by control of corruption, rule of law, government 
effectiveness and government accountability. They find that corruption and 
ineffectiveness of government go against innovation in the European Union. In the 
context of China, Gu and Shen (2012) explore city-level variation in the preferences 
and values of local officials using a dataset of the listed enterprises in the Small and 
Medium Enterprises Board in the Yangtze River Delta and Pearl River Delta during 
2007 to 2009. They find that local leaders with an entrepreneurial background are 
favourable towards improving regional innovation. 
The main indicator of China's bureaucratic incentive system is still the 
performance of GDP, although local competition based only on GDP probably bring 
serious negative consequences in many aspects (Xu, 2017). Hence, given the state's 
efforts in the development of innovation, this is an opportunity to provide some 
evidences for the reasonable improvement of the bureaucratic promotion mechanism 
based on the important role of officials in innovation. Virtually no scholars have 
studied this topic from an empirical perspective; thus, our results will fill the gap in 
this field. 
The literature above only touches the separate linkages between agglomeration 
and innovation and between bureaucrat incentives and innovation; however, China’s 
appointment and selection mechanism may influence city innovative outputs with a 
focus on the industrial agglomeration. For instance, Li (2015) uses labour mobility, 
R&D expenditure and intermediate inputs as institutional variables to examine the 
impact of both specialisation and institutions as important features on regional 
innovation systems. He finds that the positive impact of specialization externalities is 
moderated by regional institutional factors by using Chinese SIC manufacturing 
industries at the provincial-level in 2009. This is similar to us that bridges two 
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separate lines of research by linking agglomeration and government official incentives 
to affect innovation. 
Previous research examining the effects of regional innovation in China does not 
generally consider inter-regional externalities. However, considering that correlation 
exists across space, a city may receive inter-regional spillovers from its neighbours. 
The theory of NEG offers deeper insights into the relationship between cities, instead 
of treating cities independently (Krugman 1991a, 1992, 1993). Based on this, Jaffe et 
al. (1993) create geographically localised knowledge spillovers, and find that spatial 
spillovers reinforce unequal regional development. Similarly, spatial clusters of 
regional innovation are explored via combining knowledge production function with 
geographical consideration by using the US innovation count database (Acs et al., 
2002). The existence of spatial proximity of knowledge is also considered by Fischer 
and Varga (2003) and Goncalves and Almeida (2009). These studies inspire us to 
extend the knowledge production function to the spatial framework, as geographical 
dependence may occur between cities close to each other. Hence, to explain the 
existence of spatial interdependence, we construct spatially lagged variables of 
innovative inputs on the basis of the knowledge production function framework. 
Overall, this study goes beyond the existing related studies by analysing the 
effects of agglomeration and local officials on city innovation, through the use of 
prefecture city data from the perspective of market mechanisms and political 
incentives. 
2.3. Empirical strategy 
2.3.1. Theoretical framework: knowledge production function 
Rodríguez-Pose and Di Cataldo (2015) suggest institution as a factor in growth 
or knowledge production function as it matters for the regional economic trajectories 
(Myrdal, 1957). We adopt an extended knowledge production function with 
externality effects popularized by Griliches (1979) and Griliches (1992). R&D-based 
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knowledge capital was included and lower-case variables were expressed in per capita 
terms, given by: 
 
𝑝𝑎𝑡 = Z 𝑘𝛽?̅??̅?𝑒𝜀               (2.1) 
 
where pat stands for a city’s innovative output, measured by the number of patent 
applications; k denotes all productive inputs, including knowledge capital (stock of 
R&D investment), domestic capital (domestic investment), foreign capital (FDI) and 
human capital (education); ?̅?  represents the spatial spillovers of four inputs of 
production in the neighbouring cities; ε is the disturbance term; 𝛽 and ?̅? are two 
vectors of elasticities of production inputs; Z is an aggregate index of all other factors 
affecting the patent production function, where 𝑍 =  𝑍0 𝑒
𝑎𝐼𝐴𝑏 ; and 𝑍0  is the 
exogenous parameter associated with total factor productivity, combining city and 
time fixed effects that capture individual heterogeneity across cities. Of particular 
interest is the variable represented by 𝐼, referring to local officials’ characteristics and 
political incentives. We also accounted for the effect of agglomeration comprising 
indices of specialisation and diversity, grouped in vector 𝐴. 
Given that neither the China City Statistical Yearbook nor the NBS release data 
on capital stock, the measure of physical and knowledge capital stocks was 
constructed with Kohli’s (1978) perpetual inventory method, using data on real R&D 
expenditure and the number of patents, with a 15% depreciation rate, as well as real 
fixed assets investment and real foreign investment, with 9.6% and 5% depreciation 
rates, respectively (see Section 1.4.3 for the construction of capital stocks). 
Taking the logarithms on both sides of Equation (2.1) provides our estimation 
equation: 
 
𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝑋′𝑖𝑡𝛣 + 𝐼′𝑖𝑡𝑎 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡              (2.2) 
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where 𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡 is the log-linearised per capita patent applications; subscript 𝑖 and 𝑡 
refer to city and time, respectively; vector 𝐼′𝑖𝑡 denotes local officials’ characteristics 
and political incentives; vector 𝑋′𝑖𝑡 gathers all variables from 𝑘, ?̅? and 𝐴; γt is 
time fixed effects; μi denotes city fixed effects; and εit is the error term. 
In summary, four alternative empirical models are proposed and fit a dynamic 
panel data model. The baseline model is as follows: 
 
Model 1: 
𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛ℎ𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽5𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑙𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                      (2.3) 
 
where 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 is the lagged dependent variable that fits the dynamic model; 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑡 
and 𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑡 are the domestic physical capital per capita and foreign physical capital, 
respectively; 𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡  is knowledge capital per capita; ℎ𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡  is human capital per 
capita; and agglomeration variables, 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑖𝑡  and 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡 , denote the indices of 
specialisation and diversity, respectively. 
With consideration of the characteristics of city leaders and their political 
incentives, we have the second model: 
 
Model 2: 
𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛ℎ𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽5𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑙𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝐼′𝑖𝑡𝑎 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                     (2.4) 
 
where vector 𝐼′𝑖𝑡  includes party secretaries’ age, tenure, perceived promotion 
pressure, factional ties, previous working situation and educational background. With 
the inclusion of the spatially lagged variables, we can also derive Models 3 and 4 
from Models 1 and 2, respectively: 
 
Model 3: 
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𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛ℎ𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽5𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑙𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡+𝛽7𝑊𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑊𝑙𝑛𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑊𝑙𝑛ℎ𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑊𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑡 +
𝛾𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                         (2.5) 
 
where W represents the spatial lags of productive inputs. 
 
Model 4:  
𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛ℎ𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽5𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑙𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡+𝛽7𝑊𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑊𝑙𝑛𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑊𝑙𝑛ℎ𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑊𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑡 +
𝐼′𝑖𝑡𝑎 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                       (2.6) 
 
2.3.2. Empirical methodologies 
The estimation is biased and less efficient if the classical linear estimators of 
OLS and fixed-effects model are used, as a result of the existence of a potential 
endogenous problem. Therefore, we preferred fixed-effects instrumental variables 
estimation (2SLS) and linear GMM estimator. According to the result of the test of 
over-identifying restrictions,5 weak instruments arose, leading to the bias of the 2SLS 
estimator. In addition, as discussed by Roodman (2009), GMM is generally more 
efficient than 2SLS because of the complication with its sophisticated reweighting 
moments. More importantly, endogeneity of the production inputs is an important 
issue to address since innovation output and input variables can be simultaneously 
determined or an innovative city might be more able to conduct R&D, and attract 
investment. To address such concerns as omitted variable bias and reverse causality, 
we use instrumental variable estimator especially designed for short dynamic panels 
(Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
The competitive advantages of the GMM estimator make it popular for dealing 
with the empirical issues of panel data, as the GMM estimator is particularly designed 
 
5 The result rejected the null hypothesis that all instrumental variables were exogenous, as the p-value was less 
than 0.1. 
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for a linear relationship in panels with small T and large N, in which explanatory 
variables are not strictly exogenous and the dependent variable is dynamic and 
influenced by its own past realisations. Additionally, the fixed individual effects are 
contained and are heteroskedastic and auto-correlated within, yet not across, 
individuals. Then the general model is as follows: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  α𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑉𝑖𝑡
′𝜑 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡           𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑁;   𝑡 = 1,… , 𝑇 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡               (2.7) 
 
where 𝑉𝑖𝑡
′  includes a vector of strictly exogenous covariates that depends on neither 
current nor past 𝑣𝑖𝑡  and a vector of endogenous covariates that is potentially 
associated with past and present errors; 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 is the lag of y that is potentially 
correlated with past errors; α and β are estimated parameters and 
E(μi) = E(vit) = E(μivit) = 0; 𝜇𝑖 are unobserved individual-level effects; and 𝑣𝑖𝑡  are 
the observed specific errors. 
The Arellano–Bond estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991) transforms all 
regressors by differencing and using the GMM without the two-step standard error 
correction. It is known as ‘difference GMM’. The Arellano–Bover/Blundell–Bond 
estimator, augmented by Arellano and Bover (1995) and developed by Blundell and 
Bond (1998), allows consideration of more instruments because of an additional 
assumption of no correlation between the first differences of instrument variables and 
the fixed effects. It establishes a system of two equations—the original one and the 
transformed one—thereby dramatically improving efficiency. It is called ‘system 
GMM’. According to evidence suggested by Windmeijer (2005), two-step GMM 
produces lower bias and corrected standard errors, and is superior to one-step GMM 
in estimating coefficients. 
To summarise, the two-step S-GMM estimator is used to investigate the effects 
of agglomeration and bureaucratic incentives on city innovation.
2.4. Data and variable description 
34 
 
2.4. Data and variable description 
2.4.1. Data sources 
The data used in this study were compiled from three datasets: (i) the SIPO of 
the PRC, (ii) China City Statistical Yearbook and (iii) Database on Prefectural Party 
Secretary of the PRC. 
The SIPO is affiliated directly with the State Council, which is mainly engaged 
in patent work and coordination of foreign-related intellectual property matters. This 
database covers all announced and published China patent information from 
10 September 1985, consisting of three basic types of patent: invention, utility model 
and design. The patent data were constructed at a unique city level and collected 
manually from SIPO for the period 2001 to 2014. The data were collected using 
‘advanced search’ from the official website of the SIPO.6 The time period was limited 
by the availability of city patent statistics and other required variables. Of the 287 
prefecture cities, 284 were included in this dataset. The IPC includes two types of 
patent: invention and utility model. The design is part of the LPC, rather than the IPC. 
The total number of application patents summed by the applications of the invention, 
utility model and design were used as the dependent variable. 
China City Statistical Yearbooks were used to collect the Chinese urban 
characteristics data, including cities from 22 provinces, four municipalities and four 
autonomous regions7 during 2001 to 2014. This dataset included city characteristics, 
such as expenditure for R&D, GDP, investment in fixed assets, FDI, population 
density, human capital and employment of 19 industrial sectors. In particular, data on 
19 industrial sectors’ employment were used to calculate the industrial agglomeration. 
 
6 We selected each type of patent and filled in the application date and application address in the form of province 
and city, and then searched the website. 
7 The four municipalities were Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing. The four autonomous regions were 
Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Ningxia and Xinjiang. Cities in Tibet were excluded from this dataset because of 
insufficient statistical information. In addition, Hong Kong and Macau were not included because of the different 
administrative systems. 
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Following information on local officials’ curriculum vitae, a dataset of politician 
profiles was manually collected from the Database on Prefectural Party Secretary of 
the PRC and Baidu Database, which were representative of all secretaries of 
municipal committees in each city from 2001 to 2014.8  Our final profile data 
contained information on 1,254 city party secretaries, including their tenure; age; 
experience in the CYL, party or army; education background, degree of promoting 
competition; and working experience. 
2.4.2. Variables used in the estimation 
Table 2.1 illustrates some summary statistics of all variables used in this study. 
Table 2.1. Description and summary of variables 
Variables and descriptions Classification Obs. Mean Std dev. 
Innovation: Number of patent applications in unit/total population Dependent variable 3,946 ˗0.009 1.826 
FDI: Actually utilized foreign capital/total population Innovative inputs 3,844 ˗1.334 1.864 
R&D: Expenditure for R&D in million yuan/total population 3,965 2.464 1.858 
Education: Student enrolment in high schools in 10,000 person/total population 3,815 4.230 1.190 
Capital investment: Investment in fixed assets in million yuan/total population 3,965 -0.707 0.495 
FDI (spillover): Constructed by spatial lag of log of FDI Spillover effects 3,780 0.414 0.980 
R&D (spillover): Constructed by spatial lag of log of R&D  3,827 3.322 1.636 
Education (spillover): Constructed by spatial lag of log of education  3,750 4.249 0.395 
Capital (spillover): Constructed by spatial lag of log of physical capital  3,836 5.601 1.036 
Distance of cities to the nearest six largest Chinese seaports in meters External 
instruments 
3,864 13.262 0.810 
Real average wage 3,899 9.863 0.591 
Specialisation index: Calculated by 19 industrial sectors’ employment Agglomeration 3,948 ˗0.800 0.393 
Diversity index: Calculated by 19 industrial sectors using Herfindahl index 3,948 1.278 0.784 
Party education = 1 if having experience in party education Factional ties 3,842 0.571 0.495 
Experience in CYL = 1 if having experience in CYL 3,867 0.254 0.435 
Join army = 1 if joining army 3,897 0.084 0.277 
College degree = 1 if graduated from college Education 
background 
3,875 0.050 0.218 
Undergraduate degree = 1 if graduated with bachelor degree  3,875 0.226 0.418 
Postgraduate degree = 1 if graduated with master’s degree 3,875 0.553 0.497 
Turnover rate = 1 if official is changed Perceived pressure 3,971 0.268 0.443 
Tenure of city leaders: Different between the first half year and second half year 3,132 2.660 1.700 
Competition intensity of leaders: Calculated by turnover rate 3,976 0.380 0.435 
Age: Age of secretary Individual feature 3,918 52.151 3.945 
Workplace = 1 if previous job is in same province as current job Workplace 3,878 0.984 0.126 
Dependent variable 
We employed domestic patent applications per capita to measure city innovation. 
The reason we used patent application date, rather than publication date, was because 
 
8 The name lists of secretaries were collected from http://www.hotelaah.com/liren/index.html. Based on the name 
lists, the characteristics of secretaries were then researched and collected from the Database on Prefectural Party 
Secretary of the PRC and Baidu Database. 
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patent application considers innovative effort, which can mirror spillover effects more 
effectively than granted patents, and subsequently avoid underestimation of city 
innovative activities and capacities (Li, 2011; Ning et al., 2016; Usai, 2011). 
Several previous studies argued that new product sales can be a more suitable 
indicator than patent data to reflect innovation activities, given that not all innovations 
are successfully granted as patents (Griliches, 1991). However, in the context of 
China, the sales of new products are often over-recorded by firms to reap more 
subsidies from the local government, thereby leading to an overestimation of city 
innovation. In contrast, the applications of a patent are based on a standardised 
procedure across the whole of China (Wang and Zhou, 2013). Besides, new product 
sales are more inclined to evaluate the technological-economic value, while patents 
reflect more the generation and improvement of technologies (Huang et al., 2012). 
Thus, we preferred a patent-based variable, which was relatively more accurate and 
more suitable than the use of new product sales. 
Explanatory variables 
From the perspective of the knowledge production function, physical, knowledge 
and human capital should be included first, which particularly consist of R&D 
expenditure per capita, human capital per capita, FDI per capita and capital 
investment per capita. We included inwards FDI because new technology is usually 
associated with new foreign capital investment (Driffield and Love, 2007; Sembenelli 
and Siotis, 2003). We expected that increased R&D expenditure, FDI, capital 
investment and an educated workforce were likely to promote local innovative 
capacity. 
Knowledge spillovers and innovation are often embedded in industrial 
agglomeration to improve the efficiency of the study suggested by Griliches (1991); 
thus, we considered two typical industrial structures (specialisation and diversity) to 
examine the effect of agglomeration on urban innovation. We measured city industrial 
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specialisation by employing 19 industrial sectors, according to the Krugman 
specialisation index (Krugman, 1991b; Kim, 1995), which is defined as follows: 
 
𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡 = ∑ |
𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡
∑ 𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑝
𝑗=1
− 
∑ 𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑞
𝑖=1
∑ ∑ 𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑞
𝑖=1
𝑝
𝑗=1
|𝑝𝑗=1           (2.8) 
 
where Eij is employment in industry j in city i, and p and q are the total numbers of 
industries and cities, respectively. The higher the value of the city’s specialisation, the 
more it is considered specialised. In addition, according to Henderson (1997), a city’s 
diversity is constructed with the Hirschman-Herfindahl concentration index on 
employment, as follows, to measure the effect of Jacobs externalities: 
 
𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡 =
1
∑ [
𝐸𝑖𝑗
𝐸𝑖−𝐸𝑖𝑗
]2
𝑝
𝑗=1,𝑗′≠𝑗
             (2.9) 
 
where p is the total number of industries. This indicator excludes industry j to avert 
the relations between the diversity of an industry and the specialisation of itself.  
More importantly, to estimate the effects of bureaucratic incentives on the 
performance of city innovation, we considered various characteristics of municipal 
party secretaries, listed in Table 2.1, including the party secretaries’ education 
background, age, tenure, perceived promotion pressure, fractional ties and work 
experience. Notably, considering that it takes time for officials to perceive 
competition, we used its first lag to test the impact of competition intensity on local 
innovation. 
Instrumental variables 
A noteworthy point about possible reverse causality needs to be discussed. To 
conquer the potential problem of endogeneity, we adopted the S-GMM approach in a 
dynamic production function framework. Lags in first difference and levels are used 
as instruments to deal with endogeneity issues. In addition to lags, two other external 
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instruments are included to improve the performance of the instrumental variable 
estimator: distances from each city center to the nearest six seaports9 and real wages 
in each prefecture city. Instruments need to be selected among the determinants of the 
demand function of the inputs of production. Production function is estimated based 
on the duality approach from multiple equation structural models with input demand 
functions. In a structural model, average wage indices are used by Bernstein and 
Nadiri (1991) for the estimation of product demand functions and spillover effects. 
The key exogeneity assumption is that city’s historical characteristics are exogenous 
to current shocks in performance. 
Spatially lagged variables 
The theory of NEG offers deeper insights into spatial interdependence, instead of 
treating regions independently (Krugman 1991a, 1992, 1993; Krugman and Venables, 
1995). As discussed in the literature, the relationship between cities is measured by 
using spatially lagged variables to investigate the effects of economic activities 
between one city and its neighbours. In accordance with the knowledge production 
function framework, we constructed the spatial lags of R&D expenditures, FDI, 
domestic investment and human capital, followed by the spatial econometric analysis 
proposed by Keisuke (2017). 
2.5. Empirical results 
2.5.1. Main results on the way agglomeration economy affects city innovation 
Table 2.2 reports the empirical results of the way that an agglomeration economy 
affects city innovation for a range of estimators, using the natural log of patent 
applications per capita as the dependent variable. In all specifications, the most 
innovative inputs had significant and positive effects on city innovation. The 
elasticities of R&D stock ranged from 2.5 to 6.8%, while those of domestic and 
 
9 The major seaports used in this chapter are Shanghai port, Shenzhen port, Ningbo port, Qingdao port, 
Guangzhou port and Tianjin port. 
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foreign capital stocks ranged from 5.3 to 15.0% and from 1.8 to 3.9%, respectively, 
and those of human capital ranged from 1.2 to 6.6%. According to the estimates in the 
last two columns, diversity of industries is negatively related to city innovativeness. 
This result was similar to the work of Stiebale and Reize (2011). The specialisation 
produces the similar negative effect on innovation, which is consistent with Ning et al. 
(2016). In addition to the innovative inputs and industrial agglomeration, city 
innovation also highly depends on its past realisations. 
 
Table 2.2. Results for effects of agglomeration economy on innovation 
Variables OLS FE 2SLS S-GMM S-GMM2 
Lagged dep. var. 0.894*** 0.694*** 0.770*** 0.853*** 0.855*** 
 (0.006) (0.013) (0.021) (0.003) (0.003) 
R&D (stock) 0.040*** 0.068*** 0.025 0.056*** 0.058*** 
 (0.007) (0.014) (0.018) (0.002) (0.003) 
Capital (stock) 0.059*** 0.150*** 0.148*** 0.060*** 0.053*** 
 (0.013) (0.030) (0.038) (0.006) (0.006) 
FDI (stock) 0.022*** 0.018 0.029* 0.039*** 0.039*** 
 (0.006) (0.013) (0.015) (0.002) (0.002) 
Education (enrolment) 0.012* 0.030 0.066* 0.038*** 0.038*** 
 (0.007) (0.019) (0.039) (0.004) (0.004) 
Aglom. (specialisation) -0.020 0.021 -0.007 -0.017*** -0.016*** 
 (0.017) (0.033) (0.036) (0.003) (0.005) 
Aglom. (diversity) -0.028*** -0.027 0.006 -0.038*** -0.038*** 
 (0.009) (0.019) (0.021) (0.003) (0.003) 
Cons. -0.289*** -0.902*** -1.057*** 0.000 0.000 
 (0.062) (0.143) (0.212) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Obs. 3,404 3,404 3,129 3,404 3,339 
R-squared 0.910 0.923 0.921   
AR (1)    -8.349*** -8.317*** 
(p-value)    (0.000) (0.000) 
AR (2)    1.812 1.816 
(p-value)    (0.070) (0.069) 
Hansen test of exogeneity    260.09 254.71 
Hansen-in-difference test 1     -2.790 
Hansen-in-difference test 2     -1.529 
Note: * (**, ***): significance at the 10% (5%, 1%) level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Endogenous 
variables are lagged patent, R&D, capital, FDI and education. The S-GMM estimation considers the full set of lags 
available of the endogenous variables as instruments. In the last regression, two additional instruments are 
considered: the distance of city to its nearest seaport and real average wage. Separate statistics of Sargan test of 
over-identification of the two externals are reported as well. Tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation 
are reported in AR (1) and AR (2). 
 
Table 2.3 displays the results of the spatial autoregressive model by OLS, FE, 
2SLS and two-step S-GMM estimators. By comparing the empirical results between 
various specifications and estimation methodologies, different outcomes arose from 
the specification of the spatial weight matrix. It can be clearly seen that the 
magnitudes of coefficients of innovative inputs and agglomeration variables in Table 
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2.2 differed considerably from those estimated by the spatial econometric model. For 
instance, the effect of R&D stock decreased by approximately 3%, while foreign 
capital stock contributed more than 2% to city innovation. Besides, the contribution of 
human capital rose by around 1 to 2%. In terms of agglomeration, the effect of 
specialisation became insignificant, and the effect of diversity reduced slightly. The 
spatially lagged variables captured spatial spillover effects on city innovation across 
prefecture cities, suggesting that the city’s innovation was also affected by innovative 
inputs in neighbouring cities. Columns 5 and 6 show the results of Model 3, in which 
the spatial lags of R&D spending and human capital significantly and positively affect 
city innovation, indicating that an increase in neighbouring knowledge capital 
investment led to a rise in innovation. Conversely, the negative signs of the 
coefficients of spatially lagged domestic and foreign investment suggest that more 
either domestic or foreign investment in neighbouring city crowded out the own city’s 
innovation. In brief, surrounding cities with higher-skilled and higher-educated labour, 
as well as more expenditure on knowledge and technologies, have knowledge 
spillovers in promoting city innovation, compared with investment in public spending. 
Thus, spatial spillover effects need to be considered as a significant channel for 
research and policy implications. 
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Table 2.3. Results for effects of agglomeration on innovation with spatial lags 
Variables OLS FE 2SLS S-GMM S-GMM2 
Lagged dep. var. 0.891*** 0.633*** 0.692*** 0.840*** 0.839*** 
 (0.007) (0.014) (0.024) (0.004) (0.004) 
R&D (stock) 0.010 0.001 -0.039** 0.027*** 0.028*** 
 (0.009) (0.015) (0.019) (0.004) (0.005) 
R&D (stock, spatial) 0.203*** 1.213*** 1.198*** 0.317*** 0.341*** 
 (0.070) (0.108) (0.133) (0.029) (0.032) 
Capital (stock) 0.086*** 0.155*** 0.136*** 0.083*** 0.095*** 
 (0.017) (0.033) (0.042) (0.010) (0.008) 
Capital (stock, spatial) -0.353*** 0.179 0.425 -0.429*** -0.467*** 
 (0.100) (0.255) (0.306) (0.070) (0.044) 
FDI (stock) 0.015** 0.044*** 0.057*** 0.056*** 0.060*** 
 (0.007) (0.014) (0.018) (0.003) (0.005) 
FDI (stock, spatial) 0.026 -0.267*** -0.337*** -0.066*** -0.082*** 
 (0.031) (0.092) (0.100) (0.019) (0.013) 
Education (enrolment) 0.022*** 0.037** 0.082** 0.047*** 0.041*** 
 (0.007) (0.019) (0.040) (0.005) (0.005) 
Education (spatial) 0.196*** 0.035 -0.109 0.182*** 0.188*** 
 (0.073) (0.187) (0.216) (0.022) (0.026) 
Aglom. (specialisation) -0.018 0.046 0.025 -0.006 -0.003 
 (0.017) (0.033) (0.035) (0.006) (0.005) 
Aglom. (diversity) -0.030*** 0.009 0.042* -0.026*** -0.023*** 
 (0.010) (0.019) (0.021) (0.003) (0.003) 
Cons. 0.207 -3.654*** -4.697*** 0.000 0.000 
 (0.342) (1.132) (1.518) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Obs. 3,404 3,404 3,129 3,404 3,339 
R-squared 0.911 0.927 0.925   
AR (1)    -8.355*** -8.313*** 
(p-value)    (0.000) (0.000) 
AR (2)    1.808 1.808 
(p-value)    (0.071) 0.071 
Hansen test of exogeneity    254.49 250.02 
Hansen-in-difference test 1     0.764 
Hansen-in-difference test 2     0.942 
Note: * (**, ***): significance at the 10% (5%, 1%) level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Endogenous 
variables are lagged patent, R&D, capital, FDI and education. The S-GMM estimation considers the full set of lags 
available of the endogenous variables as instruments. In the last regression, two additional instruments are 
considered: the distance of city to its nearest seaport and real average wage. Separate statistics of Sargan test of 
over-identification of the two externals are reported as well. Tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation 
are reported in AR (1) and AR (2). 
 
2.5.2. Main results of the way bureaucratic incentive affect city innovation 
Table 2.4 presents the results of the tests for the effect of bureaucratic incentive 
on city innovative capacities, using the two-step S-GMM estimator, including six 
estimates of various characteristics of municipal party secretaries, including their 
educational background, work experiences, tenure, age, promotion competition and 
factional relations. The six aspects of the characteristics of officials can be classified 
into five categories, as shown in Table 2.1. 
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In terms of the variables of bureaucracy, the first result gleaned from Column (1) 
is that all variables regarding party secretaries’ factional relations were significantly 
and positively associated with innovation, with army experience the major contributor 
at 4.8%, followed by youth party (3.0%) and party education (1.3%). These results 
may delineate that officials who have similar experience are more likely to be 
provided opportunities to maintain a relatively close relationship with other officials, 
even central government. They tend to follow the policies that emphasise the 
importance of innovation, as claimed by national leaders consciously and intuitively. 
Second, the level of education has a highly significant and positive relationship with 
city innovation, which implies that the higher educational level attained by the party 
secretary, the greater the probability that he or she will contribute more to city 
innovation. Third, the age of city leaders played a negative role in city innovation. 
This result indicates that young cadres have more incentives to pursue innovative city 
performance. Fourth, result in Column (3) indicates the effect of the workplace of the 
party secretary on city innovation. The evidence illustrates that, if a party secretary is 
transferred within the same province, this leads to a significantly positive influence on 
city innovation (4.5%). This result raises important implications for policymakers to 
design the appointment and selection of cadres in promoting city innovation. 
Finally, the coefficient of the city leaders’ turnover rate was negative, signifying 
that a high turnover rate between officials weakens the capacities of city innovation. 
Generally speaking, this result indicates that, although collusion between officials and 
local firms might be avoided by personnel shuffling from one locality to the other, 
this leads to a rise in local policy uncertainties and finally goes against city innovation. 
The interaction terms Turnover* specialisation and Turnover* diversity is negative 
and significant at the 5% significance level, showing the negative moderating effect 
of specialisation and diversity on the relationship between turnover and city 
innovation. This indicates industrial agglomerative forces are more limited to the 
impact of turnover on innovation. 
 High perceived competition, measured by turnover rate, also negatively affected 
innovation. This aligns the interests of local agents with the central principle. Notably, 
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this negative role has a positive moderating effect illustrated in the interaction terms 
in Column (5). In addition, we also expected tenure’s effect to be conditional on the 
city’s agglomeration. With the introduction of the interaction variable of tenure and 
specialisation and diversity, we found that none of them are significant. The positive 
but insignificant sign revealed that a longer period of tenure promoted innovation, 
which indicates that local leaders staying in the same position for a long time seemed 
to be helpful for city innovation via the consideration of policy stability and 
continuity of implementation. Apart from these results, all the variables of innovative 
inputs had positive correlations with city innovation. In addition, both specialisation 
and diversity played negative roles in promoting city innovative capacities. 
Table 2.5 reports the main results from Model 4, with spatially lagged variables 
of innovative inputs. As a whole, the magnitudes of spatial lag of R&D stock ranged 
from 0.29 to 0.36, while those of spatial lag of human capital were around 0.2 at the 
1% significant level, and those of spatial lag of domestic and foreign capital stocks 
ranged from ˗0.42 to ˗0.36 and from ˗0.09 to ˗0.07, respectively. For agglomeration 
variables, similar results were found to those in Table 2.3. When we contrasted the 
estimates of the variables of bureaucracy, we found that the magnitudes of all 
increased slightly except age when the spatial spillovers were considered.  
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Table 2.4. GMM results for effects of bureaucratic incentive on innovation 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lagged dep. var. 0.848*** 0.854*** 0.855*** 0.855*** 0.852*** 0.856*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
R&D (stock) 0.060*** 0.057*** 0.060*** 0.061*** 0.060*** 0.064*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Capital (stock) 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.044*** 0.050*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) 
FDI (stock) 0.041*** 0.048*** 0.041*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.041*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Education (enrolment) 0.041*** 0.031*** 0.042*** 0.038*** 0.041*** 0.039*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Aglom. (specialisation) -0.027**
* 
-0.026**
* 
-0.015**
* 
0.003 -0.022**
* 
-0.013* 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Aglom. (diversity) -0.040**
* 
-0.039**
* 
-0.038**
* 
-0.029**
* 
-0.051**
* 
-0.032**
*  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
Party edu. (dummy) 0.013***      
 (0.003)      
Army (dummy) 0.048***      
 (0.005)      
Youth party (dummy) 0.030***      
 (0.004)      
College deg. (dummy)  -0.069**
* 
    
  (0.008)     
Underg. deg. (dummy)  0.016***     
  (0.004)     
P-grad. deg. (dummy)  0.052***     
  (0.003)     
Age   -0.003**
* 
   
   (0.000)    
Workplace (dummy)   0.045***    
   (0.016)    
Turnover (dummy)    -0.033**
* 
  
    (0.008)   
Turnover × specialisation    -0.034**
* 
  
    (0.007)   
Turnover × diversity    -0.011**
* 
  
    (0.004)   
Party competition (lag)     -0.085**
* 
 
     (0.017)  
Party comp.(lag) × specialisation     0.039***  
     (0.015)  
Party comp.(lag) × diversity     0.055***  
     (0.009)  
Tenure       0.001 
      (0.002) 
Tenure × specialisation      -0.000 
      (0.002) 
Tenure × diversity      -0.001 
      (0.001) 
Cons. 0.000 -0.571**
* 
0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.531**
*  (0.000) (0.040) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.057) 
       
Obs. 3,254 3,281 3,291 3,334 3,339 3,330 
AR (1) -8.141 -8.230 -8.266 -8.328 -8.310 -8.313 
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR (2) 1.828 1.782 1.903 1.822 1.832 1.859 
(p-value) 0.068 0.075 0.057 0.069 0.067 0.063 
Hansen test of exogeneity 251.49  246.63 251.99 252.40 249.59 248.96 
Hansen-in-difference test 1 -1.449 -3.322 2.313 3.590 -1.070 -7.108 
Hansen-in-difference test 2 -0.469 -4.180 -1.069 0.353 1.522 -7.217 
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Note: * (**, ***): significance at the 10% (5%, 1%) level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Endogenous 
variables are lagged patent, R&D, capital, FDI and education. The S-GMM estimation considers the full set of lags 
available of the endogenous variables as instruments. In the last regression, two additional instruments are 
considered: the distance of city to its nearest seaport and real average wage. Separate statistics of Sargan test of 
over-identification of the two externals are reported as well. Tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation 
are reported in AR (1) and AR (2). 
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Table 2.5. GMM results for effects of bureaucratic incentive with spatial lags 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lagged dep. var. 0.840*** 0.841*** 0.836*** 0.839*** 0.839*** 0.840*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
R&D (stock) 0.030*** 0.038*** 0.025*** 0.037*** 0.034*** 0.032*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
R&D (stock, spatial) 0.308*** 0.291*** 0.358*** 0.309*** 0.316*** 0.314*** 
 (0.033) (0.036) (0.041) (0.037) (0.040) (0.025) 
Capital (stock) 0.079*** 0.089*** 0.079*** 0.080*** 0.076*** 0.091*** 
 (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Capital (stock, spatial) -0.417*** -0.416*** -0.363*** -0.356*** -0.408*** -0.404*** 
 (0.058) (0.066) (0.049) (0.067) (0.059) (0.051) 
FDI (stock) 0.058*** 0.064*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.058*** 0.055*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
FDI (stock, spatial) -0.079*** -0.085*** -0.084*** -0.079*** -0.077*** -0.074*** 
 (0.015) (0.019) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) 
Education (enrolment) 0.049*** 0.031*** 0.062*** 0.050*** 0.045*** 0.042*** 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
Education (spatial) 0.184*** 0.180*** 0.155*** 0.161*** 0.186*** 0.181*** 
 (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.030) 
Aglom. (specialisation) -0.009 -0.014** -0.003 0.005 -0.016** -0.007 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) 
Aglom. (diversity) -0.030*** -0.022*** -0.029*** -0.023*** -0.039*** -0.023*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
Party edu. (dummy) 0.011***      
 (0.003)      
Army (dummy) 0.048***      
 (0.007)      
Youth party (dummy) 0.022***      
 (0.004)      
College deg. (dummy)  -0.076***     
  (0.008)     
Underg. deg. (dummy)  0.011**     
  (0.006)     
P-grad. deg. (dummy)  0.047***     
  (0.004)     
Age   -0.004***    
   (0.001)    
Workplace (dummy)   0.073***    
   (0.017)    
Turnover (dummy)    -0.031***   
    (0.008)   
Turnover × specialisation    -0.032***   
    (0.007)   
Turnover × diversity    -0.010**   
    (0.004)   
Party competition (lag)     -0.076***  
     (0.016)  
Party comp.(lag) × specialisation     0.050***  
     (0.014)  
Party comp.(lag) × diversity     0.051***  
     (0.008)  
Tenure       0.001 
      (0.002) 
Tenure × specialisation      -0.001 
      (0.002) 
Tenure × diversity      -0.001 
      (0.001) 
Cons. 0.000 0.000 -0.439 -0.473 0.000 -0.206 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.298) (0.395) (0.000) (0.312) 
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Obs. 3,254 3,281 3,291 3,334 3,339 3,330 
AR (1) -8.170 -8.240 -8.328 -8.336 -8.330 -8.314 
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR (2) 1.821 1.774 1.902 1.816 1.824 1.849 
(p-value) 0.069 0.076 0.057 0.069 0.068 0.064 
Hansen test of exogeneity 250.09 247.70 249.87 248.58 248.58 247.54 
Hansen-in-difference test 1 -1.449 3.188 -4.022 -1.086 -0.411 2.601 
Hansen-in-difference test 2 -5.056 2.695 2.819 -1.596 0.326 -0.302 
Note: * (**, ***): significance at the 10% (5%, 1%) level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Endogenous 
variables are lagged patent, R&D, capital, FDI and education. The S-GMM estimation considers the full set of lags 
available of the endogenous variables as instruments. In the last regression, two additional instruments are 
considered: the distance of city to its nearest seaport and real average wage. Separate statistics of Sargan test of 
over-identification of the two externals are reported as well. Tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation 
are reported in AR (1) and AR (2). 
 
2.5.3. Extensions and robustness checks 
In this section, we directly use flow data from China City Statistical Yearbook to 
conduct the robustness check. The results for robustness checks are displayed in Table 
2.6. Compared with the results in Table 2.4, the similarity of these results is striking, 
and only a few deviations are worthy of note. First, the magnitudes of innovative 
inputs generally decrease to some extent except R&D, leading to an underestimation 
as flow data are introduced. More importantly, when we switched to measures of the 
city leaders, the effects of most estimated coefficients turnover, competition and 
previous workplace—became smaller, which again confirmed the underestimation by 
using flow variables, while the influences of interaction term, Party comp.(lag)* 
specialisation, became insignificant. 
Table 2.7 reports the results for when we accounted for spatial lags. In 
comparison with Table 2.5, the signs of diversity remained the same, and the impact 
of specialisation was still insignificantly. In addition, through comparing the estimates 
of Table 2.7 and Table 2.6, we found that highly educated cadres who transferred 
within the same province contributed much more to city innovation, while the positive 
effect of a party secretary with good factional ties decreased a bit. In addition, 
turnover and perceived promotion competition played a relatively more important role 
in city innovation. 
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Table 2.6. GMM results for city innovation using flow data 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lagged dep. var. 0.853*** 0.856*** 0.861*** 0.854*** 0.854*** 0.859*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
R&D  0.110*** 0.101*** 0.103*** 0.101*** 0.104*** 0.099*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Capital  0.022** 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.034*** 0.032*** 0.034*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) 
FDI 0.034*** 0.043*** 0.037*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.035*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Education (enrolment) 0.030*** 0.017*** 0.024*** 0.026*** 0.022*** 0.029*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Aglom. (specialisation) -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.018*** -0.009 -0.024*** -0.019*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Aglom. (diversity) -0.043*** -0.040*** -0.038*** -0.035*** -0.044*** -0.042*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
Party edu. (dummy) 0.015***      
 (0.003)      
Army (dummy) 0.050***      
 (0.006)      
Youth party (dummy) 0.029***      
 (0.004)      
College deg. (dummy)  -0.064***     
  (0.010)     
Underg. deg. (dummy)  0.013***     
  (0.005)     
P-grad. deg. (dummy)  0.054***     
  (0.004)     
Age   -0.003***    
   (0.000)    
Workplace (dummy)   0.021**    
   (0.010)    
Turnover (dummy)    -0.025***   
    (0.006)   
Turnover × specialisation    -0.026***   
    (0.007)   
Turnover × diversity    -0.008***   
    (0.003)   
Party competition (lag)     -0.076***  
     (0.014)  
Party comp.(lag) × specialisation     0.015  
     (0.013)  
Party comp.(lag) × diversity     0.024***  
     (0.007)  
Tenure       -0.002 
      (0.002) 
Tenure × specialisation      0.001 
      (0.002) 
Tenure × diversity      0.001 
      (0.001) 
Cons. -0.278*** -0.119** -0.230*** 0.000 0.000 -0.278*** 
 (0.059) (0.058) (0.061) (0.000) (0.000) (0.046) 
       
Obs. 3,260 3,287 3,297 3,340 3,345 3,336 
AR (1) -8.235*** -8.314*** -8.336*** -8.388*** -8.395*** -8.400*** 
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR (2) 2.107 2.101 2.177 2.105 2.116 2.131 
(p-value) 0.035 0.036 0.0230 0.035 0.034 0.033 
Hansen test of exogeneity 260.91 257.61 258.09 261.14 258.72 259.85 
Hansen-in-difference test 1 0.975 -0.688 2.739 3.981 -3.473 -1.484 
Hansen-in-difference test 2 2.106 1.907 -5.022 -0.265 3.743 2.716 
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Note: * (**, ***): significance at the 10% (5%, 1%) level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Endogenous 
variables are lagged patent, R&D, capital, FDI and education. The S-GMM estimation considers the full set of lags 
available of the endogenous variables as instruments. In the last regression, two additional instruments are 
considered: the distance of city to its nearest seaport and real average wage. Separate statistics of Sargan test of 
over-identification of the two externals are reported as well. Tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation 
are reported in AR (1) and AR (2). 
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Table 2.7. GMM results for city innovation using spatial lags and flow data 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lagged dep. var. 0.847*** 0.853*** 0.856*** 0.852*** 0.851*** 0.855*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
R&D 0.081*** 0.075*** 0.070*** 0.064*** 0.070*** 0.071*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
R&D (spatial) 0.233*** 0.231*** 0.227*** 0.256*** 0.226*** 0.227*** 
 (0.039) (0.038) (0.031) (0.039) (0.037) (0.031) 
Capital  0.047*** 0.065*** 0.066*** 0.084*** 0.059*** 0.062*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) 
Capital (spatial) -0.438*** -0.447*** -0.488*** -0.471*** -0.391*** -0.363*** 
 (0.065) (0.084) (0.065) (0.070) (0.068) (0.072) 
FDI  0.030*** 0.036*** 0.029*** 0.025*** 0.031*** 0.028*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
FDI (spatial) 0.027* 0.023 0.031* 0.032* 0.017 0.013 
 (0.015) (0.021) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) 
Education (enrolment) 0.057*** 0.039*** 0.052*** 0.051*** 0.049*** 0.058*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
Education (spatial) 0.092*** 0.064* 0.112*** 0.076* 0.079** 0.103*** 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.039) (0.041) (0.040) (0.034) 
Aglom. (specialisation) -0.003 -0.007 -0.001 0.011 -0.008 0.008 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) 
Aglom. (diversity) -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.030*** -0.044*** -0.030*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
Party edu. (dummy) 0.010***      
 (0.004)      
Army (dummy) 0.058***      
 (0.008)      
Youth party (dummy) 0.027***      
 (0.004)      
College deg. (dummy)  -0.070***     
  (0.009)     
Underg. deg. (dummy)  0.012**     
  (0.006)     
P-grad. deg. (dummy)  0.054***     
  (0.004)     
Age   -0.003***    
   (0.001)    
Workplace (dummy)   0.072***    
   (0.012)    
Turnover (dummy)    -0.032***   
    (0.007)   
Turnover × specialisation    -0.033***   
    (0.008)   
Turnover × diversity    -0.007**   
    (0.003)   
Party competition (lag)     -0.098***  
     (0.013)  
Party comp.(lag) × specialisation     0.013  
     (0.013)  
Party comp.(lag) × diversity     0.034***  
     (0.007)  
Tenure       -0.001 
      (0.003) 
Tenure × specialisation      0.000 
      (0.003) 
Tenure × diversity      0.000 
      (0.001) 
Cons. 0.932*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.660* 0.373 
 (0.358) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.380) (0.422) 
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Obs. 3,235 3,262 3,272 3,315 3,320 3,311 
AR (1) -8.141 -8.237 -8.245 -8.305 -8.328 -8.296 
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR (2) 2.103 2.080 2.150 2.060 2.100 2.103 
(p-value) 0.036 0.038 0.032 0.039 0.036 0.036 
Hansen test of exogeneity 250.10 253.02 254.04 248.67 251.90 250.44 
Hansen-in-difference test 1 7.016 2.779 1.598 -4.953 5.580 -2.753 
Hansen-in-difference test 2 -0.126 5.144 1.121 -5.908 1.968 -1.251 
Note: * (**, ***): significance at the 10% (5%, 1%) level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Endogenous 
variables are lagged patent, R&D, capital, FDI and education. The S-GMM estimation considers the full set of lags 
available of the endogenous variables as instruments. In the last regression, two additional instruments are 
considered: the distance of city to its nearest seaport and real average wage. Separate statistics of Sargan test of 
over-identification of the two externals are reported as well. Tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation 
are reported in AR (1) and AR (2). 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
This chapter has provided empirical insights into the question of how China’s 
city innovation is affected by the agglomeration economy and bureaucratic incentives. 
To avoid the potential endogenous problem, we conducted a two-step S-GMM 
approach within a dynamic production function framework, using panel data 
consisting of 284 prefecture cities for the period 2001 to 2014. We examined the 
factors that affect China’s performance of innovation from two aspects—first by 
diversity and specialisation, and second by different characteristics of local leaders of 
a city from various perspectives of age, tenure, education background, factional 
relations, perceived competition and working experience. 
Our major contribution comes from the estimation of leader’s role in promoting 
innovation with manually-collected patent information and profiles for city leaders. 
We find that promoting younger cadre with rich work experiences into leader’s 
positions facilitates innovation. In addition, the negative influence of both high 
turnover and high level of competition among city leaders exist to cities. The 
interaction terms between turnover and industrial agglomeration are significantly 
negative across all models, which implies that cities may benefit less if they have 
either a very diverse industrial structure or a very specialised industrial structure from 
high turnover rate of official. In contrast, the positive signs of interaction terms 
between competition intensity and industrial agglomeration are significantly positive 
indicate that more specialised and diversified industrial structure with relatively 
higher perceived competition foster local innovation. Lastly, good factional relations 
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positively affect city innovation and, officials with a lower educational level are 
limited in innovation. Another contribution of this study is that using spatially lagged 
variables, we sought to measure more realistic economic activities in China from the 
inter-regional perspective in response to those studies that ignored spatial spillover 
effects.  
In regard to policy, it is advisable for policymakers and the Chinese government 
to observe a trade-off between local leaders and city innovation and its underlying 
rationale. Because of the existence of heterogeneity of local government official 
characteristics in affecting city innovation, the Chinese central government should be 
able to develop methods—such as the appointment of younger talent from nearby 
previous workplaces into leadership positions—to improve the capacity of innovation 
and productivity, rather than pursuing surface political performance. 
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Chapter 3: Heterogeneous effects of inter- and intra-city 
transportation infrastructure on economic growth: Evidence 
from Chinese cities 
3.1. Introduction 
The contribution of public infrastructure in economic development has been a 
topic of interest for economists for a long time. Several country-level studies with 
western experiences have found strong positive influence of public infrastructure on 
economic growth (Eisner, 1991; Munnell, 1992; Roller and Waverman, 2001; Pereira 
and Andraz, 2007) and on productivity (Aschauer, 1989; Munnell, 1990; Nadiri and 
Mamuneaus, 1994; Fernandez and Montuenga-Gomez, 2003). The experience of 
other non-western countries has also shown such a relationship (Hulten, 1996; 
Vijverberg et al., 2011; Kustepeli et al., 2012). This chapter goes beyond the present 
literature by analysing the effect of transportation infrastructure with the use of 
city-level data from the perspective of inter- and intra-city transportation and its 
impact on economic growth of cities. 
Among other forms of infrastructure, transportation in particular plays a 
significant role in the prosperity of the countries and regions. It affects the economy 
through better connections among the entities providing increased opportunities in 
trade, lower cost of production, better access to markets and urbanization. It also helps 
in increasing labour productivity and organizational efficiency (Kustepeli et al., 2012). 
Agbelie (2014) finds that highway and railway infrastructure expenditures and 
densities have positive impact on GDP and such effect varies significantly across 40 
countries studied. Fernald (1999) shows that the productivity growth of 
vehicle-intensive industries benefits disproportionately more from road building. Del 
Bo and Florio (2012) provide evidence that investment in quality and quantity of 
transport infrastructure along with information and communication technology 
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improvement has a significant and positive impact on GDP. In a paper focusing on US 
transportation, Boarnet (1996), using data on California counties from 1969 to 1988, 
argues that road and highway capital is productive and that ground transportation 
infrastructure has partially opposing direct and indirect effects. In a comparison 
between US and Europe, Melo et al. (2013) show that productivity effect of transport 
infrastructure tends to be higher for US than for European countries.10 
China placed much attention to infrastructure investment after the opening up of 
her economy starting from the 1980s. In particular, investment in transportation 
infrastructure gained pace since the late 1990s. The emphasis was on highway 
connections and railway expansion to connect the cities as well as public 
transportation facilities within the cities. In the early stage of reform and opening up, 
China's transportation infrastructure was weak and deemed insufficient. In 1978, the 
total mileages of highway and railway routes were only 890,000 km and 52,000 km, 
respectively, compared with those of 4,230,000 km and 98,000 km in 2012.11 
Transportation experienced tremendous development since 1995 and transportation 
infrastructure has been an essential part of China’s development policy since then. It 
is noteworthy that the development of railways gained much pace in the later years, 
especially that of high-speed railway system. From Figure 3.1a, it is evident that these 
investments in highways and railways have contributed positively to passenger flow, 
particularly after 2003. The passenger flow increases by about 95% for highways and 
143% for railways from 2003 to 2012. There has also been a huge growth in intra-city 
movement of people during this time. Figure 3.1b illustrates the annual aggregate 
passenger flow of intra-city public transportation, which increased by 122% between 
2002 and 2013. 
  
 
10 See Appendix 3.A for details of this literature. 
11 Data is collected from NBS in 1978 and 2012, respectively. 
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Figure 3.1a. Passenger traffic volumes of Highways and Railways (1978-2012) 
 
Figure 3.1b. Passenger traffic volume of intra-city public transit (2002-2013) 
 
Note: Data is collected from NBS. 
 
A few studies explore China’s experience in infrastructure and economic growth 
focusing on the provincial level. Demurger (2001) analyses the linkage between 
infrastructure investment and economic growth using a sample of 24 Chinese 
provinces from 1985 to 1998. He finds that difference in transport facilities is a key 
factor in explaining the growth gap. Similarly, Yu et al. (2013) indicate that positive 
spillovers exist between provinces in each period due to the connectivity 
characteristic of transport infrastructure at the national level. At the regional level, 
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transport infrastructure spillover effects vary considerably over time across China's 
four macro-regions12. These findings generally echo those of the international studies 
surveyed previously. 
Innovations in new economic geography (NEG) theories (Krugman 1991, 1992, 
1993; Krugman and Venables, 1995; Baldwin and Martin, 2004) offer deeper insights 
into the role of transportation costs in local economic growth. Brakman et al. (2009, 
pp. 65-72) emphasize that the reduction of trade costs within a certain range, 
facilitated by improvement in transportation facilities, strengthens the core with 
increased manufacturing share and economic size at the expense of the less 
industrialized periphery. The role played by the geographical economics in explaining 
the heterogeneity in city growth is confirmed by a bulk of empirical literature. For 
example, Black and Henderson (2003) state that variations in economic growth across 
US cities can be explained by differences in first-nature geography and the 
second-nature geography13 due to the concentration effect (also see Mellinger et al., 
2003; Nunn and Puga, 2012). Similarly, Li and Ni (2013) contend that the 
improvement of transport networks which lowers inter-city transport costs enables the 
core cities to attain faster growth by stimulating factor agglomeration. However, other 
empirical studies find some contradicting evidence. Using the 1995 Israeli census data, 
Leck et al. (2008) find out that newly introduced rail links significantly enhance the 
welfare of the underdeveloped cities. Lao et al. (2016) conclude that the improvement 
in air transportation plays an important role in accelerating the economic development 
of cities in central and western China rather than eastern region. It is thus interesting 
to explore whether and to what degree the improvement of various transportation 
facilities contributes to economic prosperity within the core-periphery framework. 
This chapter examines the effects of transportation infrastructure on China’s 
economic growth from two perspectives. On the one hand, we investigate the 
heterogeneous roles of various transportation modes in urban economic development. 
 
12 See Appendix 3.A for details of this literature. 
13 The first-nature geography is also termed as the physical geography, which could be measured using the climate 
condition or the distance to a port or ocean. The second-nature geography is more important in explaining why 
cities continue to thrive because of agglomeration economies even when the initial cost advantages no longer exist. 
It is usually measured by an urban potential function. 
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On the other hand, we assess the heterogeneous effects of transportation infrastructure 
on different types of cities. Our contribution is threefold. First, this chapter engages 
more refined city-level data. The second contribution lies on the heterogeneity aspect 
of the analysis wherein we look into inter-city infrastructure (highways and railroads) 
and intra-city infrastructure (public transit) which per our knowledge lacks in present 
literature. Third, this study analyses the impact of transportation on different types of 
cities, either by administrative/economic hierarchy or by geographical location. 
Whereas most of the previous studies on China look at transportation in aggregate at 
the provincial level, the roles of different types of infrastructure need to be looked 
into separately. For example, highways have a specific role in linking nearby cities 
that allow people to work in one city but reside in another. Railroads connect distant 
cities in a much more efficient manner in terms of time and resources which gives rise 
to urban migration, in unison providing convenience for people to return to their 
hometowns for family reunions. Urban development also demands strong public 
transportation within the cities due to the increasing number of residents. Having 
insights on these separate contributions, policymakers would benefit by being able to 
prioritize projects on different types of transportation infrastructure. 
Empirically we find that both inter-city and intra-city infrastructure contribute 
significantly to the economic growth of Chinese cities in the long run. Nationwide, 
the contribution of highways and railroads towards the economic growth of cities is 
roughly 6% each. Similarly, the contribution of intra-city transit is about 2%. Core 
cities are found to benefit far more than peripheral cities from both inter- and 
intra-city transportation infrastructure improvements, consistent with the predictions 
made by the NEG theory. In the short run, we find evidence of causal effect of 
intra-city transportation infrastructure on local economic growth (nationwide and in 
core cities) as well as reverse causal effects of economic growth on highways (core 
cities) or railroads (nationwide and in peripheral cities). In all cases, urban growth is 
found not to benefit immediately from the improvement of inter-city transportation 
facilities. On the analysis of regional impacts, we find that the contributions of all 
types of transportation infrastructure are highest in western China. 
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section describes the 
empirical framework and explains the data used for the econometric analysis. In 
Section 3.3, we discuss our empirical strategies. Section 3.4 presents our findings and 
Section 3.5 concludes. 
3.2. Empirical framework and data description 
3.2.1. Empirical framework 
We assume that the production of final output in each city is governed by a 
Cobb-Douglas production function with Hicks neutral technology, 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑍𝑖𝑡𝐹(𝐾𝑖𝑡, 𝐿𝑖𝑡) = 𝑍(𝑋𝑖𝑡)𝐾𝑖𝑡
𝜃𝐾𝐿𝑖𝑡
𝜃𝐿                                    (3.1) 
 
where subscripts i and t denote city and year, respectively. 𝑌 is city-specific real 
GDP; 𝐾 denotes the capital stock and 𝐿 represents the labour force. X is a vector 
of covariates that affects the total output. In the current study, they are measures of 
inter- and intra-city transportation infrastructures, plus additional controls. Applying 
the log transformation on both sides of equation (1) gives our baseline model: 
 
ln𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃𝑘𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑙𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝜃𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑗                        (3.2) 
 
where 𝜂𝑖 is unmeasured individual idiosyncrasy and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term. The 𝜃𝑠 
are elasticities of the covariates. 
In this study, we consider three types of transportation infrastructure: highway, 
railway, and (intra-city) urban transit. Melo et al. (2013) suggest that the urbanization 
rate and the urban congestion rate are potential sources of omitted variable bias in 
similar studies. Specifically, the urbanization rate influences the elasticities of 
transport infrastructures because it is positively correlated with transport investment 
and economic growth. If the regression model fails to account for the urbanization 
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rate, its impact on economic growth will be partially captured by transportation, 
resulting in upward biases. Similarly, Finn (1993) argues that failure to control for 
congestion may lead to a downward bias. Therefore, they are controlled for in this 
study. The measurements for the variables will be discussed shortly. 
3.2.2. Data description 
We collect the annual aggregate data for prefecture-level cities over 1999-2012 
from different sources.14 Data on nominal GDP and city population are taken from 
the China City Statistical Yearbook (various issues 2000-2013). Data on total fixed 
asset investment (FAI), provincial CPI and labour participation are taken from the 
Wind Database.15 
The annual nominal GDP is converted to its real value (in billions of 1995 Yuan) 
using provincial-level CPI, which serves as our measure of real GDP (rgdp). Our 
measure of the labour force (l) is not perfect: it is estimated using the city total 
population times the annual labour participation rate at the national level. 
Nevertheless, this is the best and most reliable one that can be obtained from official 
publications.16 
Since the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) does not publish data on aggregate 
capital stock, our measure (𝐾) is constructed by the perpetual inventory method of 
Kohli (1978) using data on real fixed asset investment (rFAI), which is FAI deflated 
by CPI in year t, and adopting Zhang et al.’s (2004) estimate of the depreciation rate, 
which is 9.6%17(See Section 1.4.3. for the construction of aggregate capital stock). 
 
14 The definition of the labor force in the China City Statistical Yearbook has undergone a major revision in 1999. 
We find that the values reported by the yearbook have been reduced by roughly a magnitude following this change 
in definition. To keep consistency, we choose 1999 as the starting period of our study. 
15 NBS does not publish price indices for prefecture-level cities. Provincial data on CPI are the best we can find. 
16 We also construct an alternative measure of labour force by summing up unit employment, employment in 
privately owned enterprises, the number of self-employed, and the urban registered unemployed. This measure 
excludes urban migrant employees (also referred to as the floating population) and leads to inconsistency with the 
definition of labour force. Although this measure is not adopted here, regressions using this alternative measure do 
not qualitatively change our results. 
17 The estimation of capital stock at the provincial level was pioneered by Zhang et al. (2004). This depreciation 
rate of 9.6% is widely used in Chinese studies such as Yang and Li (2007), Wu et al. (2014). Other researchers 
proposed other values, such as 9.2% (Jin, 2012) and 5% (Fan et al. 2004). However, these estimates are less 
popular than Zhang’s. 
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We use two different measures of the transportation infrastructure, either by 
physical capital (capacity) or by volume of passenger traffic. Data on traffic volumes 
of highway (hp), railroad (rp) and intra-city public transit (pp) are taken directly from 
the China City Statistical Yearbook (various years 2000-2013). Capital-based 
measures are constructed from multiple sources. We measure the highway 
infrastructure by the density of highway routes, i.e., the total mileage of highways in 
the administration divided by the area of the administration (hwy_density). Higher 
density implies greater accessibility to/from the city by road. Similarly, we measure 
intra-city transit infrastructure by per capita area of paved urban roads (aprpop). 
Larger value of this variable means better urban transit conditions. The only exception 
is railroad, for which we cannot find a capital-based measure in NBS publications. 
Therefore, we continue to use the traffic-based measure (rp). Given the facts that 
inter-city passenger trains operate on a fixed timetable and that the Chinese railway 
system is usually operating near its full capacity, the traffic volume is likely a good 
proxy to the physical capacity18. Data on the mileage of highway routes are taken 
from the China Urban Construction Statistical Yearbook (various years 2000-2013), 
and the rest of the variables are taken from the China City Statistical Yearbook 
(various issues 2000-2013). 
Equation (3.2) studies multiple transportation modes, but they are likely to be 
correlated with each other19. Multicollinearity may be a more serious problem for the 
traffic-based measures, since more economic activity (rgdp) entails more economic 
interactions, both exterior and interior, thus more traffic. Therefore, we check 
pairwise correlations between the transportation variables as shown in Table 3.1. 
  
 
18 On the contrary, traffic volumes by highway or intra-city transit modes may vary substantially from their 
designed capacity, depending on the rate of usage. 
19 Conceptually, all types of transportation infrastructure are funded by public spending. As the local economy 
grows, different types of facilities are likely to be improved in a synchronous way. Therefore, we expect positive 
correlation among the transportation variables. 
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Table 3.1. Pairwise correlations for different measures of transport 
infrastructure 
 lnhwy_density lnrp lnaprpop  lnhp lnrp lnpp 
lnhwy_density 1 ¾ ¾ lnhp 1 ¾ ¾ 
lnrp 0.14 1 ¾ lnrp 0.45 1 ¾ 
lnaprpop 0.24 0.22 1 lnpp 0.50 0.63 1 
 
It is clear from the table that all traffic-based measures are highly correlated, 
justifying our worries. The capital-based measures, however, only exhibit mild 
correlations. Evidently, the capital-based measures are superior to the traffic-based 
ones, both conceptually and empirically. 
Lastly, the urbanization rate (ur) is defined as the ratio of the non-agricultural 
population to the total population of each city. The congestion rate is defined as the 
number of rental and public vehicles divided by the area of urban paved roads. These 
variables are taken from the China City Statistical Yearbook (various years 
2000-2013). The summary statistics is presented below. 
 
Table 3.2. Summary statistics of variables 
Variable unit Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Real GDP (rgdp) billion Yuan 3044 80.19 121.22 1.54 1355.58 
Capital stock (k) billion Yuan 3066 157.89 267.74 0.037 2753.22 
Labor force (l) 10,000 persons 3066 260.81 184.11 3.27 1949.64 
Real Fixed asset investment (FAI) billion Yuan 3066 42.29 66.06 0.04 693.19 
Highway density (hwy_density) km-1 3048 0.71 0.46 0.02 3.83 
Highway passenger traffic (hp) 10,000 persons 3066 7605.84 11779.1 82 179369 
Railway passenger traffic (rp) 10,000 persons 3066 620.61 1145.37 1.00 14271 
Urban road area per person (aprpop) m2/person 3046 2.98 3.62 0.02 64.00 
Passenger traffic of intra-city transit (pp) 10,000 persons 3066 19926.44 46398.31 33.00 525607.4 
Urbanization rate (ur) percent 3066 0.36 0.18 0.01 1.00 
Congestion rate (conr) vehicle/km2 3066 4.33 3.16 0.27 26.47 
 
In summary, we propose the following baseline model: 
Model 1: 
ln𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃𝑘𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑙𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃ℎ𝑙𝑛ℎ𝑤𝑦_𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑟𝑙𝑛𝑟𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑝𝑙𝑛𝑎𝑝𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 +
𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                              (3.3) 
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With other controls, we also have 
Model 2: 
ln𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃𝑘𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑙𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃ℎ𝑙𝑛ℎ𝑤𝑦_𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑟𝑙𝑛𝑟𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑝𝑙𝑛𝑎𝑝𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 +
𝜃𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                (3.4) 
 
and 
Model 3: 
ln𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃𝑘𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑙𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃ℎ𝑙𝑛ℎ𝑤𝑦_𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑟𝑙𝑛𝑟𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑝𝑙𝑛𝑎𝑝𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 +
𝜃𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑐𝑙𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                     (3.5) 
 
These specifications use capital-based measures of transportation infrastructure. If we 
switch to traffic-based measures, hwy_density and aprpop are replaced by hp and pp, 
respectively. 
3.3. Empirical methodology 
3.3.1. Testing for panel unit root and cointegration 
Least squares estimates are bound to be spurious if the covariates contain unit 
roots (Engle and Granger, 1987). Our first step is to identify the order of integration in 
our data using panel unit root tests. These tests are usually based on individual unit 
root tests (e.g., ADF or Phillips-Perron) in each cross section. By pooling information 
from all cross sections, the resulting test statistic has a conventional distribution, and 
the test has more power than the individual tests. We use Im et al.’s (2003) IPS test 
and Maddala and Wu’s (1999) Fisher test because both tests allow heterogeneity in 
the cross sections by assuming different autoregressive parameters. Consequently, 
these tests are less restrictive than other panel unit tests which assume homogeneous 
autoregressive structures (Levin et al., 2002; Breitung, 2000). 
Specifically, the IPS test and the ADF-based Fisher test perform the following 
ADF regression for each cross-section: 
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Δ𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜌𝑖𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + ∑𝛽𝑖𝑗 Δ𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑗 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡         (3.6) 
 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡  is the variable under study; 𝜂𝑖  is the individual intercept; 𝜌𝑖  is the 
number of lags for cross section i; and 𝜈𝑖𝑡 is the error term that is assumed to be 
serially uncorrelated and mutually independent. 
The null hypothesis assumes unit root in all cross sections, i.e. 
 
𝐻0: 𝜌1 =⋅⋅⋅= 𝜌𝑁 = 0                      (3.7) 
 
The alternative hypothesis specifies that some series in the panel are stationary: 
 
𝐻1: 𝜌1 < 0,⋅⋅⋅, 𝜌𝑁0 < 0,𝑁0 ≤ 𝑁           (3.8) 
 
Table 3.3 summarizes the results of the IPS and Fisher panel unit root tests on the 
variables of interests in both levels and first differences. 
Table 3.3. Panel unit root tests 
 level first difference 
 IPS test Fisher test IPS test Fisher test 
 W-t-bar p-value Z-statistic p-value W-t-bar p-value Z-statistic p-value 
lnrgdp 25.24 1.00 24.93 1.00 -20.68** 0.00 -18.99**  0.00 
lnk 16.18 1.00 15.39 1.00 -9.74** 0.00 -8.64** 0.00 
lnl -0.90 0.18 -0.49 0.31 -34.66** 0.00 -26.07** 0.00 
lnhwy_density 4.06 1.00 5.42 1.00 -38.27** 0.00 -31.02** 0.00 
lnhp 9.84 1.00 10.54 1.00 -36.81** 0.00 -30.57** 0.00 
lnrp -1.52* 0.06 1.44 0.93 -39.96** 0.00 -31.06** 0.00 
lnaprpop -0.63 0.26 0.53 0.70 -40.37** 0.00 -29.59** 0.00 
lnpp -0.54 0.29 1.17 0.88 -40.22** 0.00 -33.05** 0.00 
ur -0.13 0.45 2.78 0.99 -36.35** 0.00 -26.30** 0.00 
lnconr -4.03** 0.00 -2.87** 0.00 -37.42** 0.00 -31.26** 0.00 
Note: * (**, ***): significance at the 10% (5%, 1%) level. 
 
According to both tests, all variables are stationary at the 5% significance level 
in first difference. It is also clear that most variables contain a unit root in levels. Even 
though the IPS test rejects the null of unit root for lnrp at the 10% significance level, 
the p-value of the Fisher test remains large. However, both the IPS and Fisher tests 
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strongly suggest stationarity for lnconr. Thus, we conclude that all variables are 
integrated of order one except for lnconr. 
We proceed to test the existence of cointegration relationships. To this end, we 
test cointegration among two sets of variables, which are (lnrgdp, lnk, lnl, 
lnhwy_density, lnrp, lnaprpop, ur) and (lnrgdp, lnk, lnl, lnhp, lnrp, lnpp, ur)20. We use 
Kao’s (1999) and Pedroni’s (1999) residual-based tests. The Kao test assumes 
homogeneous cointegration vectors except for individual intercepts. The null 
hypothesis is no cointegration (e.g., the residuals from the first-step spurious 
regression contain a unit root). The Pedroni test is more flexible in assuming 
heterogeneous cointegration vectors in the cross section. Here we report p-values 
against the heterogeneous alternative since it allows individual AR coefficients in the 
residuals. The test results as summarized in Table 3.4 clearly reject the null hypothesis 
of no cointegration. Therefore, we conclude that the variables in model 1 and 2 have a 
long-run relationship. 
Table 3.4. Panel cointegration tests 
 Kao test Pedroni test 
ADF-statistic p-value Group ADF-statistic p-value 
capital based measure -17.06** 0.00 -10.22** 0.00 
traffic based measure -13.97** 0.00 -9.67** 0.00 
Note: * (**, ***): significance at the 10% (5%, 1%) level. 
3.3.2. Long-run relationship and short-run causality 
Given the cointegration relationship identified above, equation (3.2) no longer 
reflects the conventional causal effect of the covariates on lnrgdp. Instead, it should 
be interpreted as a linear long-run relationship among these variables. In this sense, 
the covariates in equation (3.2) are endogenous, because innovations in the dependent 
variable will be transmitted to the covariates through the common trend. Although the 
OLS estimator is superconsistent, it has a second order bias that results from 
endogeneity. Besides, the t-statistic does not have the conventional asymptotic 
distribution so that inference becomes difficult. Phillips and Hansen’s (1990) Fully 
 
20 lnconr has been identified as being stationary, thus not included. 
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modified OLS (FMOLS) and Saikkonen’s (1991) dynamic OLS (DOLS) estimators 
are designed to address these issues. FMOLS is a non/semi-parametric estimation 
accounting for endogeneity and serial correlation as well as high degrees of 
heterogeneity in the cointegrated panel (Pedroni, 2000; Witt et al., 2003; De Bois et 
al., 2007). In comparison, DOLS is a parametric estimation that controls for 
endogeneity by including lags and leads of the first differenced terms. Although Kao 
and Chiang (2000) suggest that DOLS is superior to FMOLS with a smaller bias, 
using DOLS may lead to severe loss in degrees of freedom as it involves adding leads 
and lags of the independent variables. In our sample with a short time span, the 
FMOLS estimator is thus preferred (Liddle, 2012) to examine the long-run 
relationship in models 1 and 2. 
Once the cointegration vector has been identified, we proceed to investigate the 
short-run dynamics of the system by using conventional vector error correction model 
(VECM)21. Denote the parameter estimates by ?̂?, the error correction term is the 
residual from the FMOLS regression, or 
 
𝑒𝑖𝑡 = ln𝑌𝑖𝑡 − 𝜃𝑘𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 − 𝜃𝑙𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 − ∑ 𝜃𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑗𝑖𝑡 − ?̂?𝑖𝑗                         (3.9) 
 
The pooled error correction model for variables of interest (lnY, and lnXj) is given by 
 
1 1 1 1 1ln ln ln ln lnit Y Y it YY it YK it YL it Yj jit Yit
j
Y c e Y K L X u    − − − − − = + +  +  +  +  +  
1 1 1 1 1ln ln ln ln ln .    − − − − −

 = + +  +  +  +  +jit j j it jY it jK it jL it jm mit jit
m j
X c e Y K L X u                    
(3.10) 
 
 
21 Recently, a few statistical methodologies have been developed to test causal effects in panel data. These include 
Dumitrescu and Hurlin’s (2012) panel causality test, Canning and Pedroni’s (2008) long-run causality test, and 
Kónya’s (2006) bootstrap causality test. All these tests are robust to cross-sectional dependence and structural 
heterogeneity. Unfortunately, none of them fits our empirical problem. The Dumitresch-Hurlin test is designed for 
pairwise causality between stationary variables, while Kónya’s test is designed for stationary panels. Therefore, 
they do not apply to our multivariate cointegrated system. The Canning-Pedroni test is designed for cointegrated 
systems, but it allows only two variables. In their context, the test based on the parameter of the error correction 
term is plausible, but inference will be difficult to make if there are more than two variables. 
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As usual, the short-run Granger-causality can be identified through a t-test on the 
corresponding γ parameter.22  For instance, the causal effect of transportation mode 
Xj on Y can be tested by the t-test on Yj, the reverse causal effect of Y on Xj can be 
tested similarly by the t-test on jY.23 
3.4. Empirical results and inferences 
3.4.1. Main results with panel FMOLS analysis 
Table 3.5 reports the main results from our baseline model and models with 
additional controls based on Pedroni’s (2000) panel FMOLS estimator. We contrast 
the two sets of estimates based on different measures of transportation infrastructure. 
 
Table 3.5. Panel FMOLS long-run estimates  
 Capital-based measure Traffic-based measure 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
lnk 0.502** 
(0.001) 
0.501** 
(0.001) 
0.501** 
(0.001) 
0.504** 
(0.001) 
0.502** 
(0.001) 
0.497** 
(0.001) 
lnl 0.211** 
(0.004) 
0.212** 
(0.004) 
0.210** 
(0.003) 
0.194** 
(0.009) 
0.196** 
(0.006) 
0.193** 
(0.005) 
lnhwy_density 0.063** 
(0.002) 
0.062** 
(0.002) 
0.061** 
(0.001) 
⎯ ⎯ ⎯ 
lnhp ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ 0.066** 
(0.002) 
0.064** 
(0.001) 
0.064** 
(0.001) 
lnrp 0.066** 
(0.001) 
0.064** 
(0.001) 
0.064** 
(0.001) 
0.060** 
(0.002) 
0.059** 
(0.001) 
0.060** 
(0.001) 
lnaprpop 0.022** 
(0.002) 
0.018** 
(0.002) 
0.018** 
(0.002) 
⎯ ⎯ ⎯ 
lnpp ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ 0.038** 
(0.001) 
0.037** 
(0.001) 
0.037** 
(0.001) 
ur 
 
⎯ 0.122** 
(0.005) 
0.121** 
(0.004) 
⎯ 0.117** 
(0.005) 
0.114** 
(0.004) 
lnconr ⎯ ⎯ -0.0001* 
(0.002) 
⎯ ⎯ -0.017** 
(0.001) 
fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
cities 218 218 217 219 219 219 
years 2000-2012 2000-2012 2000-2012 2000-2012 2000-2012 2000-2012 
N 2800 2800 2794 2843 2843 2843 
Notes: * (**, ***): significance at the 10% (5%, 1%) level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Dependent 
variable is lnrgdp. The estimation assumes heterogeneous cointegration relationship in the first-stage regression 
and heterogeneous long-run covariance matrices in the cross section. 
 
 
According to the estimates in columns 1-3, when transportation infrastructures 
are measured by physical capital, the output share of capital is 50%, and that of labour 
is 21%. In all specifications, both inter-city and intra-city transportations have 
 
22 Here we lag the first differences by only one period because our data have a very short time span. 
23 Similarly, one can test Granger-causality between any pair of variables, but they are not our major interests. 
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significant impacts on economic growth. The elasticities of highway network ranges 
from 6.1% to 6.3%, that of railroad range from 6.4% to 6.6%, and that of intra-city 
transit range from 1.8% to 2.2%. The urbanization rate contributes positively to 
economic growth, and our measure of urban congestion is found to be negatively 
related to economic growth, both consistent with findings in the previous literature. 
However, lnconr is significant only at the 10% level in model 3 and the estimated 
coefficient is virtually zero. Note that lnconr is stationary in level, rigorously speaking, 
it should not be a component of the cointegrated system. It is thus not surprising to 
find the coefficient to be insignificant and small in size. When these control variables 
are added to the regression model, the elasticities of capital, labour, and transportation 
variables are generally reduced, but the changes are negligible. 
When we switch to traffic-based measures of transportation infrastructure in 
columns 4-6, the overall result is similar to the previous ones. Remarkably, the 
estimated coefficients on lnpp are twice the size of those on lnaprpop. The coefficient 
on lnconr continues to be negative, but becomes highly significant and much larger in 
size. 
Our previous discussions show that the capital-based measures are superior to 
traffic-based ones because the former is not only conceptually better but also less 
affected by multicollinearity. The unit root tests and empirical estimates both suggest 
that lnconr should not be included in the regression model. Based on these concerns, 
our future analysis will be based on the model in column 2. 
3.4.2. The short-run Granger causality 
It is clear from the FMOLS estimates that transportation infrastructure 
contributes positively to economic growth in Chinese cities, while how they interact 
in the short run remains unclear. We are motivated to show whether improvements in 
transportation infrastructure have any immediate effect on local economic growth 
which has strong policy implications, as China has been recently criticized for 
building too many highways and railroads without yielding expected social return 
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(Bai and Qian, 2010). If the infrastructure is found to have no immediate impact on 
local economic growth, then such policy is indeed questionable, and governments 
should divert resources to other needs. Notably, China’s economic growth has been 
identified as being investment driven, a large fraction of which was on infrastructure, 
especially transportation facilities (Demurger, 2001; Baum-Snow et al., 2017). It is 
thus intriguing to explore whether city growth has reverse causal effects on 
transportation infrastructure. Both tasks can be accomplished with the VECM model 
described in section 3.3.2. Here we focus on the causation between economic growth 
and individual transportation modes. Table 3.6 reports the estimates based on model 
2. 
 
Table 3.6. VECM estimates 
 lnrgdpt lnkt lnlt lnhwy_d
ensityt 
lnrpt lnaprpo
pt 
urt 
lnrgdpt-1 0.191** 
(0.018) 
0.036** 
(0.018) 
0.120** 
(0.037) 
0.053 
(0.077) 
0.301** 
(0.100) 
-0.093 
(0.070) 
-0.015 
(0.029) 
lnkt-1 0.180** 
(0.013) 
0.709** 
(0.013) 
-0.029 
(0.027) 
0.179** 
(0.056) 
0.061 
(0.072) 
0.082 
(0.050) 
-0.054** 
(0.021) 
lnlt-1 0.000 
(0.008) 
-0.009 
(0.008) 
-0.470** 
(0.017) 
-0.008 
(0.036) 
0.002 
(0.046) 
0.008 
(0.032) 
-0.009 
(0.013) 
lnhwy_densityt-1 0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.008** 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.008) 
-0.212** 
(0.018) 
0.013 
(0.023) 
-0.018 
(0.016) 
-0.004 
(0.007) 
lnrpt-1 -0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.006 
(0.007) 
-0.009 
(0.014) 
-0.176** 
(0.018) 
-0.007 
(0.013) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
lnaprpopt-1 0.011** 
(0.005) 
0.017** 
(0.005) 
-0.010 
(0.010) 
0.006 
(0.021) 
-0.006 
(0.028) 
-0.198** 
(0.019) 
-0.471** 
(0.020) 
urt-1 0.004 
(0.012) 
0.012 
(0.013) 
0.025 
(0.026) 
0.004 
(0.054) 
-0.033 
(0.070) 
-0.020 
(0.049) 
-0.471** 
(0.020) 
ect-1 0.053** 
(0.009) 
0.008 
(0.010) 
-0.135** 
(0.020) 
-0.180** 
(0.041) 
-0.215** 
(0.053) 
-0.097** 
(0.037) 
-0.059** 
(0.015) 
Notes: * (**, ***): significance at the 10% (5%, 1%) level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ect is 
computed as in equation (3.9), using the parameter estimates in column 2 of Table 3.5. 
 
The estimates in column 1 indicate short-run causal effect of other variables on 
real GDP. Highways and railroads are found to have no short-run effect on real GDP 
at all, but that of intra-city transit has a significant impact on real GDP. Intuitively, it 
takes time for inter-city transport infrastructure to generate the desired effect on 
economic growth. In contrast, there is immediate benefit from intra-city facilities. 
Investment in highways (lnhwy_densityt) exhibits negative serial correlation. This is 
also true for other types of transportation infrastructure. The estimates also suggest a 
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positive and significant feedback from real GDP to railroads, but the reverse causal 
effects on other transportation infrastructures are insignificant. 
3.4.3. The core and the periphery 
The NEG theories (Krugman 1991, 1992, 1993; Krugman and Venables, 1995; 
Baldwin and Martin, 2004) suggest that improvement on inter-city transportation 
infrastructure affects the core and the periphery in different ways. Our next step is to 
investigate this hypothesis within the current analytical framework. 
We define the core cities as tier-one and tier-two cities in the subdivision of 
Chinese cities. The classification, which divides all Chinese cities into four groups, is 
based on the following criteria: administrative power, economic size, population, and 
regional influence24. There are five tier-one cities25 which are either political or 
economic centers of the nation and thirty-five tier-two cities which are either 
provincial capitals or regional economic hubs. These criteria closely match the 
definition of the core in the NEG theories. For this reason, we divide our sample into 
a subsample of 39 core cities (tier-one and tier-two) and the other of 179 peripheral 
cities (tier-three and tier-four), and rerun model 2 using both the capital- and 
traffic-based measures. The results are reported in Table 3.7. 
  
 
24 The definition of tier 1-4 cities used in this article was developed by the Institute of Finance and Trade 
Economics of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Other institutions have their own classifications, but the 
definitions are conceptually similar. 
25 Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen. 
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Table 3.7. Panel FMOLS estimates in the core and the periphery 
 Capital-based measure Traffic-based measure 
Full sample Core Periphery Full sample Core Periphery 
lnk 0.501** 
(0.001) 
0.468** 
(0.002) 
0.502** 
(0.001) 
0.502** 
(0.001) 
0.475** 
(0.001) 
0.505** 
(0.001) 
lnl 0.212** 
(0.004) 
0.362** 
(0.006) 
0.105** 
(0.006) 
0.196** 
(0.006) 
0.260** 
(0.006) 
0.123** 
(0.010) 
lnhwy_density 0.062** 
(0.002) 
0.122** 
(0.003) 
0.059** 
(0.002) 
⎯ ⎯ ⎯ 
lnhp ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ 0.064** 
(0.001) 
0.080** 
(0.002) 
0.050** 
(0.001) 
lnrp 0.064** 
(0.001) 
0.164** 
(0.002) 
0.047** 
(0.001) 
0.059** 
(0.001) 
0.137** 
(0.002) 
0.046** 
(0.002) 
lnaprpop 0.018** 
(0.002) 
0.028** 
(0.004) 
0.011** 
(0.002) 
⎯ ⎯ ⎯ 
lnpp ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ 0.037** 
(0.001) 
0.119** 
(0.002) 
0.030** 
(0.001) 
ur 
 
0.122** 
(0.005) 
-0.023** 
(0.006) 
0.273** 
(0.008) 
0.117** 
(0.005) 
-0.027** 
(0.006) 
0.282** 
(0.009) 
fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
cities 218 39 179 219 39 180 
years 2000-2012 2000-2012 2000-2012 2000-2012 2000-2012 2000-2012 
N 2800 503 2297 2843 505 2338 
Notes: * (**, ***): significance at the 10% (5%, 1%) level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Dependent 
variable is lnrgdp. Column 1 and 4 are taken from table 3.5 (columns 2 and 5). 
 
 
Clearly, there are remarkable differences between the two sets of estimates. The 
estimated coefficients on transportation modes are 2-4 times larger in core cities than 
in peripheral ones, which shows strong evidence that the core cities benefit a lot more 
from improved transportation than the periphery, consistent with the theory. We also 
find much larger output share for labour in core cities, indicative of better human 
capital. The effect of urbanization rate is very different: it has a small and negative 
impact on economic growth in the core, but a large and positive effect in the periphery. 
Overall, the estimates from the subsample of peripheral cities are similar in size to 
those of the full sample. 
We also present the short-run dynamics of model 2 for the core and peripheral 
cities in Tables 3.8 and 3.9, respectively. 
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Table 3.8. VECM estimates for core cities 
 lnrgdpt lnkt lnlt lnhwy_d
ensityt 
lnrpt lnaprpo
pt 
urt 
lnrgdpt-1 0.308** 
(0.047) 
0.003 
(0.055) 
0.253* 
(0.149) 
0.368** 
(0.169) 
0.329 
(0.275) 
-0.330* 
(0.193) 
-0.398** 
(0.166) 
lnkt-1 0.106** 
(0.025) 
0.782** 
(0.029) 
-0.076 
(0.078) 
0.181** 
(0.089) 
0.021 
(0.145) 
0.152 
(0.102) 
-0.035 
(0.088) 
lnlt-1 -0.010 
(0.013) 
-0.010 
(0.015) 
-0.470** 
(0.041) 
-0.010 
(0.046) 
0.023 
(0.075) 
-0.020 
(0.053) 
-0.008 
(0.045) 
lnhwy_densityt-1 -0.005 
(0.011) 
-0.056** 
(0.013) 
-0.037 
(0.036) 
-0.229** 
(0.041) 
-0.037 
(0.066) 
-0.086 
(0.046) 
0.002 
(0.040) 
lnrpt-1 -0.014* 
(0.007) 
-0.012 
(0.008) 
-0.010 
(0.023) 
-0.030 
(0.026) 
-0.412** 
(0.042) 
-0.022 
(0.029) 
0.026 
(0.025) 
lnaprpopt-1 0.026** 
(0.011) 
0.040** 
(0.013) 
-0.037 
(0.036) 
0.045 
(0.041) 
-0.059 
(0.066) 
-0.190** 
(0.046) 
0.053 
(0.040) 
urt-1 0.008 
(0.014) 
0.021 
(0.016) 
0.033 
(0.043) 
0.020 
(0.049) 
-0.087 
(0.079) 
-0.060 
(0.056) 
-0.502** 
(0.048) 
ect-1 -0.001 
(0.017) 
0.033 
(0.020) 
-0.279** 
(0.054) 
-0.113* 
(0.061) 
-0.411** 
(0.099) 
-0.300** 
(0.069) 
-0.025 
(0.060) 
Notes: * (**, ***): significance at the 10% (5%, 1%) level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ect is 
computed by equation (3.9), using the parameter estimates in column 2 of Table 3.7. 
 
Table 3.9. VECM estimates for peripheral cities 
 lnrgdpt lnkt lnlt lnhwy_d
ensityt 
lnrpt lnaprpo
pt 
urt 
lnrgdpt-1 0.158** 
(0.019) 
0.047** 
(0.019) 
0.073** 
(0.036) 
0.038 
(0.087) 
0.274** 
(0.108) 
-0.096 
(0.076) 
0.025 
(0.019) 
lnkt-1 0.207** 
(0.015) 
0.688** 
(0.015) 
-0.000 
(0.028) 
0.163** 
(0.066) 
0.097 
(0.082) 
0.086 
(0.058) 
-0.045** 
(0.014) 
lnlt-1 0.004 
(0.010) 
-0.007 
(0.010) 
-0.472** 
(0.019) 
-0.009 
(0.046) 
-0.008 
(0.057) 
0.027 
(0.040) 
-0.005 
(0.010) 
lnhwy_densityt-1 0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.008) 
-0.211** 
(0.019) 
0.015 
(0.024) 
-0.010 
(0.017) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
lnrpt-1 -0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.000 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.007) 
-0.005 
(0.016) 
-0.129** 
(0.020) 
-0.004 
(0.014) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
lnaprpopt-1 0.007 
(0.005) 
0.014** 
(0.005) 
-0.006 
(0.010) 
0.003 
(0.025) 
0.007 
(0.030) 
-0.202** 
(0.021) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
urt-1 -0.012 
(0.023) 
-0.000 
(0.023) 
-0.000 
(0.043) 
-0.029 
(0.103) 
0.108 
(0.128) 
0.072 
(0.090) 
-0.408** 
(0.022) 
ect-1 0.082** 
(0.011) 
0.000 
(0.011) 
-0.066** 
(0.021) 
-0.219** 
(0.051) 
-0.187** 
(0.063) 
-0.013 
(0.045) 
-0.052** 
(0.011) 
Notes: * (**, ***): significance at the 10% (5%, 1%) level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ect is 
computed by equation (3), using the parameter estimates in column 3 of Table 3.7. 
 
The two subsamples exhibit very different short-run dynamics. At the 5% 
significance level, we are able to identify a causal effect from intra-city transportation 
(lnaprpop) to economic growth (lnrgdp) among the core cities, consistent with our 
findings from the full sample. We also find a reverse causal effect from real GDP to 
highways (lnhwy_density), but that on railroads (lnrp) is insignificant. In the 
subsample of peripheral cities, the causal effects of all transportation modes on real 
GDP are found to be insignificant, but the feedback from real GDP to railroads is 
positive and significant. These results are summarized in Table 3.10 below. 
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Table 3.10. Summary of Granger-causality tests 
causality Full sample core periphery 
highway → rGDP no no No 
railroad → rGDP no no No 
Intra-city transit → rGDP yes yes No 
rGDP → highway no Yes No 
rGDP → railroad yes no Yes 
rGDP → intra-city transit no no No 
Note: All tests are based on the 5% significance level. 
 
In all cases, GDP does not benefit from inter-city transportation infrastructures in 
the short run. This finding casts doubt on China’s current investment strategy. 
Intra-city transit facilities have a limited causal effect on GDP, at least in the core 
cities. The reverse causal effect is found to be significant for highways (core cities) or 
railroads (full sample and peripheral cities), but never for intra-city transit. Overall, 
we find evidence of asymmetric bidirectional causal effects between transportation 
and economic growth in the short run. 
3.4.4. Regional differences in the long-run effects of transportation 
Next, we extend the framework to subsamples of three macro-economic regions 
of the nation (the east, west, and central China) and present the estimates in Table 
3.11 based on model 2.26 
  
 
26 The division of the country into three regions is based on definitions provided by the NBS. East China includes 
Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong and Hainan. Central 
China consists of Heilongjiang, Jilin, Shanxi, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei and Hunan. West China comprises 
Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, Shan’xi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia and 
Xinjiang. 
 3.4. Empirical results and inferences 
73 
 
Table 3.11. long-run relationship by region—the east, center and west 
 sample 
Full sample east center west 
lnk 0.501** 
(0.001) 
0.504** 
(0.002) 
0.508** 
(0.002) 
0.463** 
(0.002) 
lnl 0.212** 
(0.004) 
0.440** 
(0.008) 
0.407** 
(0.014) 
0.126** 
(0.005) 
lnhwy_density 0.062** 
(0.002) 
0.043** 
(0.003) 
0.033** 
(0.003) 
0.160** 
(0.004) 
lnrp 0.064** 
(0.001) 
0.064** 
(0.002) 
0.028** 
(0.002) 
0.128** 
(0.003) 
lnaprpop 0.018** 
(0.002) 
0.014** 
(0.002) 
-0.029** 
(0.003) 
0.096** 
(0.003) 
ur 
 
0.122** 
(0.005) 
0.121** 
(0.007) 
0.296** 
(0.010) 
0.011 
(0.008) 
fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
cities 218 81 92 45 
years 2000-2012 2000-2012 2000-2012 2000-2012 
N 2800 1044 1184 572 
Notes: * (**, ***): significance at the 10% (5%, 1%) level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Dependent 
variable is lnrgdp. Column 1 is taken from table 3.5 (columns 2). 
 
Table 3.11 shows that in the eastern region, the economic impact of railroad 
investment is the largest (6.4%), followed by highways (4.3%), and intra-city transit 
(1.4%). The ranking of the three transport modes is different in the western region 
where the contribution of highways is the highest (16%) followed by railroads (12.8%) 
and intra-city transit (9.6%). In central China, the contribution of highways tops 
(3.3%) followed by railroads (2.8%). Surprisingly, intra-city transit is found to be 
negatively correlated to real GDP. Across the nation, the impacts of transportation on 
economic growth are found to be highest in the west, where the parameter estimates 
are 2-6 times higher than in the rest of the nation. This observation may indicate 
insufficient transportation infrastructure in the west. Even though cities in eastern 
China on average have better transportation infrastructures than those in central 
China 27 , the contributions of transportation are still higher in the east. This 
phenomenon may be explained by the fact that proportionally more of the core cities 
are found in the east 28 , which benefits more from inter-city transportation 
infrastructure than the peripheral ones.
 
27 Summary statistics show that the sample average of highway density (hwy_density) is 0.81 km-1 in the east and 
0.70 km-1 in central China. Similarly, the average passenger traffic volume by railroads (rp) is 7.65 million persons 
in the east and 5.31 million persons in central China, while those of intra-city public transit (aprpop) are 3.89 m2 
per person (east) and 2.21 m2 per person (central), respectively. 
28 Out of the 39 core cities identified in the full sample, 23 are located in the east, 10 in central China, and 6 in the 
west. 
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3.5. Concluding remarks 
Transportation infrastructure affects the economic growth in several ways. 
Researchers find evidence that it has positive impact on economic growth, 
productivity and leads to efficiency and urbanization. In this chapter, we analyse the 
role of transportation infrastructure in China’s economic growth at the city level, 
using a panel dataset comprising 219 cities for the period 1999-2012. We look into 
two types of heterogeneity, one by different types of infrastructure, the other by 
different types of cities. 
We consider three types of transportation infrastructure: highway density and 
passenger traffic volume by railroad are used to measure inter-city infrastructure 
while per capita area of urban paved roads is used to represent intra-city infrastructure. 
The panel unit root tests and panel cointegration tests suggest a long-run relationship 
among the variables of interest. To entangle the causal relationships in the 
cointegrated system, we conduct the analyses within different timeframes. The 
long-run relationship is identified by FMOLS regression that accounts for 
simultaneity and cross-sectional heterogeneity. We use the VEC model to study the 
short-run causal effects between transportation and economic growth. In the long-run, 
we find that both inter- and intra-city infrastructure have significant positive effects 
on the growth of cities which is aligned to our expectations. Different types of 
infrastructure, however, contribute to economic growth in different ways. Nationwide, 
the estimated contribution rates for highways and railroads are roughly 6% compared 
with intra-city transit at 2%. 
We also look into the effects of transportation on GDP among the core cities and 
the peripheral cities. The estimates clearly show that in the long run, the former 
benefit far more from the infrastructure than the latter from all transportation modes. 
The evidence thus supports the NEG hypothesis that the core-periphery disparity 
exacerbates as inter-regional transportation costs decrease. 
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Although all types of transportation infrastructure contribute to economic growth 
significantly in the long term, our short-run analysis with the error correction model 
yields mixed results. Nationwide, only intra-city transit Granger-causes GDP in the 
short run. The same is true for the core cities. We find reverse causal effects from 
GDP to railroads or highways, depending on the sample being used. 
   Finally, we look into the regional differences in the relationship between 
transportation and economic growth. The impact of transport infrastructure on 
economic growth is most pronounced in the west but less in central China. This 
suggests that coordinated investment in transportation infrastructure led by the 
government provides a partial solution to the economic prosperity of the most 
backward region in China, an argument made by Rosenstain-Rodan (1943). In 
comparison, with a higher level of agglomeration, eastern China benefits strongly 
from concentration of economic activities and infrastructure investments even though 
such infrastructure is abundant. 
   From the policy aspect, it may be advisable for the Chinese government to 
reconsider her investment strategy on transportation infrastructure. Cities seem to 
benefit from intra-city transit in the short run, but most of the long-term benefits are 
brought by inter-city transportation facilities. The government may prioritize different 
infrastructure depending on the timeframe of targets. Another tradeoff between the 
long run and the short run is in the western region, where transportation infrastructure 
is most productive in the long run but barely so in the short run. Finally, 
infrastructural investments are most productive in core cities at the expenses of 
peripheral cities. This raises the challenge for the government to strike a balance 
between regional inequality and efficiency. 
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3.6. Appendix 
Table 3.A.  Literature related to transportation infrastructure 
Study subject Methodology and data Conclusion 
Agbelie (2014). 
Investigated relationship between transportation infrastructure 
expenditure and its effect on GDP. 
Cross country (40 countries across the world).  
Random-parameters model. 
Dependent variable: GDP 
Variable of interest: Highway expenditures; Rail expenditures; 
highway density, railway density 
Other control variables: Employment, FDI, Industry in GDP, Service in 
GDP 
Highway and railway infrastructure expenditures and densities have 
positive impact on GDP. 
The magnitude, influence and resulting impact on GDP varies 
significantly across countries. 
Highway infrastructure expenditures have higher impact on GDP 
relative to railway infrastructure expenditure. 
Del Bo and Florio (2012). 
Examines the return to infrastructure in EU regions in a spatial 
framework. 
Data from 262 European NUTS2 regions in 2007. 
Log-linear with fixed effects. 
Dependent variable: GDP in purchasing power 
Variables of interest: Infrastructure endowment 
Other control variables: Physical capital, labour force and human 
capital 
Investment in information and communication technology, overall 
accessibility, quality and quantity of transport infrastructure has a 
significant and positive impact on GDP.  
Boarnet (1996). 
Examines how road and highway investments redistribute economic 
activity by dividing the economic impacts of transportation 
infrastrucure into a direct and an indirect effect.  
Data on California counties from 1969 to 1988.  
Fixed effects. 
Dependent variable: log (country output) 
Variables of interest: Street and highway capital stock in the county, 
street and highway capital stock in other counties 
Other control variables: Country employment, private capital stock in 
the county 
Street and highway capital is productive for counties. Results also 
show that ground transportation has partially opposing direct and 
indirect effects.  
Demurger (2001). 
Links between infrastructure investment and economic growth.  
Sample of 24 Chinese provinces (excluding municpalities) from 1985 
to 1998. 
Random effects, fixed effects and two-stage least-squares (2SLS). 
Dependent variable: Average annual growth rate of real GDP per capita 
Variables of interest: Geographical constraints and infrastructure 
endowments 
Other control variables: Level of real GDP per capita, matrix of 
variables to account for differences in reform implementation and 
economic structure, province and time-specific parameters 
Transport facilities are a key differentiating factor in explaining the 
growth gap and point to the role of telecommunication in reducing the 
burden of isolation.  
Fernald (1999).  
Correlation between public capital and productivity by focusing on 
roads, the largest component of public capital.  
Data on inputs and outputs for 29 sectors of the U.S economy for the 
years 1953- 1989.  
Seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR). 
Dependent variable: Value-added productivity growth 
Variables of interest: Sectorial vehicle intensity, growth in roads 
Other control variables: Gross output, capital, labour, materials 
Finds that when growth in roads (largest component of infrastructure) 
changes, productivity growth changes disproportionately in U.S. 
industries with more vehicles.  
Industry data from 1953 to 1989 strongly support the view that 
vehicle-intensive industries benefitted disproportionately from 
road-building.  
Melo et al. (2013). 
Meta-analysis of existing empirical evidence on the output elasticity of 
transport infrastructure. 
Pooled OLS and a maximum-likelihood random-effects estimator. 
Dependent variable: Output elasticity of transport 
Results indicate that the existing estimates of the productivity effect of 
transport infrastructure can vary across main industry groups, tend to 
be higher for the US economy than for European countries and are 
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Sample of 563 estimates (of output elasticity of transport 
infrastructure) obtained from 33 studies.  
higher for roads compared to other modes of transport.  
Yu et al. (2013). 
Examines the possibility of spatial spillover effects of transport 
infrastructure in Chinese regions.  
Data from a panel of 29 Chinese provinces for the period 1978 - 2009 
for which data is available on real GDP, private sector investment, 
employed population (labour input), transport infrastructure 
investment and public investment.  
Spatial Durbin Model.  
Dependent variable: Real GDP 
Variables of interest: Transport infrastructure capital stock.  
Other control variables: Labour input, private sector capital stock, 
public capital stock (except for transport capital stock) 
Results indicate that positive spillovers exist in each period due to the 
connectivity characteristic of transport infrastructure at the national 
level. At regional level, transport infrastructure spillover effects vary 
considerably over time among China's four macro-regions.  
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Chapter 4: High-speed rail and the new economic 
geography—Evidence from Chinese cities 
4.1. Introduction 
Progress in traffic and transportation technology has important consequences for 
urban development. A recently growing body of literature has analysed the effects of 
railroad construction on a range of outcomes, addressing the consequences of 
establishing HSR systems for a number of Western and advanced economies. 
Research analysing aspects of population growth, employment, housing price 
convergence and related industries has usually found evidence of large gains from 
reducing transport costs and increasing mobility because of HSR network expansion 
(Haynes, 1997; Pol, 2003; Preston and Wall, 2008; Willigers and Wee, 2011). 
The outstanding performance of China’s HSR after 2008 has led numerous 
studies to analyse the HSR’s effect on China’s economy and society (Wang and Lin, 
2011, Chen and Meng, 2013). However, these were predominantly descriptive 
discussions, were based on expectations regarding other countries’ experience in HSR 
development, or were case studies from a microscopic view. There has been a lack of 
macro-quantitative research. In recent years, some empirical studies analysing the 
Chinese HSR have begun to appear. For instance, Zheng and Kahn (2013) used 
city-level data during the period 2006 to 2010 to document that bullet trains help 
stimulate the growth of second- and third-tier cities. Through facilitating market 
integration, they found that high-speed trains were associated with increasing real 
estate prices in the nearby secondary cities. However, few studies have analysed the 
effect of HSR on distributing economic activities under the framework of the 
geographical economic model. Further, little attention has been devoted to the policy 
implications that arise from geographical economics, particularly in China. 
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This chapter first provides a detailed overview of the development of China’s 
HSR system in the period 2008 to 2014, and then sheds light on the effect of HSR on 
the spatial distribution of regional economic activity in China. In particular, it assesses 
the possible consequences for China’s internal economic geography to offer some 
useful and valuable policy implications to central planners. The analysis is firmly 
based on the NEG model, as it stresses the relationship between cities, rather than 
treating cities independently (Fujita and Mori, 2005). Three sectors—agriculture, 
manufacturing and housing—are considered in the NEG model, in accordance with 
Puga (1999) and Bosker et al. (2012). This study follows the work of Bosker et al. 
(2012) in considering the use of the NEG theoretical model to predict inter-regional 
labour mobility. Additionally, it closely aligns with Roberts et al. (2012) to evaluate 
the expansion of China’s transportation infrastructure to economic agglomeration by 
adopting a counterfactual approach. 
The full NEG model can be simulated by allowing a relaxation of China’s Hukou 
system, making us predict the consequences of improving transportation condition. To 
simulate the consequences of reducing transport cost to migration dynamics, the key 
structural NEG model parameters should be estimated first. To do this, we estimate 
wage equation followed by Au and Henderson (2006), Bosker et al. (2010, 2012), 
Hering and Poncet (2010a, 2010b), Moreno-Monroy (2011) and Roberts et al. (2012) 
as well as migration equation followed by Poncet (2006) and Bosker et al. (2012). 
The empirical strategy consisted of three steps. The first step estimated the 
equilibrium wage equation, which is central to the NEG model. By using a dataset of 
234 prefecture cities from 2004 to 2014 in China, we found that transport cost was 
negatively associated with wages, while the increase of market access simulated the 
rise in wages. The second step estimated the migration dynamics using 2010 
population census data. The regression results indicated that the higher wages and 
lower migration costs stimulated labour mobility. In the third step, the estimated key 
parameters from the wage and migration equations, together with additional 
information in other key parameters, were used to carry forwards some counterfactual 
simulations. 
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This final step differentiates our study from other related geographical economic 
studies for China. In this step, we aimed to answer one significant question: what will 
happen to China’s economic activities and internal economic geography when 
transportation is improved? We dealt with this question based on two specific 
questions: (i) What would have happened if there was no HSR? (ii) What happens if 
all HSR will be active? By combining the estimates of these key structural parameters 
in Steps 1 and 2, we simulated the consequences of improving transportation.  
We found that most of China’s economic activities tend to occur in the eastern 
regions of China, especially the relatively developed regions. Additionally, with 
consideration of the housing sector, the four highest-population cities—Shanghai, 
Hangzhou, Suzhou and Chongqing—demonstrate a trend of agglomeration. Following 
the introduction of the HSR, the degree of labour mobility significantly increased; 
thus, the inflow of labour mobility also increased, which illustrates an enhancement of 
the core–periphery pattern in China. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the 
concept of China’s HSR, the background of the HSR network expansion, and related 
studies on transportation and NEG model consisting of both western and eastern. The 
theoretical model is introduced in Section 4.3, while Section 4.4 describes the data 
and variables used for the empirical analysis. The estimated parameters of the wage 
equation are demonstrated in Section 4.5, while Section 4.6 estimates the migration 
equation. The estimates from Sections 4.5 and 4.6 are used in Section 4.7 to predict 
the real wages and generate the counterfactual simulations. Finally, Section 4.8 
concludes this chapter. 
4.2. Chinese HSR and related studies 
4.2.1. HSR development in China 
HSR in China refers to all high-speed trains in China built for 
passenger-dedicated lines with commercial use at a speed of 250 km/h (160 mph) or 
higher. The network is built to Chinese HSR standards, and trains on the route are 
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capable of running up to 350 km/h (217 mph) (National Railway Administration of 
the People’s Republic of China, 2008). China’s high-speed network has increased 
progressively over recent years. The first Chinese HSR was inaugurated in 2008 
between Beijing and Tianjin. Afterwards, China planned to expand its HSR system 
into a network of eight east–west and eight north–south corridors to provide better 
transport services for 1.3 billion Chinese people and support the receding economy. 
Five hundred and thirty-seven HSR stations had been opened and operated by October 
2016, which extended to 28 of China’s 31 provinces. The nationwide HSR grid is 
already the world’s largest, with 19,000 kilometres of track at the end of 2015, and a 
service exceeding 961 million passengers, seeing a sharp increase by 36.6% that 
accounted for 37.9% of the total passengers. In the years ahead, the envisioned HSR 
grid consisting of 16 corridors will be completed by 2030, as stated by Zhirong Fei, 
who is the head of the infrastructure department at the National Development and 
Reform Commission. When it is completed, the total operational mileage will 
accumulate to 45,000 kilometres and will connect all provincial capitals and cities 
with over 500,000 HSR services, which will represent more than double the current 
network (National Railway Administration of the People’s Republic of China, 2016). 
Fifteen countries and regions throughout the world had opened a HSR at the end 
of 2015, yet the operating length and background of HSR development in China has 
significant distinctions relative to the rest of the world. According to the international 
standards (on the basis of International Union of Railways [UIC]), the length of HSRs 
across 15 countries and regions at the end of 2015 is illustrated in Figure 4.1. China’s 
HSR boom is like what John Scales said, who is the World Bank Beijing senior 
transport specialist. He described China’s efforts to expand rail networks as 
unprecedented around the world: ‘Historically, this is the only country that has ever 
attempted such an increase’ (Railway technology, 2012). 
  
 4.2. Chinese HSR and related studies 
82 
 
Figure 4.1. Mileage of HSR across 15 countries/regions at the end of 2015 
 
Note: The 15 countries presented in the figure from top to bottom are the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Taiwan, Sweden, Russia, Korea, the US, Turkey, Germany, Italy, France, Spain, Japan and China. 
Sourced from the National Railway Administration of the People’s Republic of China and International Union of 
Railways (2016).29 
 
Figure 4.2. GDP per capita and urbanisation rate in 11 countries (various years) 
 
Note: Sourced from World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2016). The starting year of HSR is in 
parentheses. Left axis is per capita GDP, while the right axis is the urbanisation rate. 
 
29 (1). After 2013, China has no HSR statistics of international standards, yet they can be calculated according to 
the following. First, under the framework of conformity between China’s standard and the UIC standard in 2011, 
China’s HSR mileage is 9,790 km, as announced by the UIC, yet it reduced to only 5,133 km after the 
implementation of China’s new revised standards, followed by ‘Twelve-Five’. Second, after 2012, China 
implemented a batch of new southeast lines into operation, such as Chang Fu, Han Yi, Yu-Li and Heng Liu, with 
designed speeds of up to 250 km/h. These encompass more than 4,000 km, but are used for passenger and freight 
trains to share, which does not align with China’s new standard (National Railway Administration of the People’s 
Republic of China, 2016). 
  (2). The total mileage of HSR across the world is 17,166 km, with the unified standards by the end of 2011 in 
which is 9,790 km, constituting about 57% of the total mileage. With the rapid expansion of China’s HSR, the 
proportion of China’s HSR in the world’s total is further improved. According to UIC standards, at the end of 2015, 
China had moved up to 67.85% of the world’s total HSR mileage (National Railway Administration of the 
People’s Republic of China, 2016). 
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Figure 4.2 describes GDP per capita and the rate of urbanisation for a sample of 
11 countries when the first HSR line opened. This figure clearly illustrates that 
China’s HSR was constructed during a period of rapid economic growth, yet has 
remained at a fairly low level, compared with the other 10 countries. For instance, the 
2008 GDP per capita in China was only US$3,441.22, which remains a sizeable gap 
(three to seven times) with other countries in the 1990s, let alone compared with that 
of other countries (Netherlands and United Kingdom) around the same period.30 This 
implies great potential for China’s HSR passenger volume growth in the future, and 
demonstrates the important role of HSR in China’s future economic activities. 
Additionally, the rate of urbanisation in China stood at 46.54% in 2008, lagging far 
behind the levels of other countries in the range of 66.74 to 96.92%. Thus, Chinese 
cities are not only faced with the rapid development of external space, but also with 
the conformity of internal space (World Bank, 2016). 
In addition, regarding the speed of HSR construction and build-up time of its 
HSR network, there is a significant difference between China and the other countries. 
For instance, Japan, France and Germany started their second line construction after 
seven to eight years of operating their first line. In contrast, China started large-scale 
HSR construction in the fifth year after completing the first line. Therefore, this may 
lead to different processes and mechanisms of urban development (National Railway 
Administration of the People’s Republic of China, 2016; International Union of 
Railways, 2016). 
4.2.2. Related studies 
The contributions of transportation infrastructure have long been theorised by 
economists. Several pieces of research with Western contexts have found a strong 
positive effect of transport construction on economic growth and productivity at the 
aggregate level (Boarnet, 1996; Del Bo and Florio, 2012; Melo et al., 2013; Agbelie, 
 
30 The HSR construction in Japan was too early, so it was not included in the comparison. 
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2014). The experience of other non-Western nations has also illustrated such a 
relationship (Kustepeli et al., 2012; Yu et al., 2013; Hornung, 2015). 
High-speed trains, as one of the most important technological innovations in 
transportation improvements, have been discussed both theoretically and practically in 
recent years. For instance, Desmaris and Bouf (2015) used OLS to estimate the 
possible effect of HSR on French regions with regard to spatial equity. Their results 
illustrated a positive correlation with GDP per capita and demographic growth. 
Beyond that, they found that high-speed lines resulted in a peculiar and singularly 
unfair pricing system on the basis of intermodal competition and yield management. 
In addition, Albalate and Bel (2012) highlighted valuable lessons from five cases 
(Japan, France, Germany, Spain and Italy) that must be considered by policymakers, 
planners and transportation managers when building and operating HSR networks to 
solve traffic congestion and improve the environment. They concluded that economic 
activities might drain away and suffer a negative effect because of limited gains for 
the largest cities in the network, although this is not the case for intermediate-sized 
cities. Focusing on the effects of HSR on land cover change in large urban areas, Yu et 
al. (2014) examined Madrid’s Atocha railway station influence area and proposed an 
accessibility-based spatial mixed logit model, with panel data from 1990 to 2006. The 
estimation results revealed that the improvement of regional accessibility positively 
affected the urbanisation of land cover changes in the Atocha station area. 
In the context of China, Wang and Lin (2011) analysed the characteristics of 
HSR and summarised that HSR affects regional development from the perspective of 
spaces, cities and stations, and this effect is highly associated with the regional 
urbanisation level, as well as the characteristics and maturity of urban external 
passenger transport. Additionally, Chen and Meng (2013) reviewed both Chinese 
research and research from other countries by tracking the effect of HSR based on 
initial studies of its effect on the passenger transport market, and then examined the 
effect on the regional spatial structure and regional economic development. 
The growing body of literature on the evaluation of HSR has thus far devoted 
much attention to the role of spatial effect, yet the majority of the studies were either 
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descriptive papers or case studies. The existing empirical evidence on market access, 
core–periphery patterns, agglomeration and the diffusion of economic activity is still 
limited. Thus, the main contribution to the literature of this chapter is to use the NEG 
model and counterfactual simulations to examine the influence of improving 
transportation infrastructure and to understand the economic effects of government 
policy, which are not neutral across space. 
The emerging geographical economics theories (Krugman 1991a, 1992, 1993; 
Krugman and Venables, 1995; Fujita and Mori, 2005; Behrens and Thisse, 2007) 
provide deeper insights into the role of transport costs in affecting local economic 
activities. Puga (1999) emphasised that declining transport costs alter the strength of 
dispersion and agglomeration forces of economic activities within the NEG model. In 
other words, regional disparities are initially enhanced, and an agglomeration of 
activity increases before the final convergence is induced. Further, dispersion of 
activity arises if congestion costs exceed transport cost savings. The heterogeneity of 
cities explained by the geographical economics was also confirmed by Brakman et al. 
(2009), who contended that the improvement of transport facilities and the reduction 
of transport costs within a certain range enable the core cities to increase economic 
size and manufacturing share, at the expense of the less industrialised periphery. 
However, some contradictory evidence has been found in other empirical 
research. For example, Leck et al. (2008) used data extracted from the 1995 Israel 
census and concluded that the newly introduced rail links played an important role in 
enhancing the welfare of underdeveloped cities. Further, a new database of 
county-level transport costs was used to capture the changes in counties’ market 
access in the American economy (Donaldson and Hornbeck, 2016). Donaldson and 
Hornbeck (2016) studied the effect of railroad network expansion in the agricultural 
sector from 1870 to 1890, and found that the values of county agricultural land were 
positively associated with county market access, thereby stimulating population levels 
and consumer welfares. 
Research on the spatial patterns of transportation infrastructure and the existence 
and magnitude of regional interdependencies in the context of China is relatively rare 
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and still produces mixed results. Li and Ni (2013) found that reduced transport costs 
significantly stimulated the faster growth of core cities by factor agglomeration. 
However, a few counter-arguments states that the presence of transportation 
infrastructure offers advantages to less-developed areas and periphery cities. For 
instance, Lao et al. (2016) found that improvement of air transportation enabled 
central and western China to attain faster economic growth, rather than the eastern 
region.
Studies that use counterfactual simulations to investigate the effect of improving 
transportation were suggested by Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016) and Roberts et al. 
(2012). The former evaluated how railroads affect the American economy using data 
from 1870 and 1890. Through calculation of market access if railroads were 
eliminated or replaced with waterways, they found that railroads played a vital role in 
increasing market access and market integration to promote economic development. 
Counterfactual scenarios were also adopted by Roberts et al. (2012), who simulated 
the effect of the construction of China’s expressway network, using 2007 as the 
benchmark year. By analysing the pattern of regional inequality, they found that the 
expansion of the expressway was conducive to China’s economic development, as 
reflected by a rise in real income. However, the extension of the expressway grid 
seemingly enhanced the spatial inequality across prefectures. 
4.3. The geographical economics model and its policy implications 
4.3.1. The NEG model 
A flexible New Economic Geography model is used to investigate the 
equilibrium spatial distribution of both people and economic activity under different 
inter-regional labor mobility regimes. Different from most other research (Bosker and 
Garretsen, 2010, Krugman, 1991a; Krugman and Venables, 1995; Puga, 1999), which 
only included the two sectors of agriculture and manufacturing, the sharp increase in 
China’s living costs—mainly driven by the house prices of the top cities—led us to 
consider housing as an additional spreading force in our theoretical model (Hanson, 
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2005; Bosker et al., 2012). Given that the prediction of models with only two sectors 
(agriculture and manufacturing) can more easily lead to an unrealistic scenario of full 
agglomeration with perfect inter-regional labour mobility, we included the housing 
sector to be closer to reality. 
The model assumes that the economy consists of R (i = 1, …, R) regions and that 
each region has three sectors: agriculture (A), manufacturing (M) and housing (H). Li 
workers populate region i, and each region is endowed with Ki units of arable land 
and a stock of non-tradable housing, Hi. Arable land is used only by agriculture and is 
immobile between regions. Labour is used both by agricultural and manufacturing 
sectors, with perfect mobility between these two sectors within each region and 
between regions. Farmers produce a homogeneous agricultural good using arable land 
under constant returns to scale and perfect competition. It is described by a 
Cobb-Douglas production function, where θ denotes the share of labour in agricultural 
function. The assumption of a free trade-off of agricultural goods between regions 
implies that there is no transport cost for agricultural goods. Thus, the price of 
agricultural goods is the same in each region and is set as the numeraire. In this sense, 
any mobility of labourers from agriculture to manufacturing indicates obtainment of a 
higher wage. The fixed stock of land, Ki, together with the fixed housing stock, Hi, are 
regarded as the spreading forces to capture the congestion costs related to larger 
agglomerations. 
Manufacturing firms produce differentiated products—that is, each industry 
produces a unique variety of manufacturers, which implies that the firms are 
characterised by internal economies of scale and have monopolistic power. Shipments 
of the manufactural variety to all regions, including to foreign markets, are where 
‘iceberg’ transport costs (τ) occur. Iceberg transport costs in geographical economics 
imply that a fraction of the units does not arrive at the destination when goods are 
shipped between regions. That is, to ensure that one unit from region i will be 
delivered to region j, at least τij (> 1) units need to be shipped. One notable point here 
is that transport costs can be interpreted as many measures consisting of not only 
distance costs, time costs and freight costs, but also tariff barriers, information costs 
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and legal and regulatory costs (Bosker and Garretsen, 2010; Puga, 1999). In our case, 
the measurement of transport costs was associated with HSR, which made time the 
best way to represent it. According to Venables (1996) and Puga (1999), the producer 
demand for manufacturing is a Cobb-Douglas composite of labour and an 
intermediate aggregate with 0 ≪ μ ≪ 1 the share of intermediates, followed by a 
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) across varieties (i.e., σ > 1). As in Bosker et 
al. (2012), relative higher wages offered by some regions is a result of the differential 
of production efficiency (ci) across different regions, and these differences arise from 
factors such as economic structures and human capital. Meanwhile, a similar 
production efficiency of industries is assumed within the same region. 
Turning to the demand side, Cobb-Douglas preferences are owned by consumers 
over agricultural goods, housing and a CES aggregate of manufacturing goods with 
the Cobb-Douglas share of each good (where 0 < 𝛾𝑧 < 1;  𝑧 = 𝐴,𝐻,𝑀; 𝛾𝐴 + 𝛾𝐻 +
𝛾𝑀 = 1). For simplicity, it is assumed that all varieties enter both consumers’ utility 
and production with the same CES (σ). Maximisation of profit and utility combined 
with equilibrium prices and equilibrium demand gives the equilibrium wage of the 
composite factor of immobile production. The wage differential is the motivation of 
the mobility of firms and people, and firms’ and people’s corresponding equilibrium 
distributions depend on the assumption of no labour mobility between regions (Puga, 
1999). Based on Bosker et al. (2012), four equilibrium conditions are given in each 
region, i, if there is no inter-regional labour mobility—namely, Equation (4.1) for the 
manufacturing price index, 𝑞𝑖; Equation (4.2) for nominal wages, wi; Equation (4.3) 
for total manufacturers’ expenditures, ei; and Equation (4.4) for housing price, pHi: 
 
𝑞𝑖 = (
1
1−𝜇
∑ (𝜉𝑗𝐿𝑗𝑞𝑗
−𝜇𝜎𝑐𝑗
−𝜎𝑤𝑗
1−𝜎(1−𝜇)𝜏𝑖𝑗
1−𝜎))1/(1−𝜎) 𝑗        (4.1) 
 
𝑤𝑖 = 𝑞𝑖
𝜇/(𝜇−1)
𝑐𝑖
1/(𝜇−1)
(∑ 𝑒𝑗𝑞𝑗
𝜎−1𝜏𝑖𝑗
1−𝜎
𝑗 )
1/(𝜎(1−𝜇))
       (4.2) 
 
𝑒𝑖 = 𝛾𝑀(𝑤𝑖𝐿𝑖 + 𝐾𝑖𝑟(𝑤𝑖)) + 𝜇/(1 − 𝜇)𝑤𝑖𝜉𝑖𝐿𝑖        (4.3) 
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𝐻𝑖𝑃𝐻𝑖 = 𝛾𝐻𝑌𝑖               (4.4) 
 
The equilibrium price index of the manufacturing varieties in city i (𝑞𝑖) is given 
by Equation (4.1), where 𝜇 is the share of Chinese intermediate inputs in Chinese 
manufacturing production; 𝜎 is the elasticity of substitution between manufacturing 
varieties; 𝜉𝑖 denotes the share of manufactural labour force in city i, illustrating that 
the lower transport costs, the smaller the price index of industrial goods; 𝐿𝑗 is the 
labour force in city j; 𝑞𝑗  is city j’s manufacturing price index; 𝑐𝑗  is city j’s 
production efficiency; 𝑤𝑗 is the nominal wages in city j; and 𝜏𝑖𝑗 is the transport 
costs from city i to j. The nominal wage in Equation (4.2) is derived from the market 
equilibrium conditions of the equivalence of supply and demand (markets clear), 
where 𝑒𝑗 is city j’s income. Intuitively, firms located close to large markets can offer 
higher wages and perceive less competition. If we let 𝑒𝑖 in Equation (4.3) denote 
expenditure on manufacturers in region i, this implies that expenditures mainly 
depend on wage income and landowner rents, where 𝑟(𝑤𝑖) represents the rent earned 
per unit of land in region i. Equation (4.4) gives the equilibrium condition on the 
non-tradable services sector, signifying that the rise in house prices results in more 
income 𝛾𝐻𝑌𝑖 spent on houses, given fixed housing stock (𝐻𝑖). Note that the effect of 
housing price on labourers’ location decisions arises only if labourers are allowed to 
move freely between regions. Thus, if perfect inter-regional labour mobility is 
allowed, equilibrium conditions should consider real wage, since mobile workers can 
react to differences in the real wage between regions. Therefore, the equilibrium 
considering real wage equalisation is given by: 
 
𝜔𝑖 = 𝑞𝑖
−𝛾𝑀𝑝𝐻𝑖
−𝛾𝐻𝑤𝑖 = 𝜔             (4.5) 
 
Equation (4.5) indicates that real wages (𝜔𝑖) depend on both the price index of 
manufacturers, 𝑞𝑖 , and housing prices, 𝑃𝐻𝑖 . With a fixed supply of non-tradable 
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housing, housing prices are relatively higher in large agglomerations because of the 
larger demand for housing. In turn, regions with higher housing prices become less 
attractive to people, making them seek higher real wages elsewhere. This explains 
why the housing sector serves as a spreading force. Given that labourers can move 
between regions, they will move towards regions with higher real wages. The results 
of this type of movement are unclear, and we need to confirm whether spreading or 
agglomeration depends on some crucial model parameters, such as transport costs; the 
shares of agriculture, manufacturing and housing; and the initial allocation of 
region-specific land, labour and housing stock. 
The construction and development of China’s HSR system make labour mobility 
easier and seem to positively influence the region’s market access, since the transport 
costs reduce with the expansion of the railroad network. However, it is not exactly 
clear whether an improved transportation network contributes to either the 
agglomeration effect or spreading effect. The rest of the study will concentrate on 
some counterfactual simulation exercises through estimating key relevant parameters 
in wage equation and migration equation to explore the effect of China’s HSR system 
on economic activities. 
4.3.2. Effect of rail connections in geographical economics—pancake economy 
The construction of the HSR system across cities is like building a bridge over 
the sea, which can easily alter the spatial distribution of economic activities via 
distance and time reduction, as well as improved market access. It can be 
demonstrated as the racetrack economy proposed by Fujita et al. (1999), which refers 
to many locations in neutral space.31 Suppose that the circle of the racetrack economy 
is adapted with 12 cities, which is flattened to the ‘pancake’ shape demonstrated in 
Figure 4.3. The farmers and manufacturing workers are uniformly distributed between 
the 12 cities as assumed. This symmetric structure implies that the initial distribution 
 
31 Neutrality of space means that the locations are evenly distributed in a circle in which transportation moves 
only along the rim of that circle—that is, ‘neither location is preferred by construction over the other location, 
because the distances between the two locations are the same, and hence so are the transport costs’ (Brakman, et al., 
2009). 
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indicates a long-term ‘flat earth’ equilibrium and each city can host and produce 
one-twelfth of the economy’s total. 
When an active policy intervention is introduced, such as a change of 
infrastructure and transport costs, the consequences of this flat earth equilibrium 
distribution might be changed, which implies that the spatial allocation of economic 
activity might be altered or the agglomeration might be affected. Brakman et al. (2009) 
provided a simple policy experiment dubbed ‘building a bridge’ in the multi-region 
congestion model. As the name suggests, ‘building a bridge’ can be interpreted as a 
direct connection between two cities, reducing the distance between them. This 
indicates that the space in the pancake economy is no longer neutral, which is in 
contrast to the racetrack economy. 
When it comes to discussing the possible situations of building a vertical bridge, 
three cases are analysed as follows: 
1) a bridge between Cities 2 and 12 (analytically equivalent to a bridge between 
Cities 6 and 8), as illustrated in Figure 4.3b 
2) a bridge between Cities 3 and 11 (analytically equivalent to a bridge between 
Cities 5 and 9), as illustrated in Figure 4.3c 
3) a bridge between Cities 4 and 10, as illustrated in Figure 4.3d. 
The distance between the linked cities is assumed to reduce one unit in all cases. 
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Figure 4.3. The pancake economy 
 
Note: based on Brakman, Garretsen and Marrewijk (2009). 
 
The infrastructure project means that cities not directly linked by the bridge may 
benefit in terms of reducing their distance to other cities, which improves market 
access, expands labour markets and reinforces spatial agglomeration. As documented 
in Figure 4.3, Cities 1 and 7 never benefit from any of the possible vertical bridges, 
while the others do benefit from the bridge building, either directly or indirectly. An 
example in Panel b is the distance reduction not only between Cities 2 and 12 
themselves (which falls from 2→1→12 to 2→12), but also between Cities 2 and 12 
and some other cities (e.g., distance between Cities 2 and 11, which falls from 
2→1→12→11 to 2→12→11). As is intuitively evident, in comparison with bridge 
building in Panels b and c, the bridge between Cities 4 and 10 and the linked cities 
themselves leads to a larger reduction in average distance. 
Therefore, building bridges largely affects the distribution of manufacturing 
activity in a pancake economy, and leads to alteration of the equilibrium spatial 
distribution and considerable agglomeration of economic activity. Starting from the 
absence of a bridge illustrated in Panel a, the flat earth equilibrium is stable for the 
base scenario parameter setting, which is against economic agglomeration. However, 
once the bridge has been introduced, its effect is remarkably high, and the rationale 
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behind this is straightforward. It is assumed that manufacturing activity is evenly 
distributed. Given that the workers in the two cities at each end of the bridge are able 
to pay lower transport costs, this contributes to the highest real wage and thus attracts 
other manufacturing workers into the linked cities and expands the share of 
manufacturing production. It is important to note that the reduction of transport costs 
that results from building a bridge enhances the process of migration, yet also leads to 
more congestion and increases the attraction of demand in the more remote markets. 
These forces are balanced in the long-term equilibrium. 
4.3.3. HSR network and transport costs in the NEG model 
‘Building bridges’ in the pancake model, reflected in China’s city transportation 
construction, is one of the most important aspects relevant to the development of HSR, 
as shown in Figure 4.4. Suppose that A, B, C, D and E are five cities and a black line 
implies a direct connection between two cities through HSR. We first analyse three 
possible situations of HSR connections: 
1) direct HSR connection between two cities (A and B, A and C, A and D, and B 
and D) 
2) indirect HSR connection between two cities (B and C via A, and C and D via 
A32) 
3) no HSR connection between two cities (E and any of A, B, C and D). 
 
Figure 4.4. Example of HSR connections among cities 
 
 
32 C to D through A and B were not considered in our case because this would not occur in reality if C to D is 
available through A. 
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Based on this situation, particularly that of the third case (i.e., City E in Figure 
4.4 has no HSR station, so it cannot connect with Cities A to D by HSR), we used the 
benchmark rail network (see Case A in Table 4.1) to estimate parameters on transport 
costs and market access, and then to conduct a counterfactual analysis for simulation. 
Specifically, Case A computed transport costs between Cities I and J starting from 
direct HSR connections. For those cities without direct HSR, information on the direct 
K-train was used to compute transport costs. We then considered indirect HSR 
connections and updated transport costs for cities without direct HSR if it was lower 
than that of the direct K-train. Finally, the rest of the cities that owned neither HSR 
(direct or indirect) nor direct K-trains were treated as indirect K-train and computed 
based on travel information of the direct K-train. 
Case B (counterfactual) focused on the effect of the railway’s network in the 
labour market, where all trains were K-type. Different from Case A, in Case B, all 
direct HSR connections were ‘transformed’ into direct K-trains. If there was no direct 
K-train connection, then indirect K-trains were taken into account. Finally, Case C 
(counterfactual) actually focused on the effect of developing a HSR system between 
two locations. For that reason, again, we began with direct HSR connections. For 
inter-cities without direct HSR, we first considered whether a new direct HSR would 
be built to replace the system of the direct K-train, and what kind of effect this would 
have. We then focused on indirect HSR—that is, if the inter-city could not be 
connected via indirect HSR, similarly, what consequences it could have once new 
connections were established to replace the indirect K-train connections. We first 
focused on Case A to predict real wages, and then moved onto the simulations that 
compared Cases B and C. 
 
Table 4.1. Three cases of rail network for counterfactual analysis 
Case A 
Benchmark network 
Case B—counterfactual 
If all connections with K-trains 
Case C—counterfactual 
If all connections with HSR trains 
1. Direct HSR connections 
2. Direct K-connections 
3. Indirect HSR if transport cost lower 
than direct K-connections 
4. Indirect K-connections 
Assume direct HSR becomes direct 
K-trains (i.e., increase direct 
connections and frequencies 
accordingly) 
Assume all direct K-trains become 
direct HSR (i.e., reduce travel time 
accordingly) 
Note: Case A was used to estimate the wage equation to obtain parameters for simulation. Cases B and C aimed to 
conduct simulations based on the obtained parameters from Case A. 
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The measurement of transport costs is vital to perform counterfactual simulation 
exercises and investigate the effect of China’s HSR system on economic development 
within the framework of a geographical economics model. Given the inability to 
directly measure transport costs, in contrast to most existing empirical NEG studies 
that only used distance or travel time to proxy trade costs (see Breinlich, 2006; 
Hanson, 2005; Hering and Poncet, 2010a, 2010b; Mion, 2004; Redding and Venables, 
2004), we simultaneously applied the travel time and frequency of China’s HSR and 
K-trains to represent transport costs in this study. 
Two related questions arise with regard to the measurement of transport costs: 
Why should frequency be considered? Why is travel time preferred, rather than travel 
distance or ticket prices? One simple example can be used to explain the first question. 
The travel times from Beijing to Shanghai and from Beijing to Xi’an are 
approximately the same, while the former’s frequencies are almost double that of the 
latter. If either travel time or frequency is the only factor in designing trade costs, then 
it probably includes bias. This gives strong evidence that it is necessary to consider 
the frequency of trains. 
The reason that distance and ticket prices fail to measure transport costs is 
because of the different criteria for HSR and regular trains in China. Table 4.2 
displays some rules and features to identify the different types of trains. It can be seen 
that ticket prices and distance, as transport costs, are not significant anymore when 
calculated in Case A. The distance is similar via comparing HSR with the K-train, and 
the monetary cost of the K-train is even smaller than that of HSR because of the 
relatively lower price of the K-train per kilometre. This again highlights the 
advantages of using travel time and frequency as trade costs. 
 4.4. Data description 
96 
 
 
Table 4.2. Criteria of HSR and K-train 
Standard Ticket price Distance Travel time 
HSR 0.46 RMB/km Similar to regular train Speed of around 300 km/h 
K-train 0.05861 RMB/km Similar to HSR Speed of around 120 km/h 
Note: Price standard is based on economy class. 
 
Specifically, we proxied transport costs by a simple power transport cost function, 
which was given by: 
 
𝜏𝑖𝑗 = (𝑇𝑖𝑗 + 24/𝐹𝑖𝑗)
𝛿
             (4.6) 
 
where 𝑇𝑖𝑗  represents the travel time from city i to city j; 𝐹𝑖𝑗  denotes frequencies 
between two cities (i.e., the number of trains per day from city i to city j); and δ is the 
decay parameter. Equation (4.6) characterises the travel conditions across regions, 
which indicates that the higher the cost of travel (travel time) between two cities, the 
lower the accessibility between them. In contrast, more frequencies imply fewer 
transport costs. Considering the differentials in the city’s open date of HSR, the 
transport costs measured by HSR vary over time (s) and can be modified as follows: 
 
𝜏𝑖𝑗 = (𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑠 + 24/𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑠)
𝛿
             (4.6a) 
4.4. Data description 
Based on China’s current economic geography, China consists of four layers of 
regional divisions: provinces, prefecture-level cities, districts and counties, and 
townships. The construction of a railway system views the city as a carrier. We 
constructed a dataset covering 234 cities (of a total of 287 Chinese prefecture cities) 
in China from 2004 to 2014. The choice of number of cities was based on the status 
quo of China’s railway construction. At the end of 2014, 234 Chinese cities had 
established regular trains, while HSR only existed in 153 cities. Direct regular trains 
between cities accounted for roughly one-third, and direct HSR accounted for a 
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similar proportion. However, the HSR network was not fully contained by the normal 
speed network—12 of those 153 cities were outside the K-train network. 
The prefecture city data were collected from various data sources for the 
estimation of wage equation. The China City Statistical Yearbook and NBS of China 
provide information on cities’ incomes, real wages, expenditures, total employment, 
human capital, population density, population, and employment share in banking and 
finance. Baidu Baike was used to collect information on HSR stations in each 
prefecture city, including their opening date, to reflect changes in transport costs over 
time. Travel times and frequencies of HSR and regular trains between two cities were 
collected manually from the Railway Customer Service Centre of China 
(www.12306.cn). 
Since China’s migration flows were limited to provincial level data, we were 
only able to construct a migration dataset for 30 provinces to estimate migration 
equation. Migration flows at the provincial level were gathered from the 2010 
Population Census. Provincial real average wage was computed by urban income 
taken from NBS. Unemployment rate at the provincial level were collected from NBS 
as well. GIS information of province shapefiles, latitudes and longitudes was 
constructed to compute the distance between provinces used in the migration 
estimation. In addition, dummy variables regarding whether the origin and destination 
regions shared a common border or were in the same province were created according 
to GIS information. Table 4.3 provides definitions and summary statistics of all the 
variables used. 
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Table 4.3. Description of variables 
Variable name Descriptions 
Data to estimate wage equation:  
Nominal wages for city 𝑖 (𝑤𝑖𝑡)  GDP per capita 
City 𝑗’s income (𝑒𝑗𝑡) GDP for each city 
Transport cost between city 𝑖 and city 𝑗 (𝜏𝑖𝑗)  Travel time in hours plus 24/frequency 
City 𝑗’s wage (𝑊𝑗𝑡) GDP per capita 
Average wage outside city j (?̅?)  GDP per capita 
Share of employees in city j (𝜆𝑗𝑡)  Level of employment in each city 
Human capital for city 𝑖 (𝑋1𝑖𝑡)  Student enrolment in secondary education/total population 
Share of employment in banking and finance for city 
𝑖 (𝑋2𝑖𝑡) 
Banking and finance employment/total employment 
Population density for city 𝑖 (𝑋3𝑖𝑡)  City population of person per km
2 (logs) 
Data to estimate migration equation:  
Outflow migration from province 𝑖 to 𝑗 (𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑗) Total number of people migrating from province 𝑖 to 𝑗33 
Province 𝑗′𝑠 real wage (𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗) Real average wage in destination province 𝑗 
Province 𝑗′𝑠 unemployment rate (𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑗) Registered unemployment rate in urban areas in province 𝑗 
Distance between province 𝑖 and 𝑗 (𝑑𝑖𝑗) Distance between province 𝑖 and 𝑗 
Province 𝑖 and 𝑗 are neighbouring provinces (𝑁𝐵𝑖𝑗) Dummy variable = 1 if 𝑖 and 𝑗 are neighbouring provinces 
Province 𝑖 and 𝑗 are in the same province (𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑗) Dummy variable = 1 if 𝑖 and 𝑗 are in the same province 
Data in simulation (year 2010 as benchmark year):  
Number of houses in city 𝑖 (𝐻𝑖)  Share of urban population in city 𝑖 multiplied by national housing stock 
City 𝑖’s income (𝑌𝑖)  GDP for each city 
Labour force in city j (𝐿𝑗)  Total employment of city j 
Share of city j’s labour force in manufacturing (𝜁𝑗) City j’s employment in M/total labour force in M 
 
The first set of variables was used for the wage equation. The logarithm of 
prefecture city GDP per capita as the dependent variable was used instead of the 
average wage of workers or total wage of employees to measure wages to 
appropriately reflect wages in the private sector, following the work of Hering and 
Poncet (2010b). City income (GDP) was employed to proxy expenditure. The average 
wage was computed by all other city’s per capita GDP and used to construct a price 
index to estimate the wage equation. A number of factors that could affect wage level 
were considered. We first used population density to control for the degree of 
interactions in the city. We argue that this density is positively related to the 
productivity level (Bosker et al., 2012). The population density was measured by the 
population number divided by city area per square kilometre. Second, we controlled 
for human capital through the ratio of residents in higher education divided by the 
total population, as a higher-educated labour force is probably more productive 
(Breinlich, 2006; Hering and Poncet, 2010b). Third, the possible relevance of the 
economic structure of the city was captured by using the share of banking and finance 
in total employment for each city. Finally, dummies of city and time were included to 
control some fixed determinants that are unobserved in a city’s wage. 
 
33 Migration data were collected from the 2010 population census. Total numbers of people migrating were 
obtained from the population sampling from Long Table (9.5%), consisting of current residence, household 
registration and the places of household registration are other township, towns and street communities (person). 
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Table 4.3 also reports the variables used for migration estimation at the 
provincial level. The share of emigrants from province i to j were computed based on 
the outflow migration from i to j divided by the aggregated migration to province j. 
Following Poncet (2006) and Zhang and Zhao (2013), migration decisions are closely 
associated with expected real wages, the probability of employment in the destination 
and the costs of mobility. Therefore, the real income, unemployment rate, distance 
and dummy variables regarding whether cities were located in the same province or 
shared the same border were considered to explore their linkages with migration 
preferences. The fixed effect specific to the original province was included to increase 
the accuracy of the estimation. 
In addition, in accordance with Equations (4.2) and (4.4) in the NEG model, 
several additional variables reported in the last part of Table 4.3 were used together 
for the simulation. These included the share of city i’s urban population, national 
house stock, city i’s income, share of city j’s labour force in manufacturing and total 
labour force of city j. 
 
Figure 4.5. Distribution of population and employment (2010) across cities 
 
(a) Population share    (b) Secondary industry employment shares 
Source: NBS (2010) in Mainland China. 
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Figure 4.5 displays China’s distributions of people and firms at the prefectural 
city level in 2010. Cities that are blank indicate missing data. The darker the cities, the 
higher the cities’ distribution of people and firms. As indicated in Panel a, Chongqing 
had the largest population share, followed by two metropolises: Shanghai and Beijing. 
The east of China indicated the largest concentration of population. Cities in the 
central area of China, such as cities in Henan, Hunan and Anhui provinces, also held a 
large share of the population. In short, cities in the five provinces (Shandong, Henan, 
Hebei, Sichuan and Jiangsu) with the largest population shares accounted for around 
34% of the total population, and the three largest population cities (Chongqing, 
Shanghai and Beijing) accounted for roughly 5.6% of the total population. This 
distribution was important in the long-term equilibrium analysis of simulation in 
Section 4.7. In contrast to the distribution in Panel a, Panel b demonstrates a more 
spatially concentrated pattern—specifically, cities in the five provinces with the 
largest secondary industry employment (Anhui, Sichuan, Zhejiang, Jiangsu and 
Yunnan) contained about 62.6% of the total secondary labour force, and the shares of 
the three largest cities (Qujing, Yangzhou and Wenzhou) of secondary industry 
employment were around 23.7% in total. 
4.5. Estimation of wage equation 
Wage equation is central in NEG model and empirical work on NEG heavily 
focused on the estimation of the wage equation (Hanson, 1997, 2005; Redding and 
Venables, 2004). In the context of China, the estimation of wage equation was 
followed and supported by Au and Henderson (2006), Bosker et al. (2010, 2012), 
Hering and Poncet (2010a, 2010b), Moreno-Monroy (2011) and Roberts et al. (2012). 
We estimated the essential parameters of the NEG model first to evaluate the 
possible change of China’s economic geography because of the HSR construction. 
The vital parameter σ (elasticity of substitution between manufacturing varieties) 
related to market access was estimated by a log-linearised version of the equilibrium 
wage equation, given by: 
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ln(𝑤𝑖𝑡) =
1
𝜎
ln (∑ 𝑒𝑗𝜏𝑖𝑗
1−𝜎𝑞𝑗
𝜎−1) + ln (𝑐𝑖)
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡       (4.7) 
 
where the term between brackets implies market access, and 𝑐𝑖  denotes the 
production efficiency of city i, which allows for a productivity differential across 
regions in our model. In addition, we assumed that the error term (𝜀𝑖𝑡 ) was 
uncorrelated with the included independent variables. In particular, this efficiency 
term took the form of Equation (4.8) in our estimation: 
 
ln (𝑐𝑖) = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑡 + 𝜑1𝑋1𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑2𝑋2𝑖𝑡 +𝜑3𝑙𝑛𝑋3𝑖𝑡       (4.8) 
 
where the equation includes control variables in vector X, and city and year fixed 
effects (𝑎𝑖 , 𝑏𝑡). Controls include human capital, the share of banking and finance in 
total employment and the population density. 
Equation (4.7) is a log-linearised version of Equation (4.2) in the NEG model 
that has been simplified to exclude supplier access, 𝑞𝑖
𝜇/(𝜇−1) , considering that 
multicollinearity arises easily if market access and supplier access are included 
simultaneously (Redding and Venables, 2004; Hering and Poncet; 2010a; and Bosker 
et al., 2012). Equation (4.7) indicates that market access was associated positively 
with nominal wages—the better connected a region to other large regional markets 
(lower transport costs), the higher its market access. This indicates the crucial role of 
trade costs in explaining the spatial distribution of wages. 
Given that cities’ manufacturing price index (qj) in Equation (4.7) could not be 
observed directly in the market access term, we instead measured it with wages—that 
is, a weighted city’s own wage level and the average wage of all other cities: 
 
𝑞𝑗 = {𝜆𝑗𝑊𝑗
1−𝜎 + (1 − 𝜆𝑗)(?̅?𝜏𝑗,𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒
𝛿 )1−𝜎}
1
1−𝜎        (4.9) 
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where λj is the share of employment in city j; ?̅? is the average wage level, except for 
city j; and 𝜏𝑗,𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒 is the transport cost between city j and its nearest metropolises 
(Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou). The estimated results in Equation (4.7) were 
used as a benchmark to explore the effect of market access on wage levels. More 
importantly, the obtained parameters were used as inputs for the simulation analysis 
in Section 4.7. 
Two basic empirical strategies for the estimation of wage equation have been 
provided. The first strategy stemmed from Redding and Venables (2004), and uses 
bilateral trade data to construct a measure of market access that is then included in the 
estimation of the wage equation. Studies that followed this estimation strategy include 
Hering and Poncet (2010a, 2010b) and Ma (2006). All these studies used data on 
inter-provincial trade in China. The second strategy, introduced by Hanson (2005), 
uses nonlinear estimation techniques to estimate the wage equation directly. This 
strategy was used by Bosker et al. (2012) and Mion (2004). The second strategy was 
preferred in our study, since we possessed wage data at the city level. Generally, use 
of the first strategy was not possible because bilateral trade data in China could only 
be accessed at the provincial level, and was unavailable at the prefecture city level to 
cover our sample sufficiently. A similar strategy of direct estimation regarding market 
access was also adopted by Amiti and Javorcik (2008), Fingleton (2006) and Au and 
Henderson (2006). 
Using nonlinear estimation techniques, the baseline results from the estimation 
of Equation (4.7) are presented in Table 4.4. The results verified the sensitivity of the 
estimated market access coefficient with respect to the reduction of trade costs. 
 
Table 4.4. Results for wage equation estimation across cities 
Variables Coefficients 
Sigma 3.796*** (0.34) 
Delta 0.602*** (0.04) 
Ln (population density) 0.259*** (0.02) 
Human capital 1.456*** (0.10) 
Share of banking and finance in total prefecture city employment 0.419*** (0.01) 
Sample period 2004–2014 
Number of observations 2,574 
Fixed effects City and year 
Note: White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are between brackets. All parameters and coefficients are 
significant at the 1% level. 
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Our panel NLS estimation illustrated that all parameters and coefficients were 
significant at the 1% significant level. The coefficient of market access was 0.263 (=
1/σ = 1/3.796), which indicated a change in the nominal wage levels of 0.263% in 
reaction to a change in the domestic component of market access. This confirms that 
market access is an important way to explain the wage differences between prefecture 
cities in China. This result is consistent with the work of Moreno Monroy (2011) 
(NLS without fixed effects, MA coefficient ≈ 0.25) and Bosker et al. (2012) (NLS 
with fixed effects, MA coefficient ≈ 0.17). The transport cost parameter, δ, was 0.602, 
which is similar to the findings of Au and Henderson (2006) (NLS without fixed 
effects, δ = 0.87) and Bosker et al. (2012) (NLS with fixed effects, δ = 0.632). 
The estimates of all control variables were positive and significant at the 1% 
significance level. Specifically, population density was estimated to play a role in 
wages: a 1% increase in population density increased wages by approximately 0.26%. 
The relatively large coefficient of human capital (1.46) indicated that it is an 
important determinant of wage level. These results are similar to the suggestions of 
Bosker et al. (2012), Bosker and Garretsen (2010) and Hering and Poncet (2010a). 
Additionally, a 1% rise in the share of banking and finance in total employment 
contributed 0.42% to wages. 
The estimated results confirmed the relationship between market access and 
wage level, yet did not provide any information about how China’s future internal 
economic geography may be affected by the development of HSR and the reduction 
of transport costs. Therefore, after estimating the parameters, we moved onto the 
prediction of wages on the basis of the complete NEG model. Following this, the 
wage differential matrices were used to predict the migration patterns. 
4.6. Estimation of migration equation 
The second important equation dominated the regional migration dynamics of 
the model in 2010, given by Poncet (2006): 
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ln
𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑗
∑ 𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑗
= 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑗 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽4𝑁𝐵𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗  
(4.10) 
 
where 𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑗 is the outflow migration from province i to j, including intra-provincial 
migration in j; 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗  is the real wage in province j; 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑗  denotes the 
unemployment rate in province j; 𝑑𝑖𝑗  is the distance between home and host 
locations; 𝑁𝐵𝑖𝑗 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if province i and j are neighbouring 
provinces; 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑗 is also a dummy variable equal to 1 if i and j are in the same 
province; 𝛼𝑖 is a fixed effect specific to the original province i; and 𝜖𝑖𝑗 is an error 
term. 
We estimated Equation (4.10) using a cross-sectional dataset of migratory flows 
between and within 30 34  Chinese provinces, where fixed effects of originated 
provinces were controlled as their specific features. The results of the migration 
estimation are presented in Table 4.5. 
 
Table 4.5. Results for migration equation estimation across provinces 
Variables Coefficients 
Ln (real average wage) 1.299***(0.13) 
Ln (unemployment rate) ˗0.503***(0.13) 
Ln (distance) ˗0.924***(0.06) 
Neighbouring provinces 0.393***(0.10) 
Intra-provinces 2.847***(0.17) 
Sample period 2010 
Number of observations 795 
Fixed effects Province 
Note: Standard errors between brackets. All parameters and coefficients are significant at the 1% level. 
 
Our panel linear least squares estimation with fixed effects indicated that 
expected income in destination provinces was positively associated with migration 
dynamics—that is, a 1% rise of the expected average wage of the destination province 
boosted labour mobility to this province by 1.3%. The probability of finding a job also 
had a positive relationship with labour mobility. In terms of migration costs, our 
results were similar to Poncet (2006) and Zhang and Zhao (2013), thereby confirming 
that long distances limit workers’ migration, and there is a strong intra-province 
preference of migration.
 
34 Tibet was excluded from our dataset because of the unavailability of data. 
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4.7. Simulation 
After estimating the wage equation and migration equation (see Tables 4.4 and 
4.5), we were able to mimic the real-life distribution of economic activity in a 
benchmark year and start the counterfactual simulation of the effects of HSR on 
China’s economic geography. To complete this counterfactual analysis, two scenarios 
were compared: the case without HSR (Case B—regular railway network in 234 
prefecture cities) and the case with HSR only (Case C). 
Equations (4.2) and (4.4) were first replaced in Equation (4.5), which were used 
for the prediction of real wages: 
 
𝜔𝑖 = (
𝛾𝐻𝑌𝑖
𝐻𝑖
)−𝛾𝐻𝑞𝑖
𝜇
𝜇−1
−𝛾𝑀𝑐𝑖
1
1−𝜇 [∑ 𝑒𝑗𝑞𝑗
𝜎−1𝜏𝑖𝑗
1−𝜎]
1
𝜎(1−𝜇)      (4.11) 
 
where 𝑌𝑖 is city i’s income and 𝐻𝑖 is housing stock in city i. In addition, as with 𝑞𝑖, 
𝑞𝑗 and 𝜏𝑖𝑗 have been expressed in Equations (4.1), (4.9) and (4.6), respectively, and 
were plugged into Equation (4.11) to conduct a prediction. 
Once the real wage was predicted for all 234 cities, this was then used in the 
dynamic equation: 
 
Δ𝜆𝑖
𝜆𝑖
= 𝜓∑𝑚𝑖𝑗  ;   𝑚𝑖𝑗 = {
   (|𝜔𝑖 − 𝜔𝑗|)
𝛽1
𝐷𝑖𝑗
𝛽2
𝑒𝛽3 𝑁𝐵𝑖𝑗   𝑖𝑓 𝜔𝑖 > 𝜔𝑗
(−|𝜔𝑖 − 𝜔𝑗|)
𝛽1
𝐷𝑖𝑗
𝛽2
𝑒𝛽3 𝑁𝐵𝑖𝑗   𝑖𝑓 𝜔𝑖 < 𝜔𝑗
   (4.12) 
 
where 𝑚𝑖𝑗 implies the change in the share of a city’s total population resulting from 
immigration from another city j with a lower wage or immigration to another city j 
with a higher wage, and 𝑁𝐵𝑖𝑗 is a dummy variable that indicates whether cities i and 
j are neighbouring cities. 
One more constraint is to set a minimum for the wage differential given by 
Equation (4.13). This is called the wage threshold and is set to 15%: 
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max(|𝜔𝑖 − 𝜔𝑗/𝜔𝑗|) = 𝑥%     ∀i, j            (4.13) 
 
With the provision of main parameters in Tables 4.4 and 4.5, the real wage in 
2010 could be predicted following Equation (4.11). The year 2010 was preferred as a 
benchmark because the newest census data in China were updated in 2010, and have 
the most information available on migration. More importantly, the number of HSR 
stations in China jumped from eight in 2008 to 77 in 2010. To some extent, the year 
2010 represents the rapid development of China’s HSR, and well reflects the 
development process of the national railway from a regular railway to a HSR. 
 
Table 4.6. Key parameter settings for the simulation 
Parameters Values Definitions 
σ 3.796 From Table 4.4 
δ 0.602 From Table 4.4 
μ 0.592 From input–output (IO) table: the proportion of intermediate inputs in manufacturing 
production 
γM 0.331 From IO table: the proportion of income spent on manufacturing 
γH 0.142 From NBS: the proportion of income spent on housing 
β1 1.299 From Table 4.5 
β3 ˗0.924 From Table 4.5 
β4 0.393 From Table 4.5 
 
As displayed in Table 4.6, the proportion of intermediate inputs in production of 
manufacturing (μ) and proportion of income spent on manufacturers (γM) were 
collected and computed from a regional IO table for China in 2010. We used Chinese 
intermediate demand for Chinese manufacturing by Chinese manufacturing firms, as 
well as Chinese final demand for Chinese manufacturing as a share of the total final 
demand for Chinese output to calculate the values of μ (0.592) and γM (0.331), 
respectively. Additionally, the proportion of income spent on housing was calculated 
by sales in 2010 of commercial residential buildings, over the disposable income in 
that year, based on the NBS. In terms of the value of βs, we followed the work of 
Poncet (2006) and used China’s 2010 census provincial migration data to analyse the 
magnitude of Chinese labour mobility and its effect on labour migration dynamics. 
The empirical results were consistent with Poncet’s finding—that Chinese migration 
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patterns depend positively on higher wages, short distances and intra-province 
migration. 
After obtaining all important model parameters, we were in a position to 
generate the counterfactual simulations to see what would happen if there was no 
HSR (Case B) or if all high-speed trains were active (Case C). Based on Equation 
(4.12), we determined the directions of migration dynamics across cities, as 
demonstrated in Figure 4.6. Cities that appear in the two darkest colours indicate an 
inwards migration of labour, with the black part indicating the greatest concentration 
of labour. In contrast, the two light grey parts indicate the outflow of labour mobility. 
Compared with central China, the major labour force inwards movement occurred in 
the eastern regions of China, especially the more developed regions in the east. In 
addition, 66 prefecture cities had a positive share of work mobility in Panel b, which 
was slightly higher than that in Panel a (64 cities). Compared with Panel a, Panel b 
clearly indicates that the degree of labour mobility significantly increased with the 
development of transportation construction from regular trains to HSR, illustrating a 
trend of agglomeration towards developed cities. In particular, the number of cities 
with a larger share of population outflows (> 0.11% and the lightest grey) rose sharply 
from 19 in Case B to 127 in Case C. Similarly, regarding population inflows, the 
number of cities increased dramatically from eight cities in Panel a to 28 cities in 
Panel b if population share was greater than 0.34%. This indicated that the 
improvement of transportation enabled labourers easier access to nearby cities and 
markets. There will be an attractive agglomeration from less-developed cities to more 
developed cities. 
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Figure 4.6. Migration dynamics if transportation is improved 
 
(a) Migration direction: Case B (regular train only) (b) Migration direction: Case C (HSR only) 
 
By combining the change in a city’s share in the total population with the share 
of a city’s population in the total population, we were able to simulate the population 
shares in Cases B and C. The results are displayed in Figure 4.7, which provides some 
information about how China’s future economic geography may appear when 
considering HSR. In Panel a, there exists a clear ‘two areas’ shape regarding 
population shares of cities. One area refers to city Chongqing directly, while the other 
area is produced by Shanghai, Suzhou and Hangzhou. The big four cities based on 
population shares were Shanghai, Suzhou, Hangzhou and Chongqing (the lowest 
predicted population share was higher than 1.4%), which have a prime and dominant 
location in the centre of China’s economic geography. The rise of inflow of labour 
mobility in these cities would obviously enhance the core–periphery pattern in China. 
Particularly when the transportation conditions are improved (Panel b), the city with a 
high proportion of the population (greater than 1.4%) surged from four cities to 16 
cities, which again proved that construction of HSR strengthened the core–periphery 
pattern and enhanced the degree of agglomeration. Interestingly, most cities revolved 
around the ‘two areas’, followed by cities around Beijing and cities in the middle 
between Beijing and Shanghai (Zhengzhou and Shangqiu), such as Hangzhou, 
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Nanjing, Suzhou, Xuzhou, Changzhou and Jiaxing, which surround Shanghai, and 
Shijiazhuang, Jinan, Tianjin and Tangshan, which are located near Beijing. This 
indicates that the improvement in transportation has led to the development of urban 
agglomerations centred on big cities. 
 
Figure 4.7. Population shares (labour mobility 15%) if transportation is 
improved 
 
(a) Regular train only (Case B)      (b) HSR only (Case C) 
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4.8. Conclusions 
This chapter has provided a detailed overview of the development of China’s 
HSR system in the period 2008 to 2014, revealing the rapid development and 
achievements of China’s HSR network in recent years. More importantly, this study 
analysed the effect of China’s HSR system on economic activities under a 
geographical economics model. A wage equation and migration equation were used to 
estimate relevant parameters for counterfactual simulation exercises to answer 
questions such as: (i) What would happen if there was no HSR? (ii) What would 
happen if all HSR was active? 
To do this, we firmly based our analysis on the NEG model. Some of the 
evidence on the estimation of wage equation was first reported to support the 
empirical relevance of the linkages between wages, market access and transport costs. 
The empirical results indicated that the reduction of transport costs and increase in 
market access led to an increase in wages. Moreover, the effects of migration costs 
and expected income on migration dynamics were also investigated, indicating that 
the higher expected wage in destination regions and the shorter distance between the 
originating region and destination regions promoted labour mobility. Based on the 
estimates of these key structural parameters, we were able to simulate the 
consequences of improving transportation for China’s economic activities and 
economic geography. 
The counterfactual simulation of regular trains indicated that most of China’s 
economic activities occur in the central and eastern regions of China, especially in the 
more developed cities. Moreover, there clearly exist two big regions of large shares of 
inwards labour mobility (Shanghai, Hangzhou, Suzhou and Chongqing), showing the 
four largest population shares of cities. Once we introduced HSR, the degree of labour 
mobility significantly increased, as did the inflow of labour mobility. This illustrated a 
trend of agglomeration towards developed cities and an enhancement of the core–
periphery pattern in China.
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4.9. Appendix 
Here we provide the derivation of the equations (4.1) to (4.3) for the NEG model 
with three sectors. The derivation follows Bosker et al. (2012) and Puga (1999). 
 
Agriculture 
Farmers produce a homogeneous agricultural good using arable land under 
constant returns to scale and perfect competition. The production function is given by 
 
𝑦𝑖 = f(𝐿𝑖
𝐴, 𝐾𝑖)                                                     (A.1) 
 
where 𝐿𝑖
𝐴 is workers in agricultural sector, 𝐾𝑖 is the land endowment, and function 
f is homogeneous of degree one and is the same across regions. 
To maximize profit in each region, a function of returns to land is given by 
 
R(𝑝𝑖
𝐴, 𝑤𝑖, 𝐾𝑖) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑝𝑖
𝐴𝑦𝑖 − 𝑤𝑖𝐿𝑖
𝐴|𝑦𝑖 ≤ 𝑓(𝐿𝑖
𝐴, 𝐾𝑖)}                       (A.2) 
 
where 𝑤𝑖 is wage in region 𝑖, 𝑝𝑖
𝐴 is the producer price of the agricultural goods. 
The assumption of a free trade-off of agricultural goods between regions implies that 
there is no transport cost for agricultural goods. Thus, the price of agricultural goods 
is the same in each region and is set as the numeraire (𝑝𝑖
𝐴 = 1, ∀𝑖). R(𝑝𝑖
𝐴, 𝑤𝑖, 𝐾𝑖) is 
homogenous of degree one in 𝐾𝑖 because of constant returns to scale, which is given 
by 
 
R(1,𝑤𝑖, 𝐾𝑖  ) = 𝐾𝑖𝑟(𝑤𝑖)                                             (A.3) 
 
Manufacturing 
Given that manufacturing firms produce differentiated products under internal 
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economies of scale and have monopolistic power, firm’s profit function in region 𝑖 is 
given by 
 
𝜋𝑖 = ∑
𝑃𝑖𝑗(ℎ)𝑥𝑖𝑗(ℎ)
𝜏𝑖𝑗
− 𝑤𝑖
𝑀1−𝜇𝑞𝑖
𝜇𝑐𝑖[𝛼 + 𝛽 ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗(ℎ)]
𝑅
𝑗
𝑅
𝑗                        (A.4) 
 
where 𝑃𝑖𝑗(ℎ) is the price of a variety in region 𝑖, 𝑥𝑖𝑗(ℎ) is production of a quantity 
of a variety, 𝜏𝑖𝑗  is transport cost from region 𝑖  to region 𝑗 , 𝑤𝑖
𝑀  is the 
manufacturing wage in region 𝑖, 𝑞𝑖 is the manufacturing price index in region 𝑖, 
𝑐𝑖𝛼 is fixed costs and 𝑐𝑖𝛽 is the variable costs. 
 
Preference 
On the demand side, Cobb-Douglas preferences are owned by consumers over 
agricultural goods, housing and a CES aggregate of manufacturing goods with the 
Cobb-Douglas share of each good (where 0 < 𝛾𝑧 < 1;  𝑧 = 𝐴,𝐻,𝑀; 𝛾𝐴 + 𝛾𝐻 + 𝛾𝑀 =
1). It is assumed that all varieties enter both consumers’ utility and production with 
the same CES (σ). 
 
Equilibrium 
In the agricultural sector, the equation (A.3) gives the rate of return that 
maximizing profit per unit of land. Its derivation with respect to 𝑤𝑖 gives 
 
𝑟𝑤(𝑤𝑖) ≡
𝜕𝑟(𝑤𝑖)
𝜕𝑤𝑖
= −
𝐿𝑖
𝐴
𝐾𝑖
                                              (A.5) 
 
Given a Cobb-Douglas production function, where θ (0 ≪ θ ≪ 1) denotes the share 
of labour in agricultural function, we have 
 
𝑟(𝑤𝑖) ≡ (1 − θ)(
𝑤𝑖
𝜃
)𝜃/(𝜃−1)                                          (A.6) 
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Differentiating equation (A.6) and using equation (A.5) gives 
 
𝐿𝑖
𝐴 = 𝐾𝑖(
𝜃
𝑤𝑖
𝐴)
1/(1−𝜃)                                                 (A.7) 
 
The share of workers in manufacturing (𝜁𝑖), thus, is given by 
 
𝜁𝑖 =
𝐿𝑖
𝑀
𝐿𝑖
= 1 −
𝐿𝑖
𝐴
𝐿𝑖
= 1 −
𝐾𝑖
𝐿𝑖
(
𝜃
𝑤𝑖
𝐴)
1/(1−𝜃)                                 (A.8) 
 
where 𝐿𝑖
𝑀 is the number of labourers in manufacturing. This equation indicates that 
the share of labour in manufacturing in region 𝑖 is endogenous determined in this 
model. Analogously, total demand of agricultural goods in region 𝑖  ( 𝑥𝑖
𝐴 ) is 
determined by consumer preferences as 
 
𝑥𝑖
𝐴 = (1 − 𝛾𝑀 − 𝛾𝐻)𝑌𝑖                                              (A.9) 
 
In the industrial sector, the same profit maximising producer price is set by all 
firms producing in region 𝑖. Profit maximization by differentiating demand with 
respect to a firm’s own price, a constant relative mark-up over marginal cost is given 
by 
 
𝑝𝑖 =
𝜎𝛽
𝜎−1
𝑐𝑖𝑞𝑖
𝜇𝑤𝑖
𝑀1−𝜇                                               (A.10) 
 
where 𝑞𝑖 is the manufacturing price index in region 𝑖. It is defined by 
 
𝑞𝑖 = (∫ 𝜏𝑖𝑗
1−𝜎𝑛𝑗𝑝𝑗
1−𝜎
𝑗
)1/(1−𝜎)                                         (A.11) 
 
where 𝑛𝑗  is the number of firms in region 𝑗 and 
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𝑤𝑖
𝑀 = [(1 − μ)𝑛𝑖𝑝𝑖(
(𝜎−1)
𝜎𝛽
(α + β𝑥𝑖))](𝜁𝑖𝐿𝑖)
−1                          (A.12) 
 
𝑤𝑖
𝑀 is the wage in the manufacturing sector in region 𝑖. 
 
To maximizing utility of consumers, total demand for the production of each 
manufacturing variety is given with the iceberg assumption 
 
𝑥𝑖 = ∫ 𝑝𝑖
−𝜎𝑒𝑗𝑞𝑗
𝜎−1𝜏𝑖𝑗
1−𝜎
𝑗
                                             (A.13) 
 
The total expenditure on manufactures in region 𝑖 is 
 
𝑒𝑖 = 𝛾𝑀𝑌𝑖⏟
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟 
𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒
+ 𝜇𝑛𝑖𝑝𝑖(
(𝜎−1)
𝜎𝛽
(𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖))⏟              
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑟 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠
                    (A.14) 
 
where 
 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛾𝐻𝑌𝑖⏟
𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝑜𝑛 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔
+ 𝑤𝑖
𝐴(1 − 𝜁𝑖)𝐿𝑖 + 𝑤𝑖
𝑀𝜁𝑖𝐿𝑖⏟              
𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠
+ 𝑟(𝑤𝑖
𝐴)𝐾𝑖⏟    
𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓
𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠
+ 𝑛𝑖𝜋𝑖⏟
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠
𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠
          (A.15) 
 
Given firms zero profits, the unique equilibrium output is 
 
𝑥𝑖 = α(σ − 1)/β                                                  (A.16) 
 
Finally, the labour market clearing condition is given by 
 
𝐿𝑖 = [(1 − 𝜇)𝑛𝑖𝑝𝑖(
(𝜎−1)
𝜎𝛽
(𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖))]𝑤𝑖
𝑀−1
⏟                        
𝐿𝑖
𝑀
+ 𝐾𝑖(
𝜃
𝑤𝑖
𝐴)
1/(1−𝜃)
⏟        
𝐿𝑖
𝐴
               (A.17) 
 
The number of firms in region 𝑖 can be rewritten when labor demand equals labor 
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supply 
 
𝑛𝑖 =
𝜁𝑖𝐿𝑖
𝛼𝜎(1−𝜇)𝑞𝑖
𝜇
𝑤𝑖
𝑀−𝜇                                               (A.18) 
 
The long run equilibrium conditions shown in equations (4.1) to (4.3) in section 
4.3.1. under an assumption of no labour mobility can be derived with 𝑤𝑖
𝑀 = 𝑤𝑖
𝐴 =
𝑤𝑖 in equilibrium. Equation (4.1) for the manufacturing price index can be derived by 
substituting (A.10) and (A.18) to (A.11). Equation (4.2) for nominal wage can be 
derived by substituting (A.10) and (A.16) to (A.13). Equation (4.3) for total 
manufactures’ expenditures can be derived by substituting (A.10), (A.15), (A.16), and 
(A.18) into (A.14).
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Chapter 5: Conclusion and further research 
5.1. Empirical findings 
The main goal of this thesis project was to provide a comprehensive examination 
of the linkages between the public sector and economic performance under a spatial 
framework, and to contribute to the intersecting literature on innovative performance, 
transportation infrastructure and economic growth. The overarching purpose was to 
determine the critical determinants of improving economic performance. By doing so, 
this thesis aimed to provide testable theoretical and empirical research, predict 
China’s internal geography, and present targeted guidelines and policies. This final 
chapter of the thesis sums up the progress of these objectives and discusses some 
potential implications of the research findings. 
Economic growth benefits from innovation, while transportation infrastructure 
affects economic growth in several ways. However, which factors determine 
innovation? How does transportation construction influence economic performance? 
The first study (Chapter 2) concentrated on answering the first question through 
exploring whether the subnational leaders and agglomeration economy jointly shape 
innovation, while the latter question was addressed in Chapters 3 and 4. 
After controlling for the basic production inputs, our analysis unveiled a clear 
and significant role of meritocracy—a political philosophy that vests power in 
individuals based on talents, as well as merits—in sharpening the competitive 
advantage of city innovativeness, measured by patent applications. In the benchmark 
production function model, we found that R&D and both domestic and foreign capital 
and human capital enhance patent production. Notably, investment in neighbouring 
cities in domestic and foreign capital brings negative externalities to local innovation. 
In contrast, public spending on science, technology and education has positive 
spillover effects. A diversified industrial structure brings negative effect into regional 
knowledge and idea production. 
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Decomposition of bureaucrat-related variables into two main components—local 
party secretaries’ characteristics and the cadre appointment mechanism—provided 
theoretical and empirical implications for the research regarding the roles of local 
leadership in innovation. Many of the institutional variables show a strong significant 
effect on innovation. Well-educated young leading cadres with army experience, CYL 
experience or party education are more capable and incentivised to innovate. A 
municipal secretary whose previous work is in the same province is more likely to 
promote local innovation. Regardless of the institutional environment, turnover rate 
negatively affects city innovation; similarly, perceived promotion competition among 
city leaders measured by turnover rate plays a significantly negative role in enhancing 
innovation in the area. However, this negative effect can be moderated by either 
diversified or specialised industrial structure. Our findings provide rich implications 
for innovation-related policy making and the cadre appointment and selection system. 
In terms of the effect of transportation on economic performance, we split this 
study into two chapters—Chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 3 provided new evidence on the 
consequences of improving the different transportation forms for China’s local 
economic growth. Two types of heterogeneity were analysed. First, we employed 
three different modes of transportation infrastructure—highways, railways and public 
transit—where the first two refer to inter-city transportation, and the latter represents 
intra-city transportation. We found that, in the long term, there was a positive effect 
on economic growth from the improvement of all types of transportation 
infrastructure. However, different magnitudes of coefficients indicated the 
heterogeneous contributions of transport infrastructure to city GDP growth. Overall, 
the estimated effect of highways and railways were roughly 6% on local economic 
growth, compared with around 2% for public transit nationwide. Second, with regard 
to different types of cities, city specificities were significantly distinguished by the 
core cities and peripheral cities. The NEG theory was confirmed by our empirical 
evidence that the core–periphery pattern was enhanced by the reduction of transport 
costs. If we examined regional disparities, western China benefited most from the 
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development of transportation infrastructure, which suggests one viable approach by 
policymakers to foster the economic prosperity of this most undeveloped region. 
Following the analysis of Chapter 3, Chapter 4 investigated the relationships 
between China’s HSR system and economic activities. Based on the NEG model, the 
wage equation was estimated first. The estimated result indicated that the reduction of 
transport costs and the rise of market access led to an increase in wages. In addition, 
we also estimated the migration equation and found that the expected wage was 
positively associated with labour mobility, while labour mobility was negatively 
affected by the distance between regions. 
Finally, key parameters estimated by the wage equation and migration equation 
produced the outcomes of the counterfactual simulation that let us predict what 
outcomes a reduction in transport cost may imply for future population distribution 
and economic activity across China. The simulated results on both regular trains and 
HSR confirmed a more pronounced core–periphery pattern. Most economic activities 
occurred in the central and eastern regions of China, especially in the well-developed 
regions of the east. The mobility of labour would significantly increase if HSR was 
introduced, thereby indicating that the reduction of transport costs will play a vital 
role in China’s future economic geography. Beijing and Shanghai, with their 
surrounding cities, and Chongqing will further enhance their dominant position in the 
urban hierarchy of China. Megalopolis will drive the development of surrounding 
cities and probably develop into some urban agglomeration, led by megalopolis. 
5.2. Contributions 
The first study contributes to the economic geography literature by exploring the 
regional dimension of an institutional setting that depends on the local cadres’ 
characteristics, and their effect on regional innovation. Additionally, we examined 
how industrial agglomerative forces—such as diversity and specialisation—join with 
institutional elements to determine the city’s innovative capacities. The reviewed 
previous empirical work has presented a wide breadth of findings (He et al. 2016; He 
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et al., 2018), yet had limited exploration of these three important urban externalities 
on local innovative activities in an emerging economy context against the backdrop of 
bureaucratic incentives. Finally, we considered that the innovation process in cities 
might be open, interactive and reciprocal by drawing on local and neighbouring 
resources for idea creation and knowledge production; thus, we add to the existing 
literature (Driffield, 2006; Ouyang and Fu, 2012) by exploring the spatial spillover 
effects of FDI, knowledge capital, physical capital and human capital. Thus, this study 
fills the gap in this field and makes up for the deficiencies of the literature. 
The main contribution of the second study is twofold. We first made some 
inroads into transportation heterogeneity by testing highways, railways and public 
road infrastructure, which, to the best of our knowledge, has not been covered in the 
previous literature. For example, the relative flexibility and adaptability of highways 
is conducive to linking nearby cities, especially for the east and central regions of 
China, with dense populations and economic activities. Railroads improve 
transportation efficiency in areas such as the sparsely populated west, which reduces 
transport costs and leads to the probability of migration. Development inside the city 
also needs the support of good public transportation. These separate features of 
transportation call for prioritising projects and unambiguous plans led by the Chinese 
government. 
In addition, contrary to most previous studies that focused on China’s 
transportation at the provincial or aggregate level, we extended our study to the city’s 
economic hierarchy and geographical location. We not only emphasised the effect of 
transportation infrastructure construction of megacities on economic growth, but also 
considered the different modes of transportation that may bring varied consequences 
to regions or economic zones with different characteristics.  
The contributions of the third study derive from at least three aspects, all of 
which, to the best of our knowledge, have rarely been considered in the previous 
literature. Few studies have analysed the effect of HSR on distribution economic 
activities under the framework of the geographical economic model. Little attention 
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has been devoted to the policy implications that arise from geographical economics, 
particularly in China. Our study used the NEG model to address the relationship 
between cities, rather than treating cities independently (Fujita and Mori, 2005). The 
results provide some useful and valuable policy implications to central planners. In 
addition, the updated parameters through combining the estimation of the equilibrium 
wage equation and migration equation enhanced the accuracy of simulation to a large 
extent. 
Also noteworthy is that the study was extended to analyse the model-based 
predictions of what will happen to China’s economic activities and internal economic 
geographical pattern when transportation is improved. The full NEG model was 
simulated under two different regimes of transportation (regular trains and HSR). 
Through gaining insights on the simulation outcomes, policymakers will benefit by 
being able to prioritise projects that can further improve the efficiency of public 
expenditure. 
5.3. Political implications 
The empirical results in Chapter 2 provide rich policy suggestions on the 
practices of cadre appointment and selection, as well as government governance. First, 
promoting younger people with a good educational background and rich work 
experience into the cadre system will help the municipal-level government to weed 
through the old to bring forth the new. Second, a city’s innovation capacity is closely 
linked with a stable framework in the design and implementation of 
innovation-related policies. Frequent relocation of party secretaries among different 
positions may lead to inconsistent policy implementation, and thus impede the growth 
of innovation outputs. Additionally, the competition mechanism goes against 
innovation. This evidence signifies the importance of choosing an appropriate 
yardstick that inclusive of, but not restricted to, the required economic growth 
indicator to motivate local leaders in propelling urban innovation. The upper-level 
government should not only evaluate the local cadres’ output of one particular aspect, 
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such as economic growth. A balance between rotation and the cadres’ perceived 
competition is required within the cadre appointment system to enable benefits for 
long-term innovation and sustainability. 
From Chapters 3 and 4, some policy implications are worth discussing. Our 
findings in Chapter 3 suggest that, in the long term, the roles of transportation played 
by western China differ from those of the mid-east regions. The former may benefit 
more from infrastructure improvement. Hence, a choreographed policy of investment 
in heterogeneous transportation is required, drawing on a timeframe of objectives. In 
addition, infrastructure expenditure on core or peripheral cities should be balanced to 
improve efficiency and avoid aggravation of regional inequality. Further, the benefits 
of HSR development clearly outweigh those of conventional railways; however, 
determining where to invest and how to plan the HSR network appropriately will be a 
test for policymakers. 
5.4. Further work 
This thesis was sufficiently detailed to explore the effect of the public sector on 
economic performance spatially; however, several opportunities in each study can be 
identified as offering avenues for future research. 
In Study 1, our empirical results could be robust to the inclusion of some 
institutional factors at a higher administrative level (i.e., provincial level), since we 
considered the meritocratic effect as likely to be influenced by the higher level of 
China’s institutional quality. In recent years, with the acceleration of China’s 
market-oriented reform process, implementation of fiscal decentralisation and 
strengthening of anti-corruption efforts, we probably need to devote more 
consideration to strategic institutional reform at the national level. Provincial 
institutional policies directly follow national policies, also are the weather vane of 
prefecture cities. Therefore, fiscal decentralisation, level of corruption and 
marketisation might be considered to explore how the provincial institutional quality 
and local cadres together affect city innovation. In addition, in China, the party 
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secretary is the head of city leadership and takes responsibility for personnel, political 
duties and party affairs, while the mayor is the executive officer and is in charge of 
daily government operation and economic growth (Gao and Liang, 2016). We focused 
on the impact of party secretary, yet future research could include information about 
the city mayor to ensure robustness. 
In Study 2, one improvement of this study might be the consideration of policy 
shock (Diao et al., 2012; Wong, 2011). We argue that the accelerating transportation 
infrastructure construction, especially in 2009 to 2010, is also attributed to the 
massive fiscal stimulus introduced by the Chinese government to respond to the 
sluggishness of the economy after the worldwide financial crisis. China introduced 
more than ¥4 trillion (US$586 billion) of fiscal stimulus in the fourth quarter of 2008, 
which was implemented throughout 2009 and 2010 by the central government 
(around ¥1.2 trillion), local government and non-governmental sectors (around ¥3 
trillion) (Fardoust et al., 2012). This stimulus accounted for about 12.5% of China’s 
2008 GDP, and more than one-third of the stimulus (¥1.5 trillion) was allocated to 
infrastructure development and particularly to transportation infrastructure and 
energy. 
In Study 3, we can simply conduct a sensitivity check for our simulation by 
using the different wage thresholds, such as 5%, 10%, 20% and 25%, to examine 
whether the core–periphery outcomes would be altered. More importantly, we can 
make a comparison to the case without the housing sector in the NEG model to 
explore the influence of housing in China. 
In summary, this thesis provides a detailed treatment of the impact of public 
sector on economic performance. There is still considerable scope to develop the 
findings of the current results for further research. 
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